Kasper v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 December 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 63624,No. 4,4
• Citation: 412 Mich. 232,313 N.W.2d 904
• Parties: Theodore KASPER, Jr., Plaintiff-Interpleader Defendant-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Interpleader, v. Norma J. KASPER, a/k/a Norma Jean Kasper, Guardian of Jason Craig Kasper, Minor, Interpleader Defendant-Appellee. Cal.412 Mich. 232, 313 N.W.2d 904
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 904

313 N.W.2d 904

Theodore KASPER, Jr., Plaintiff-Interpleader Defendant-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Interpleader, v. Norma J. KASPER, a/k/a Norma Jean Kasper, Guardian of Jason

Craig Kasper, Minor, Interpleader

Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 63624.

Cal. No. 4.

412 Mich. 232, 313 N.W.2d 904

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued June 3, 1980.

Decided Dec. 21, 1981.

Irwin F. Hauffe II, Saginaw, for plaintiff-interpleader defendant-appellant.

Trogan & Trogan, P. C. by Nicholas R. Trogan, III, Saginaw, for interpleader defendant-appellee.

MOODY, Justice (for affirmance and remand).

This case involves the question of whether a provision in a judgment of divorce, which purportedly reflects an oral property settlement agreement that obligates one party to maintain a minor child as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy, may be enforced.

The trial court concluded that such a provision exceeded the statutory authority of the court and therefore declined to enforce it. The Court of Appeals reversed by peremptory order predicated upon the "clear precedent" of Krueger v. Krueger, 88 Mich.App. 722, 278 N.W.2d 514 (1979), lv. den. 406 Mich. 1003 (1979). This Court granted leave to appeal directing the parties to "include among the issues to be briefed: whether a term in a divorce judgment, voluntarily agreed to by the husband, requiring him to maintain his minor son as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, is enforceable by the son". 407 Mich. 948 (1979).

It is undisputed that Steven and Norma Jean Kasper had a right to enter into a property settlement agreement to resolve their differences pending a divorce proceeding. This purported agreement was confirmed by the court as a part of the divorce judgment. It has been recognized that a court may not compel one party to a divorce proceeding, i.e., Steven Kasper, to convey property to a third person, i.e., his son. However, a property agreement may contain provisions which a court may not otherwise have the power to compel the parties to perform. We hold that predicated on an agreement, rather than the court's separate power to adjudicate, the obligation of Steven Kasper to maintain his minor son as a beneficiary on a life insurance policy would be enforceable. The judgment of divorce indicates that Norma Jean Kasper may have bargained away other property interests in exchange for that obligation. Furthermore, it would be improper in this case to allow a collateral attack upon a divorce judgment after all benefits obtained under it were fully accepted.

As it is unclear whether the contested provision of the judgment was the result of an agreement between the parties or was imposed by the trial court, the matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I

Steven and Norma Jean Kasper had one child, Jason Craig Kasper, during the course of their marriage. The marriage was dissolved by a judgment of divorce on November 26, 1976.

The pertinent sections of the judgment are as follows:

"JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE

"This cause came on to be heard upon the pleadings filed therein, upon stipulation between the parties by their respective attorneys, that the plaintiff may take her proofs on the complaint as filed and the proofs having been taken in open court, on reading the complaint and hearing proofs from which it satisfactorily appears to this court that the material allegations charged in such complaint are true; and the court having jurisdiction of the parties, and being advised in the premises. (Emphasis added.)

"Now, therefore, on motion of Nicholas R. Trogan, III, P. C., attorney for the plaintiff, the court does order and adjudge as follows:

"ALIMONY

"That no alimony, temporary or permanent be awarded to the plaintiff.

"SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS

"The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff, through the office of the Saginaw County Friend of the Court, for the support and maintenance of the minor child, Jason Craig Kasper, the sum of forty-five ($45.00) dollars per week, commencing on Monday, November 8, 1976, until he attains the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever is the later.

"PROPERTY SETTLEMENT

"It is further ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff shall receive the Magnavox stereo and that the defendant shall repair said Magnavox stereo or pay fifty ($50.00) dollars toward the repair of said Magnavox stereo, whichever is less.

"It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendant shall receive all right, title and interest in and to the trailer owned by the parties located at 2821 E. Anita, Saginaw, Michigan, and the plaintiff shall forthwith assign and transfer all of her right, title and interest in and to said trailer. Defendant shall assume all indebtedness owing on said trailer.

"It is further ordered and adjudged between the parties that the defendant shall keep the minor child of the parties as the beneficiary on his presently existing insurance policy with Metropolitan Life until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years.

"It is further ordered and adjudged that the parties shall file their own separate income tax return for the year 1976.

"It is further ordered and adjudged that each of the parties shall receive absolutely all of their personal property now in their respective possession and shall thereafter hold the same free and clear from any claim on behalf of the other party.

"INSURANCE

"It is further ordered and adjudged between the parties that neither shall hereafter have any right, title or interest in or to the insurance upon the life of the other, except as herein previously indicated; and that in any and all other insurance policies, each of them shall be entitled to change the beneficiary to said insurance upon their respective lives, or other (sic) to deal with or dispose of the same without interference of the other of them."

Below the signature of the trial judge on the judgment appears the following:

"Approved:

"Friend of the Court

"(s) Steven Craig Kasper, Defendant

"(s) Robert J. Moskal, Attorney for Defendant".

In addition, a letter from the attorney for Steven Kasper dated November 17, 1976, was submitted by the appellant to the trial court. The letter states in part:

"Enclosed herewith is the proposed Judgment of Divorce in the above, which Mr. Kasper and I have approved. I trust that you will have the judgment approved by the Friend of the Court and signed by Judge McDonald at your earliest convenience."

After the judgment of divorce, Steven Kasper, contrary to that judgment, changed the beneficiary on his insurance policy with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company from Norma Kasper, his former wife, to his father, Theodore Kasper, Jr. On July 10, 1977, Steven Kasper died as a result of a motorcycle accident. Thereafter, Norma Kasper was appointed guardian of the estate of her son.

On February 21, 1978, Theodore Kasper, Jr., brought suit against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company seeking payment under the policy issued by Metropolitan Life. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company answered and filed a complaint of interpleader naming as defendants Norma Kasper, guardian of Jason Kasper, and Theodore Kasper, Jr. The insurance company admitted liability for ordinary and accidental death benefits arising out of the death of Steven Kasper and requested that the court determine the proper recipient of the policy funds. Metropolitan Life was discharged from liability.

Theodore Kasper, Jr., filed a motion for summary judgment based upon GCR 1963, 117.2(3), claiming that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that judgment in his favor as a matter of law was proper. Norma Kasper also filed a motion alleging that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the claim of Theodore Kasper, Jr., was barred by the judgment of divorce. See GCR 1963, 117.2(3) and 116.1(5).

The trial court granted Theodore Kasper, Jr.'s motion and awarded the proceeds to him, the designated beneficiary. Norma Kasper's motion was denied. The trial court determined that the provision in the judgment of divorce designating Jason Kasper as beneficiary exceeded the statutory authority of the court. The Court of Appeals reversed.

It is the position of the appellant, Theodore Kasper, Jr., that, except as otherwise indicated in the specific insurance provision of the judgment of divorce, either party could freely change the beneficiary on any insurance contract. He bases his argument on the statute regarding the disposition of insurance proceeds in divorce cases ¹ and the insurance provisions contained in the judgment. Theodore Kasper, Jr., claims that jurisdiction in divorce proceedings is strictly statutory and that this Court has no authority to enter a judgment that allows an award of property to third parties including making a minor child of the parties a beneficiary of an insurance policy. He relies upon a string of cases, the most significant of which include: Maslen v. Anderson, 163 Mich. 477, 128 N.W. 723 (1910), overruled in part by Newton v. Security National Bank of Battle Creek, 324 Mich. 344, 37 N.W.2d 130 (1949); Rex v. Rex, 331 Mich. 399, 49 N.W.2d 348 (1951); Flynn v. Flynn, 367 Mich. 625, 116 N.W.2d 907 (1962); and Yedinak v. Yedinak, 383 Mich. 409, 175 N.W.2d 706 (1970).

The appellee, Norma Kasper on behalf of her son, points to a different line of case law. It is her contention that the parties to a divorce proceeding have a right to make a property settlement agreement and be bound thereby. She urges that a court has jurisdiction and may confirm a judgment which includes provisions in the agreement which the court could not otherwise compel. She claims that the provision requiring Steven Kasper to designate their son as beneficiary resulted from an agreement covering all property interests. The agreement was specifically approved by Mr. Kasper as reflected by his stipulation that...