Kastis v. Mims
| Decision Date | 06 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:14-cv-01716-JLT (PC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | DIMITRIOS KASTIS, Plaintiff, v. MARGARET MIMS, et al., Defendants. |
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
(Doc. 1)
I. Background
This is Plaintiff's second case attempting to impose liability against Fresno County officials for allegedly confiscating legal documents from his cell on March 31, 2012 which were then turned over to prosecutors assigned to his pending state criminal case.
On October 16, 2013, the Honorable Lawrence J. O'Neill dismissed Plaintiff's prior case, Kastis v. Mims, et al., case number 1:13-cv-00361-LJO-DLB (PC) ("Kastis I"), without prejudice for failure to state a claim under section 1983. Plaintiff was precluded from seeking relief under section 1983 since a finding in his favor would necessarily have invalidated his conviction or sentence. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) ().
In reshaping his claims for the current case ("Kastis I"), Plaintiff explains that the issues have been "sanitized and isolated [from] having any relationship with Plaintiff's criminal case" and he omits former Fresno County District Attorney Elizabeth A. Egan, Deputy District Attorney Galen G. Rutiaga, and Fresno County District Attorney's Office employee Kevin Weins as defendants.1 (Doc. 1, p. 4.) Also omitted from this suit is Clovis Police Department Sergeant McFadden, who, based on an exhibit in Kastis I, executed the search warrant that was obtained following the confiscation of Plaintiff's legal material. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's assertion that this current suit is unrelated to his criminal proceedings, Plaintiff's constitutional claims still arise from the search and seizure of his legal documents that were turned over to prosecutors. (Id., p. 9.)
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee who is incarcerated at the Fresno County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Sheriff Margaret Mims, Captain Susan Watkins, Lieutenant Copher, Sergeants Stephanie Gibbs and H. Lara, Corporal Carrie Padilla, and Officer Gaad violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on March 31, 2012, jail officials conducted a "cleanliness inspection," during the course of which they entered Plaintiff's cell and inspected manila envelopes and expandable file folders containing Plaintiff's legal material. (Doc., p. 4.) Some of Plaintiff's documents were confiscated, purportedly because they contained explicit material which was discovered when the officer separated a stack of legal material in half to review for contraband. Plaintiff alleges that although the confiscated documents were described as being in a manila envelope, they were in a folder, making it impossible for the confiscated documents to have been discovered in a cursory review involving separating the stack of documents. Plaintiff alleges that the search and seizure of his legal materials violated his constitutional rights, and caused him "other injury" through their release to prosecutors.2 (Id., p. 9.)
Plaintiff's Complaint specifies neither the legal grounds for his constitutional claims, nor the basis of his "other injury." Therefore, the Court will address what appear to be possible bases for his claims in light of the nature of his allegations.
"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). "Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.
While "plaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ," Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" is not sufficient, and "facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" fall short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Plaintiff must identify specific facts supporting the existence of substantively plausible claims for relief, Johnson v. City of Shelby, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
If he chooses to file a first amended complaint, Plaintiff should endeavor to make it as concise as possible. He should merely state which of his constitutional rights he feels were violated by each Defendant and its factual basis.
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec'y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal connection, between each defendant's actions or omissions and a violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011).
The Ninth Circuit has held that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (...
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