Kaszubowski v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago
Decision Date | 11 June 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 1-91-3494,1-91-3494 |
Citation | 618 N.E.2d 609,248 Ill.App.3d 451 |
Parties | , 188 Ill.Dec. 39, 85 Ed. Law Rep. 142 Olga KASZUBOWSKI, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James D. Montgomery, Jean M. Templeton, James D. Montgomery & Associates, Ltd., Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Michael J. Hernandez, Asst. Atty., Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, Law Dept., Chicago, Iris E. Sholder, Atty. for Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago and the General Superintendent of Schools, for defendants-appellees.
The plaintiffs appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs' claims to recover money damages and injunctive relief against the Interim Board of Education of the City of Chicago (Interim Board or Board) 1 based on contract rights allegedly created by operation of law pursuant to the Illinois School Code. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 122, par. 34-1 et seq.) Plaintiffs and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In a memorandum opinion the trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that no contract rights were created by operation of law.
The facts are as follows:
In approximately 1985 the Board, pursuant to its statutory authority, had divided the Chicago public school district into 23 subdistricts. The Board employed a "superintendent" for each of these 23 subdistricts. 2 As of July 1989 plaintiffs-appellants Olga Kaszubowski, Aracelis Figueroa, Eleanor Pick, Howard J. Sloan, Frank Venutra, Herbert Schiff, Edith Dervin, Blaine Dene, Carol Wooley, Bernarr E. Dawson, James F. Moore, Norman Silber, and Reginald Brown occupied 13 of those 23 superintendent positions.
After the adoption of the School Reform Act (Act) and prior to the commencement of the school year in September of 1989, the Interim Board announced its intention to "combine" certain "subdistricts." As a result of this "combination," the 23 existing subdistricts were reduced to 11; of the 23 superintendents, 13 had their positions deleted (the plaintiffs in the present case). Three new individuals, who had not previously served as superintendents, were appointed to three of the 11 new districts.
On August 22, 1989, plaintiffs filed a complaint challenging the reduction in the number of subdistricts on three grounds. First, the superintendent-plaintiffs alleged that the reduction breached a purported employment contract between themselves and the Board. Second, the superintendent-plaintiffs alleged that the reduction deprived them of their "property" in those positions without due process of law. Finally, the parent-plaintiffs alleged that the reduction violated their rights as parents by reducing the number of elected parent representatives on the school board nominating commission, in alleged violation of the School Reform Act.
Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to forestall the implementation of this proposal. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' prayers for injunctive relief on August 30, 1989. Count III requested solely injunctive relief and was the only count which related to the parent-plaintiffs (who are not parties to this appeal). As a result the only matters that remained pending before the trial court were the superintendent-plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief and damages.
On June 29, 1990, plaintiffs-appellants moved for summary judgment, contending that no material facts were in dispute and that they were entitled to a judgment, as a matter of law. Plaintiffs alleged: (1) the School Reform Act established a contract between the superintendent-plaintiffs and defendants, (2) the Interim Board breached that contract by eliminating their former positions, and (3) the Interim Board lacked the authority to eliminate those positions. Plaintiffs asserted that paragraph 34-8.3(g) of the School Reform Act established their purported contract. Paragraph 34-8.3(g) provides:
"All persons serving as subdistrict superintendent on May 1, 1989, and all persons appointed as subdistrict superintendent after May 1, 1989, and prior to July 1, 1991 in a manner other than as provided by Section 34-2.5, shall be deemed by operation of law to be serving under a performance contract which expires on June 30, 1991; and unless such performance contract of any such subdistrict superintendent is renewed (or such person is again appointed to serve as subdistrict superintendent) in the manner provided by Section 34-2.5 3 the employment of such person as subdistrict superintendent shall terminate on June 30, 1991." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 122, par. 34-8.3(g).) . .)
Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The motions were briefed and oral argument was heard on October 16, 1990.
Before the trial court could render a written opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court released its opinion in Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education (1990), 142 Ill.2d 54, 153 Ill.Dec. 177, 566 N.E.2d 1283. The Fumarolo decision held unconstitutional the School Reform Act on the basis that the election procedure for the local school councils did not meet the strict scrutiny of the one person, one vote rule of law. Although the legislation contained a severability clause, the Supreme Court held that this constitutional flaw tainted the whole enactment because the local school counsel was the building block upon which school reform was based. Following the action of the Supreme Court and prior to a decision on the motion for rehearing on February 4, 1991, Pub.Act 86-1477 was enacted and became effective January 11, 1991. Pub.Act 86-1477 was enacted to remedy the constitutionally objectionable provision of the School Reform Act by providing for the appointment of all local school council members, subdistrict members, school board nominating commission members and Board of Education members by the Mayor of Chicago. Except for the foregoing change, the legislature readopted verbatim the remaining provisions of the former act, including section 34-8.3(g).
The trial court subsequently required supplemental briefs describing both the impact of the Fumarolo decision and subsequent reenactment of the School Reform Act by the legislature (Pub. Act 86-1477) to determine if the decision had bearing on the issues before the trial court in the present case. Both sides submitted supplemental memoranda and argument was heard on the supplemental issues on August 6, 1991.
* * * * * *
If the Court were to interpret Section 34-8.3(g) as creating vested contractual rights on behalf of subdistrict superintendents, the Court would be required to totally disregard the specific language in Section [34-18(7) ]. Had the legislature intended Section 34-8.3(g) to provide for vested contractual rights in subdistrict superintendents, it would not have empowered the Interim School Board to immediately reduce the number of subdistricts under Section [34-18(7) ].
The Court finds that a more logical interpretation of Section 34-8.3(g) is that that Section is merely a statement of policy to be pursued subject to the Interim Board's powers under Section 34-21.3(a) to implement an annual school budget."
The trial court held that the mere reference to "performance contract" does not suggest a legislative intent to create vested contractual rights. Finding its analysis compatible with the legislative intent of the statute, the trial court's opinion noted that Representative Levin, a sponsor of the Act, left no doubt as to the intent behind section 34-8.3(g). During the House of Representative's debates on the 1989 amendment to the School Reform Act, Representative Levin stated:
"That Section 34-8.3(g) the provision we put in last year that provides that performance contracts established by operation of law * * * that provision was not intended to preclude the interim board from reorganizing the number of District Superintendent positions nor does it require the Interim Board having reorganized the number of districts to pay the previous occupants of the District Superintendent position the salaries that they would have gotten if they should have continued in their positions." 86th Ill.Gen.Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1989, at 170.
Judgment was entered in favor of defendants on September 30, 1991. This...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Bell Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Wagner
...on the proper interpretation of a statute, we review the circuit court's ruling de novo. Kaszubowski v. Board of Education, 248 Ill.App.3d 451, 188 Ill.Dec. 39, 43, 618 N.E.2d 609, 613 (1993). At issue is the proper interpretation of section 1433 of the Act which states in pertinent "Any an......
-
Snyder v. Olmstead
...must not be rendered superfluous but must, if possible, be given some reasonable meaning. Kaszubowski v. Board of Education (1993), 248 Ill.App.3d 451, 457-58, 188 Ill.Dec. 39, 618 N.E.2d 609. Where the statutory language admits of two constructions, one of which would render the enactment ......
-
County of Cook v. LABOR RELATIONS BD. LOCAL PANEL
...the provision reasonable and sensible, the former construction must be avoided. Kaszubowski v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 248 Ill. App.3d 451, 457, 188 Ill.Dec. 39, 618 N.E.2d 609 (1993). The petitioners offer two conclusions regarding the intended effect of the 1997 amendme......
-
Mashni Corp. ex rel. Mashni v. Laski
...construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Kaszubowski v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 248 Ill.App.3d 451, 457, 188 Ill.Dec. 39, 618 N.E.2d 609, 613 (1993). Our duty when construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislatur......