Kattar v. Three Rivers Area Hosp. Authority

• Decision Date: 26 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 4:97-CV-147.,4:97-CV-147.
• Citation: 52 F.Supp.2d 789
• Parties: Divaker R. KATTAR, Plaintiff, v. THREE RIVERS AREA HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, Brad Solberg, Ro Jong Park, Kalamazoo Emergency Associates, P.C. and Andrew W. Latham, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

Page 789

52 F.Supp.2d 789

Divaker R. KATTAR, Plaintiff, v. THREE RIVERS AREA HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, Brad Solberg, Ro Jong Park, Kalamazoo Emergency Associates, P.C. and Andrew W. Latham, Defendants.

No. 4:97-CV-147.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

April 26, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James L. Dyer, Vandervoort, Cooke, McFee, Christ, et al, Battle Creek, MI, for Divaker R. Kattar, plaintiff.

William M. Newman, Lague, Newman & Irish, Muskegon, MI, Mark D. Willmarth, Willmarth & Tanoury, Detroit, MI, for Three Rivers Area Hospital Authority, Brad Solberg, defendants.

William M. Newman, Lague, Newman & Irush, Muskegon, MI, for Ro Jong Park, defendant.

Charles E. Ritter, Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, Kalamazoo, MI, for Kalamazoo Emergency Associates, P.C., Andrew W. Latham, defendants.

OPINION

QUIST, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Divaker Kattar ("Kattar"), a medical doctor, has sued Defendants, Three Rivers Area Hospital Authority ("TRAHA"), Brad Solberg ("Solberg"), and Ro Jong Park ("Park"), for violation of his procedural and substantive due process rights and his First Amendment free speech rights under 42 U.S.C.1983 and conspiracy to violate his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, in connection with his removal as Medical Director of Three Rivers Area Hospital ("TRAH").¹ Kattar also seeks to invoke this Court's supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over his state law claims for tortious interference with business relationship, retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Facts

TRAH is an acute care general hospital located in Three Rivers, Michigan, which is operated by TRAHA, a public body created under Michigan law by the vote of residents of the City of Three Rivers, St. Joseph County, and the Townships of Constantine, Fabius, Lockport, and Park. TRAH entered into a written contract ("TRAH/ECS Agreement") with Emergency Care Services ("ECS"), a division of Borgess Health Alliance, to provide emergency medicine services to TRAH's patients. In turn, ECS subcontracted with Kalamazoo Emergency Associates, P.C. ("KEA") to provide emergency physician services to TRAH pursuant to the TRAH/ECS Agreement. In addition to providing for emergency medicine services, the TRAH/ECS Agreement specified the procedure for the appointment of TRAH's Emergency Services Medical Director ("ESMD"). Paragraph 8 of the TRAH/ECS Agreement, which contains the appointment procedure, provides:

[KEA] will designate to ECS, and ECS shall recommend to [TRAH], an Emergency Physician for the position of [ESMD]. The Emergency Physician designated by [KEA] and recommended by ECS must apply for and be appointed [ESMD] in accordance with [TRAH]'s Medical Staff Bylaws. The duties of the [ESMD] are delineated in Appendix A attached to this Agreement.

(TRAH/ECS Agreement ¶ 2.2(A)(8), Pl.'s Resp.Br.Ex. 16.)²

On June 5, 1995, KEA entered into a written agreement with Kattar's wholly-owned medical professional corporation, Kattar, P.C. ("KEA/Kattar, P.C. Agreement"), which provided that Kattar, P.C. would provide emergency physician services at TRAH and other hospitals to which KEA furnished services. Under the KEA/Kattar, P.C. Agreement, Kattar, P.C. was an independent contractor and Kattar was recognized as an employee of Kattar, P.C. (See KEA/Kattar, P.C. Agreement ¶¶ 1,2, Defs.' Br.Supp.Ex. H.) On November 11, 1995, KEA and Kattar, P.C. amended the KEA/Kattar, P.C. Agreement to provide for additional compensation in anticipation of TRAH's appointment of Kattar to the ESMD position. At or about that time and pursuant to the TRAH/ECS Agreement, KEA recommended that Kattar be appointed ESMD. On November 15, 1995, TRAH made the appointment. Kattar served as the ESMD until March 21, 1997, when he was removed by Solberg, the Chief Executive Officer of TRAH, apparently without objection from KEA. During the time Kattar served as ESMD, he also held the position as Service Chief for Emergency Medicine, either as a separate position or as part of his responsibilities as ESMD.³

In February 1997, Kattar's relationship with TRAH began to deteriorate. Kattar alleges that the rift occurred because he raised concerns about inadequate medical care provided by Defendant Park, TRAH's Chief of Staff, to a patient known as Katherine I who died while admitted to TRAH.⁴ Defendants assert that Kattar was removed from the position because of his failure to perform his duties as ESMD.

On March 6, 1997, Solberg sent a letter to Dr. Andrew W. Latham ("Latham"), the president of KEA, which detailed Solberg's concerns about Kattar's "ability to function within [the] emergency department, most notably as the medical director." (Letter from Solberg to Latham of 3/6/97, Ex. C to Solberg Aff., attached to Defs.' Br.Supp.) One week later, Solberg made a formal request to Latham that KEA remove Kattar from the ESMD position. Solberg indicated, however, that TRAH would have no objection to Kattar continuing in the regular call rotation. KEA did not act on Solberg's request, and Kattar requested that Solberg provide the reasons for seeking his removal from the position. On March 19, 1997, Solberg sent a memorandum to Kattar which outlined the reasons for the removal and asked Kattar to submit his resignation as ESMD by March 20. When Kattar refused to resign, Solberg sent Kattar a memorandum dated March 21, 1997, notifying Kattar that he was removed as ESMD effective that day.

Kattar was permitted to remain on staff as an emergency room physician after his removal. Shortly thereafter, KEA sent a notice to Kattar that KEA would be terminating the KEA/Kattar, P.C. Agreement as of July 16, 1997. However, on June 19, 1997, Solberg sent a written request to KEA that Kattar be removed from service immediately "[d]ue to recent concerns regarding care that [was] reported to [Solberg] by [TRAH's] Chief of Staff," Defendant Park. (Mem. from Solberg to Latham of 6/19/97, Pl.'s Resp.Br.Ex. 13.) KEA honored Solberg's request and terminated the KEA/Kattar, P.C. Agreement that day. Kattar did not work at TRAH after that time. Kattar contends that Solberg's request for Kattar's removal had nothing to do with Kattar's performance, but instead was intended to prevent Kattar from further discussing the Katherine I incident with TRAH staff and others.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. The rule requires that the disputed facts be material. Material facts are facts which are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute over trivial facts which are not necessary in order to apply the substantive law does not prevent the granting of a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The rule also requires the dispute to be genuine. A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return judgment for the non-moving party. Id. This standard requires the non-moving party to present more than a scintilla of evidence to defeat the motion. Id. at 251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citing Schuylkill and Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1871)).

A moving party who does not have the burden of proof at trial may properly support a motion for summary judgment by showing the court that there is no evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the motion is so supported, the party opposing the motion must then demonstrate with "concrete evidence" that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id.; Frank v. D'Ambrosi, 4 F.3d 1378, 1384 (6th Cir.1993). The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but may grant summary judgment when "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Agristor Financial Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

Discussion

I. Federal Claims

A. Due Process

In Count I of his complaint, Kattar alleges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants violated his right to be free from deprivations of his property without due process by removing him from the ESMD and/or Service Chief position without a hearing as required by the Medical Staff Bylaws.⁵ Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on Kattar's due process claim because did not have a property interest in the ESMD position.⁶

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, no state actor may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. "The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Thus, to be entitled to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that he possesses a property interest which may be afforded constitutionally guaranteed due process. See Bailey v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 106 F.3d 135, 141 (6th Cir. 1997); Vinyard v. King, 728 F.2d 428, 430 & n. 5 (10th Cir.1984).

Property interests are not defined by the Constitution but instead "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits...