Kattelman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh

• Decision Date: 01 July 1964
• Citation: 415 Pa. 61,202 A.2d 66
• Parties: Leon KATTELMAN and Phyllis Kattelman, his wife, Appellants, v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

202 A.2d 66

415 Pa. 61

Leon KATTELMAN and Phyllis Kattelman, his wife, Appellants, v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

July 1, 1964.

Louis Kattelman, Martin Greitzer, Philadelphia, for appellants.

Norman Paul Harvey, John J. McDevitt, 3rd, Philadelphia, for appellees.

Before BELL C. J., and JONES, MUSMANNO, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

EAGEN Justice.

The plaintiffs, Leon Kattelman and Phyllis, his wife, sued the defendant, the National Union Fire Insurance Company, in assumpsit, to recover for damage to their dwelling, which was insured against collapse by the extended coverage endorsement in a fire insurance policy issued by the defendant. The case was tried before a judge without a jury resulting in a finding for the plaintiffs. Subsequently exceptions filed by the defendant were sustained and judgment entered for the defendant. The plaintiffs appeal.

The facts are not in dispute:

The dwelling house of the plaintiffs is located on Parma Road, Philadelphia. All of the buildings in the immediate area are constructed upon a filled bed and every two houses are built on a concrete mat resting on the fill. Plaintiffs' house was so situated that it rested partly on one mat and partly on another.

On the date involved, one of the mats underneath plaintiffs' dwelling suddenly dropped from its position, while the other remained firm. This caused a twisting action in the foundation and substantial damage to the building. A large number of cracks of sizeable proportions appeared in the inside walls; doors were jammed; plaster fell from the ceilings; a break occurred in one of the outside walls and the building itself broke away from the party wall of the adjoining building. However, the building remained standing and intact; none of the floors, walls or roof fell in.

The legal question for determination is the meaning of the word 'collapse' as used in the pertinent provision of the insurance contract, and whether or not the damage described is included within the meaning of the term. In the policy 'collapse' is defined thusly: 'Loss by collapse shall mean only physical injury to or destruction of the described property, resulting from the collapse of floor(s), wall(s) or roof(s) of the described building, but not collapse caused by or resulting from subsidence * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Since the terms of coverage involved are clear, simple and unmistakable, the words are to be construed in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning. We cannot ascribe thereto an interpretation not expressed. See, Robinson v. Stover, 320 Pa. 308, 182 A. 145 (1936); Ehrlich v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 356 Pa. 417, 51 A.2d 794 (1947); Waldman v. Shoemaker, 367 Pa. 587, 80 A.2d 776 (1951)

So read, it is clear that the physical injury to the building involved did not result from a 'collapse' of a floor, wall or roof thereof. To hold that the cracks or holes in the walls was tantamount to a collapse thereof would constitute a tortured construction of the contract and go far beyond the intention of the parties, as expressed in the clear and unequivocal language thereof.

The case of Skelly v. Fidelity and Cas. Co., 313 Pa. 202, 169 A 78 (1933), is analogous and controlling. Therein a large hole in two outer walls of a building caused by the impact of a runaway railroad car was held not to amount to a 'collapse of the outer walls of the building' as used in an insurance contract...