Katterhagen v. Meister

• Decision Date: 22 August 1913
• Citation: 134 P. 673,75 Wash. 112
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: KATTERHAGEN v. MEISTER et al.

134 P. 673

75 Wash. 112

KATTERHAGEN v. MEISTER et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 22, 1913

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; A. W. Frater Judge.

Suit by Lizzie Katterhagen against George Meister and others. From a decree for the defendants, plaintiff appeals. Judgment modified.

Robt. M. Jones, of Seattle, for appellant.

Peterson & Macbride, of Seattle, for respondents.

GOSE, J.

The principal question involved in this appeal is whether certain real property acquired after marriage was the separate property of the husband or the community property of the marriage entity. Touching this question the court found as its third finding: 'That the said George Meister and Mary Meister, intestate, acquired after said marriage the following described property, to wit: Tract No. fourteen (14) in block B, plat of Julius Horton's tracts, King county Wash., the north forty (40) feet of lot thirteen (13), in block B, plat of Julius Horton's tracts, described as follows: Commencing at the northeast corner of said lot thirteen (13), thence west one hundred thirty-one (131) feet south forty (40) feet, east one hundred thirty-one (131) feet to Estelle street; thence north on Estelle street forty (40) feet, to place of beginning; situate in King county, Wash. That the title to said lands were taken in the name of and deeded to George Meister and Mary Meister, the intestate. That the purchase price of said property was six thousand six hundred fifty ($6,650.00) dollars. That one thousand six hundred ($1,600) dollars of this was paid in cash out of the separate funds of George Meister, and that the remainder of said purchase price was paid by a promissory note and mortgage, signed by George Meister and Mary Meister, the intestate. That the said note and mortgage were paid by George Meister out of his separate funds.' The conclusion deduced was: 'The court finds that all the property described in finding 3 is the sole and separate property of said George Meister.'

The respondents have moved to dismiss the appeal because no exception was taken to either the finding or the conclusion of law, as provided by the statute (Rem. & Bal. Code, § 383). We have uniformly held that a litigant is not required to except to a fact found by the court if he is content to rest his case upon it. Brown v. Kern, 21 Wash. 211, 57 P 798.

It is also settled that a litigant need not except to conclusions of law. Hallidie Co. v. Wash. B. L. & Mfg. Co., 70 Wash. 80, 126 P. 96.

It is next contended that, the evidence not having been brought to this court, there is nothing to review. We have also held that a statement of facts is not necessary where the appellant desires to raise the question that the facts found do not warrant the conclusions of law or the decree. Brown v. Kern, supra; Hannegan v. Roth, 12 Wash. 65, 40 P. 636; Carstens v. Leidigh, etc., L. Co., 18 Wash. 450, 51 P. 1051, 39 L. R. A. 548, 63 Am. St. Rep. 906; In re Clifford, 37 Wash. 460, 79 P. 1001, 107 Am. St. Rep. 819.

The precise point urged by the respondents, however, is that, this being a case of equitable cognizance, no findings were necessary; that the findings were incomplete, and hence that it will be presumed that the evidence sustains the decree. As sustaining this view they cite: Gould v. Austin, 52 Wash. 457, 100 P. 1029; Thompson v. Emerson, 55 Wash. 138, 104 P. 201. These cases merely hold that findings are not necessary in equity cases, and therefore that such cases will not be reviewed, in the absence of a statement of facts or bill of exceptions, where the findings are defective or incomplete; the presumption being that the evidence warrants the judgment. The finding under review is neither defective nor incomplete, but on the contrary full and specific.

Upon the merits of the controversy, we think the learned trial court reached a wrong conclusions in holding that the property was the separate property of George Meister. He paid $1,600 upon the purchase price from his separate funds. To that extent the property was separate. The remainder, or $5,050, was paid by the community. When the husband and wife united in the promissory note, the debt created was a community debt, and the money borrowed upon the note belonged to the community. It is not material whether they borrowed the money of a third party and paid it to the vendor, or gave their note direct to him as a part of the purchase price. The rule would be the same in either case.

Nor does the fact that the husband later paid the note out of his separate funds change the situation. The status of the property was fixed at the time of the purchase. These views are supported by an unbroken current of decisions in this court. Yesler v. Hochstettler, 4 Wash. 349, 30 P. 398; Main v. Scholl, 20 Wash. 201, 54 P. 1125; Heintz V. Brown, 46 Wash. 387, 90 P. 211, 123 Am. St. Rep 937; Ballard v. Slyfield, 47 Wash. 175, 91 P. 642; Denny v. Schwabacher, 54 Wash. 689, 104 P. 137, 132...