Katz v. Katz
| Decision Date | 24 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-DR-1125 |
| Citation | 118 N.E.3d 813 |
| Parties | Donald P. KATZ, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Lori B. KATZ, Appellee-Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: Jonathan R. Deenik, Deenik Law, LLC, Greenwood, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee: Michael Cheerva, Emswiller Williams Noland & Clarke, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] When parties negotiate a court-approved property settlement during dissolution of marriage proceedings but later informally agree to carry out its terms through predictable, if different, means, does this latter path constitute an improper amendment of the original settlement?
[2] Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the parties' later arrangements fell within the larger terms of the formal decree and that Donald Katz was required to make additional property settlement payments to Lori Katz under the terms of their court-approved agreement. We affirm the trial court.
[3] In 2014, Donald filed a petition to dissolve the parties' marriage. The marital estate included the parties' house in Carmel, Indiana, a condominium in Colorado, and various investments and business interests. Donald and Lori negotiated a settlement agreement that the trial court approved and incorporated in a decree of dissolution on August 17, 2016. Among other provisions, the parties agreed the house and the condominium would be sold, and the proceeds would be used to pay off a mortgage and a line of credit secured by those properties. The agreement further stated Donald would pay Lori a monthly sum to equalize the division of marital assets. According to the agreement, if the parties later agreed to not sell either or both properties, Lori would be entitled to additional monthly payments "to add back the costs of sale that are no longer being incurred." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 23.
[4] The home and condominium were listed for sale. On June 6, 2017, Donald and Lori signed a one-page document that Donald had drafted without an attorney. In the document, Donald and Lori explained they wanted to "modify [their] earlier arrangement" and remove the properties from listings for sale "for the foreseeable future." Id. at 36. The document further states, "Donald P. Katz has expressed a desire to continue to occupy the [house] and maintain [the condominium] as a second home." Id. Donald and Lori further stated they wanted to "refinanc[e] the current loan secured by these properties into a more favorable mortgage program." Id. Lori quitclaimed her interest in the house after the document was signed, but she and Donald were still both parties to a mortgage on the property.
[5] On November 6, 2017, Donald filed a request for appointment of a commissioner. That document has not been provided to this Court. Lori responded by asking the trial court to either: order the sale of the house and condominium, or order Donald to make additional monthly payments to accurately account for the changed division of marital property.
[6] The court held an evidentiary hearing. On January 30, 2018, it denied Donald's request for appointment of a commissioner. The court granted Lori's request for additional payments, increasing Donald's monthly obligation from 154 payments (per the original divorce decree) to 186 payments. In its order, the court determined the additional payments were necessary because "[t]he parties agreed not to sell the marital home and condo as shown in [the June 6, 2017 document]." Id. at 13. This appeal followed.
[7] Donald raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as: Whether the trial court erred in ordering Donald to make additional payments to Lori.
[8] Neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions thereon, and the trial court did not issue any. We review the court's order under a general judgment standard. A general judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained upon any legal theory consistent with the evidence. Shelby Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Action Steel Supply, Inc. , 707 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bedford Recycling, Inc. v. U.S. Granules Corp. , 634 N.E.2d 1361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied .
[9] Donald argues the trial court erred in ordering him to make additional monthly payments to Lori due to their agreement not to sell the house and the condominium. He claims the evidence showed he still intended to sell those properties later, and the court's decision amounted to an improper modification of the settlement agreement.
[10] Settlement agreements are contractual in nature and bind the parties when the court merges and incorporates that agreement into the divorce decree. Shorter v. Shorter , 851 N.E.2d 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Once incorporated into a judicial decree, such agreements may not be altered, absent fraud, duress, or consent of the parties. Still, as Justice Sullivan observed for a unanimous Court, that "does not mean that a court has no authority to resolve a dispute over the interpretation of a settlement agreement or property-division order." Ryan v. Ryan , 972 N.E.2d 359, 363 (Ind. 2012).
[11] When such moments arise, and the terms of a contract are unambiguous, we do not construe its terms or look to extrinsic evidence. Deel v. Deel , 909 N.E.2d 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Unambiguous terms are conclusive, and we will merely apply the contractual provisions. Id.
[12] According to the parties' settlement agreement, the house and the condominium were to be listed for sale and "remain listed until sold." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 18. Donald could live in the house "until its sale," but he was "solely responsible for all mortgages ... and all other obligations associated with the marital residence." Id. In addition, "[Donald] shall pay [Lori a] property settlement judgment of $3,600 a month for 154 months." Id. at 22. If the proceeds from the sale of the house and the condominium were less than certain specified amounts, then Lori's settlement payments were to be reduced accordingly. By contrast, "[i]n the event there is a future agreement not to sell either or both of the properties, counsel for [Donald and Lori] shall calculate the extension of the payments to add back the costs of sale that are no longer being incurred." Id. at 23. The unambiguous language of the agreement provides Lori is entitled to additional payments if the properties are removed from sale by agreement of the parties.
[13] Did the trial court properly determine the parties agreed not to sell the properties? Donald and Lori's June 6, 2017 document states, "Donald P. Katz has expressed a desire to continue to occupy the [marital home] and maintain [the condominium] as a second home." Id. Donald and Lori further stated they wanted to "refinance[e] the current loan secured by these properties into a more favorable mortgage program." Id. Lori later testified Donald had told her he planned to return the properties to sale listings, but he had not done so by the time of the evidentiary hearing. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 45. This...
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