Katz v. United States
| Decision Date | 12 May 1922 |
| Docket Number | 3614. |
| Citation | 281 F. 129 |
| Parties | KATZ et al. v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
F. R Hahn, of Youngstown, Ohio, and Reuel A. Lang, of Cleveland Ohio (Seidman & Seidman, of Cleveland, Ohio, and Wilson, Hahn & Wilson, of Youngstown, Ohio, on the brief), for plaintiffs in error.
D. J Needham, Asst. U.S. Atty., of Cleveland, Ohio (E. S. Wertz U.S. Atty., of Youngstown, Ohio, on the brief), for the United States.
Before KNAPPEN, DENISON, and DONAHUE, Circuit Judges.
Defendants were convicted of a violation of section 4 of the Act of October 29, 1919 (41 Stat. 324), [1] with reference to the interstate transportation of stolen automobiles. The specific charge was that at Cleveland, Ohio, they received and concealed a specified automobile which had been stolen at Erie, Pa., and had been transported to Cleveland, and had been moving as a part of and 'which constituted interstate commerce, the said (respondents) knowing the same to have been stolen and transported in interstate commerce as aforesaid. ' It was not denied that the automobile had been stolen in Pennsylvania and brought into Ohio, and that it was transferred to and received by the respondents. The case in law and in fact turned upon the character and extent of their knowledge.
We think it unnecessary to state the circumstances in detail. It is insisted by respondents that in order to justify their conviction it must appear, not only that they knew the automobile had been stolen, but that they knew of the interstate transportation. The trial court took the other view, and charged that knowledge that the automobile had been stolen was enough. In this the court was right. As far as this point is concerned the case cannot be distinguished from our decision in Kasle v. United States, 233 F. 878, 147 C.C.A. 552. The statute does not require that persons otherwise guilty thereunder should escape because they supposed that they were violating only a state and not a federal law.
Whether section 4 of the statute may rightly be applied to the reception of goods which have before that time finished their interstate journey and become a part of the body of property in the state of destination, and what, from that point of view, would be the status of a stolen automobile, which had no lawful destination anywhere, and which was subject to be taken on further if a purchaser was not found at the first stop, are questions not raised in the court below,...
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...v. State, 239 Ind. 341, 349, 156 N.E.2d 782. State v. Chamberlin, 30 Vt. 559, 571. See Perkins, Criminal Law, 682; Katz v. United States, 281 F. 129, 130-131 (6th Cir.). We assume that, in any perjury case, if the trier of the fact should conclude that a defendant believed his statements to......
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...should escape because they supposed that they were violating only a state and not a federal law." Emphasis added Katz v. United States, 281 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1922) The Court in Kasle, stated as "As we interpret the statute such an allegation is not necessary. One who knowingly receives stole......
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Wolf v. United States, 4134
...knowledge of its interstate character, under these circumstances, is significant. Expressio unius, exclusio alterius. See Katz v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 281 F. 129; Le Fanti v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 259 F. 460. Nor can we accept as entirely analogous those cases which deal with the situs of commoditie......
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Wilkerson v. United States, 4224.
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