Katzer v. City of Milwaukee

• Decision Date: 22 June 1899
• Citation: 104 Wis. 16,79 N.W. 745
• Parties: KATZER v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

104 Wis. 16

79 N.W. 745

KATZER

v.CITY OF MILWAUKEE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 22, 1899.

Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee county; D. H. Johnson, Judge.

Action by F. X. Katzer, as archbishop of the diocese of Milwaukee, against the city of Milwaukee, to adjudge certain property exempt from taxation. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

In 1892 the diocesan officers purchased with funds of the diocese a certain block in Milwaukee as a residence for plaintiff, who is archbishop of the diocese of Milwaukee, and took conveyance, as is customary, to the plaintiff individually. The premises are used as his residence, but also contain accommodations for his assistant officers, and various functions needing his personal presence are held there. Plaintiff testified that he held the property in fee simple, according to the laws of the church; that he made no claim to any individual claim or ownership, but held it in his name for the diocese; and that he is required to devise it to his successor; also that he is chief pastor of the diocese. Taxes have been assessed on the premises in question for 1892, 1893, and 1894. Plaintiff prays adjudication that the premises are exempt, and the taxes void. The circuit court so adjudged, and the defendant appeals.Howard Van Wyck, for appellant.

Wigman & Martin, for respondent.

DODGE, J. (after stating the facts).

In view of the conclusion which we have reached in this case, it is quite immaterial and unnecessary to decide whether the premises in question are in the category of “real estate necessary for the location and convenience of the buildings of a religious association,” or constitute a “parsonage.” Subdivision 3, § 1038, Rev. St., whereon rests the exemption of church property from taxation, has been more than once construed by this court, and some of the uncertainties resulting from its language removed. In Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. Outagamie Co., 76 Wis. 591, 45 N. W. 536, it was held that the words “owned by any religious association, and used exclusively for the purposes of such association,” which, by their immediate context, might be confined to the personal property, are not so confined in their application, but extend to the real property as well. The parsonage is exemptedby the same sentence, and no reasons of construction can be urged why, if the word “owned” extends and applies to the real property, it does not also extend and apply to the parsonage. Indeed, the intention of the legislature to that effect is even stronger in the case of parsonages, for they have ex industria added to the exemption such parsonages as are rented, which would, of course, be wholly unnecessary if ownership were not otherwise required. This extension of the exemption to rented parsonages has also been construed in Gray v. Lafayette Co., 65 Wis. 567, 27 N. W. 311, to require that the renting shall be by the association, so that a parsonage rented by the pastor would not fall within it. It is therefore clear that the real estate necessary for the location and convenience of the buildings of such association, and embracing the same, not exceeding 10 acres, and the parsonage, in order to be exempt, must be owned by and used exclusively for the purposes of such association. The extent of title required by the word “owned” has received construction but once by this court, and that in the case of City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Co., 95 Wis. 424, 69 N. W. 819, in which it was decided that lands held for park purposes under an option, upon which part of the purchase price had been paid, and to conveyance of which the city would have a right on completing payment, were not owned in the sense of the statute. All of these decisions are in line with the unquestioned duty of courts in construing statutes exempting property from taxation. Such statutes conferring special privileges, and in derogation of the sovereignty exercised over other property, are to be strictly construed. If the meaning of such statute is fairly ambiguous or uncertain as to a specific piece of property or owner, it is the duty of courts to resolve the doubt in favor of the taxability of the property. It is for the legislature to grant these special privileges, and it has always been held that courts will proceed upon the assumption that whatever the legislature intends to exempt will be expressed in such clear language as to leave no doubt, and that what has been left doubtful is not intended to be exempted. Weston v. Supervisors, ...