Kaufman v. United States

• Decision Date: 07 January 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:12–0237.
• Citation: 84 F.Supp.3d 519
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: Jean Elizabeth KAUFMAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

84 F.Supp.3d 519

Jean Elizabeth KAUFMAN, Plaintiff

v.UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:12–0237.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia.

Signed Jan. 7, 2015.

Jean Elizabeth Kaufman, Barboursville, VA, pro se.

John Fulton Gianola, Stephen M. Horn, U.S. Attorney's Office Charleston, WV, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DAVID A. FABER, Senior District Judge.

A bench trial in the above-styled case was held on June 24–25, 2014.¹ Having reviewed the case, the court concludes that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity to suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) with regard to plaintiff's claims. Without such a waiver, this court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the controversy. Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint, (Doc. No. 4), is DISMISSED.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

The instant dispute arises out of an incident that occurred at Federal Prison Camp Alderson (“FPC Alderson”) on January 28, 2008, where plaintiff was incarcerated at the time. At approximately noon on the day in question, plaintiff was waiting in line for lunch at the facility's dining hall. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 18). Senior Officer Harrison Baynard, Jr., a member of FPC Alderson's staff, was monitoring the lunch line and reprimanded another inmate, Brandy Stevens, for entering the dining hall through an exit door. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 18). Officer Baynard sent Stevens out of the dining hall and directed her to re-enter through the correct door. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 14). When Stevens resumed her place in the lunch line, plaintiff remarked to Stevens, sarcastically, “That was real important,” referring to Officer Baynard's instruction to Stevens. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 14, 18).

Officer Baynard overheard plaintiff's comment and ordered her to approach him. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 14). He instructed plaintiff to refrain from making comments that would hinder the authority of FPC Alderson staff. Id. Plaintiff responded that she was not talking to him when she made the remark and that her civil and First Amendment rights allowed her to say whatever she chose. Id. The two began to argue and Officer Baynard ordered plaintiff to follow him outside of the dining hall and surrender her identification card. Id. According to Officer Baynard, he wanted to address plaintiff outside the presence of other inmates. Id.

Plaintiff and Officer Baynard present different accounts of what happened next. Plaintiff contends that, once they were outside, Officer Baynard screamed obscenities at her while she quietly asked him to stop. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 18). Officer Baynard maintains that plaintiff continued to argue with him about her constitutional rights and escalated the situation. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 15). He denies cursing at plaintiff. Id.

However, the parties agree that, at some point during the interaction, Officer Baynard ordered plaintiff to put her hands on the wall and submit to a pat search. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 15, 18). Both parties agree that, during the pat search, plaintiff began to turn around when Officer Baynard touched her right jacket pocket. Id. In plaintiff's version of events, Officer Baynard then “slam[med her] into the wall repeatedly,” face-forward, while she yelled “I want to see the Captain; I don't want to deal with you!” (Civil Action No. 1:10–cv–0071, Doc. No. 1; Doc. No. 38 at 2–3). Plaintiff maintains that Officer Baynard “grabbed [her] arm and neck and ... slung [her] to the ground approximately six feet away from the building.” (Civ. Action No. 1:10–0071, Doc. No. 1). According to plaintiff, Officer Baynard then “planted his knee in [her] back, dropping his full weight upon [her].” Id.

According to Officer Baynard, after plaintiff took her right hand from the wall, he attempted to place her hand back on the wall, but plaintiff resisted. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 15). Plaintiff began flailing her arms, and again tried to turn around. Id. Officer Baynard stated that he was concerned about plaintiff's intentions and “was trying to be more defensive with her than offensive.” Id. While plaintiff kept trying to move away from him, he attempted to restrain her. Id. Though he initially attempted to pin plaintiff to the wall, she continued to flail her arms and he decided to place her on the ground. Id. According to Officer Baynard, as plaintiff attempted to move away from him, her momentum caused her to fall, and, as a result, he did not need to use extreme measures to place plaintiff on the ground. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 15–6). As plaintiff laid face down, Officer Baynard contends that she was “flinging her arms and legs around” in an attempt to turn over onto her back. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 16). He took hold of her hands and placed them behind her back. Id.

The parties agree that plaintiff continued to shout throughout the incident. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 16, 18). Plaintiff contends that she yelled “[Y]ou didn't even warn me, you're not supposed to touch me, I want to see the Captain, don't touch me.” (Doc. No. 153–1 at 18). Officer Baynard contends that plaintiff yelled “Don't touch me. Anyone can touch me but him!” (Doc. No. 153–1 at 16). In all, Officer Baynard estimates that the entire incident lasted twenty seconds before other FPC Alderson staff members arrived, having heard the commotion. Id.

Upon the arrival of support staff, Officer Baynard stepped back from plaintiff as other staff members helped her to her feet. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 16, 18). Captain Vicky Dupuis, who responded to the incident, saw plaintiff “turn[ ] and scream[ ] towards Officer Baynard ... ‘Don't let him touch me!’ ”. (Doc. No. 153–2 at 3). Captain Dupuis then took plaintiff to her office. Id.

After making a statement, plaintiff was examined by FPC Alderson's medical staff and released back to her housing unit. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 18). Officer Baynard also reported to Health Services for an injury assessment after the incident. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 16). Medical staff noted that plaintiff suffered lower back pain and a back spasm as a result of the incident, while Officer Baynard did not sustain any injuries. (Doc. No. 153–2 at 5, 22, 23).

Almost immediately, FPC Alderson administrators began conducting an internal investigation of the incident. (Doc. No. 153–2 at 5). After speaking with plaintiff, Captain Dupuis interviewed Officer Baynard and contacted a Correctional Services Administrator. Id. When asked whether Officer Baynard's immediate use of force was justified, Captain Dupuis responded that it was. Id.

Two days after the incident, plaintiff asserted that she had bruising on her body that she wished to document. Id. As all female medical staff members were unavailable, Captain Dupuis photographed plaintiff. Id. She noted “bruising to [plaintiff's] left elbow, the right triceps area, 1 small bruise to her upper back, a large bruise to her right lower back, and an abrasion to her right forearm.” Id.

Anthony Hussion of the Office of Internal Affairs investigated the incident. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 8). After interviewing both inmates and FPC Alderson staff members, Hussion's investigation revealed insufficient evidence to substantiate plaintiff's claim of excessive force. (Doc. No. 153–1 at 11). Hussion noted that FPC Alderson staff who responded to the incident did not observe Officer Baynard use excessive force and “no other facts presented” indicated excessive force. Id. For her part in the incident, plaintiff was convicted of violating Rule 307, Refusing to Obey an Order of Any Staff Member. (Doc. No. 38 at 3).

On January 25, 2010, plaintiff filed a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the FTCA. (Civil Action No. 1:10–cv–0071, Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff's § 1983 claim was later recharacterized as a Bivens claim and dismissed. This court dismissed plaintiff's initial FTCA claim as premature because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. After plaintiff exhausted these remedies, she resubmitted her FTCA claim and initiated the instant action.

In this action, plaintiff asserts two claims pursuant to the FTCA. First, plaintiff alleges that Officer Baynard assaulted and battered her during the above-described incident, from which she suffered “possible permanent injury” as well as exacerbated pre-existing PTSD symptoms. Second, plaintiff asserts a negligence claim; specifically, that FPC Alderson officials knew that Officer Baynard had a history of acting inappropriately with female inmates but failed to protect inmates from him. The court will discuss each of these claims in turn.

II. Plaintiff's Claim of Assault and Battery Under the FTCA

A. The Discretionary Function Exception and Law Enforcement Officers

By bringing suit pursuant to the FTCA, plaintiff asserts a claim against the United States, arguing that the Government is responsible for Officer Baynard's alleged acts. As a sovereign, the United States enjoys immunity from suits unless Congress expressly waives that immunity. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941). Without a waiver of sovereign immunity, a court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a case. Id. at 587–88, 61 S.Ct. 767 (citing Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 533, 536, 47 S.Ct. 186, 71 L.Ed. 394 (1926) ).

For those plaintiffs asserting tort claims against the Government, Congress issued a limited waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA. Under this statute, the United States waives sovereign immunity for claims of “personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.”28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012). Thus, the FTCA allows a plaintiff to hold the Government liable in tort in the same way he or she could hold a private person liable. Medina v. United States,

259 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir.2001).

However, the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity is narrow and subject to a number of exceptions, with the majority codified in 28...