Kaur v. Pollack
| Decision Date | 10 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. SAG-21-00292 |
| Parties | SIMARJEET KAUR, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER POLLACK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Simarjeet Kaur ("Plaintiff") filed an Amended Complaint against multiple Defendants, including Sears, Roebuck & Co. ("Sears"), alleging twenty different causes of action including various torts and state and federal constitutional claims. ECF 7. Sears filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF 13. Plaintiff filed an opposition, ECF 19, and Sears replied, ECF 20. In its reply, Sears clarified that it seeks dismissal of all Counts except Count XIV, violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. §§ 3-501-3-509, and Count XV, violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. ECF 20 at 12. At this Court's request, Plaintiff filed a surreply, clarifying which counts of the amended complaint Plaintiff agrees should be dismissed based on Sears's furnishing of a worker's compensation insurance policy. ECF 22. Plaintiff voluntarily consents to the dismissal without prejudice of Counts I, V, XII, XIII, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX. ECF 22 at 1-2. Therefore, nine Counts remain disputed. No hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the reasons that follow, in addition to the voluntarily dismissed counts enumerated above, Sears's motion to dismiss will be granted as to Counts VII, VIII, IX, and XI, and denied as to Counts II, III, IV, VI, and X.
The following factual allegations are derived from the Amended Complaint and are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. Plaintiff began working for the Sears outlet store in White Marsh, Maryland in October, 2018. ECF 7 ¶ 41. During her employment, Plaintiff regularly gave a co-worker, Amna Inam, rides to and from work since Ms. Inam did not have her own vehicle. Id. ¶ 42-43.
On December 15, 2018, at the end of Plaintiff's shift, one of the store managers called Plaintiff into a back office. Id. ¶¶ 50-52. The manager then took Plaintiff to a senior manager's office where Jeffrey Markowski, a loss prevention employee for Sears, was waiting. Id. ¶¶ 53-55. Mr. Markowski locked the office door and began asking Plaintiff a series of questions about her job and whether she was aware of any "scams" at the store. Id. ¶¶ 56-57. Mr. Markowski then falsely stated that he had video that showed Plaintiff taking unpaid merchandise from the sales counter to her car. Id. ¶ 60. Plaintiff denied the accusation and told Mr. Markowski that she had receipts or credit card statements showing she paid for all the merchandise she took from Sears. Id. ¶¶ 61-62. Mr. Markowski refused to accept Plaintiff's answer and falsely stated that he had proof that she helped Ms. Inam steal from the store. Id. ¶¶ 63-64. Plaintiff, who did not understand English well, was confused and said that she wanted to go home to her family and asked if she could get a lawyer. Id. ¶¶ 65-66. Mr. Markowski told her if she hired a lawyer, then she would go to jail, and demanded that she write a confession and agree to pay back the money for the stolen merchandise. Id. ¶¶ 67-68. Plaintiff refused to confess because she had not done anything wrong. Id. ¶ 74. She started crying and asked again to leave, to call her husband, and to speak to a lawyer.Id. ¶¶ 69, 71, 75. Mr. Markowski told her that if her husband came, she would be in even more trouble and that if a lawyer came or if she refused to write the confession, she would go to jail. Id. ¶¶ 70-73, 76. Mr. Markowski also falsely told Plaintiff that Ms. Iman had confessed to stealing, agreed to pay the store back, and was allowed to go home. Id. ¶ 78. He told Plaintiff again to write a confession if she wanted to go home, then left the room and locked the door behind him. Id. ¶¶ 77, 79. Plaintiff tried to leave the room, but could not because the door was locked. Id. ¶ 80.
Mr. Markowski called the Baltimore County Police Department to report a suspected theft by Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 94. Officers Pollack and Birkmaier responded to the call. Id. ¶ 95. Mr. Markowski told the officers that Plaintiff and Ms. Iman were "free bagging" items on five specific dates in November and December of 2018, including two days that Plaintiff did not work. Id. ¶¶ 96, 98. Free bagging refers to a method of stealing merchandise where retail workers "scan one item and place it into a bag with other items that were not scanned . . . so that only a portion of the items are paid for." Id. ¶ 97. Mr. Markowski claimed there was closed circuit television footage of the thefts, but the officers never requested to see the video, and no such video has ever been produced. Id. ¶¶ 99-101. Likewise, Mr. Markowski did not produce, and the officers did not request, any other evidence that Plaintiff committed the thefts, such as statements of other witnesses, stolen merchandise, or partial receipts. Id. ¶¶ 102-03.
Eventually Mr. Markowski returned to the locked office and again demanded Plaintiff write a confession. Id. ¶¶ 81-82. Plaintiff "responded by crying all over the paper." Id. ¶ 82. Mr. Markowski then opened the office door and revealed Officer Birkmaier standing in the doorway. Id. ¶¶ 84-85. Plaintiff tried to call her husband, but Officer Birkmaier took her phone away and handcuffed her. Id. ¶¶ 86-87. Ms. Iman appeared in the hallway, and Plaintiff yelled at her inPunjabi saying, "This happened all because of you!!" Id. ¶¶ 88-89. Officer Birkmaier then pushed Plaintiff into the wall causing Plaintiff to fall onto the floor and hit her head. Id. ¶¶ 90-91. Plaintiff suffered a seizure, and an ambulance was called to the scene. Id. ¶¶ 92-93.
Plaintiff was later transported to the Essex District Court where Officer Birkmaier signed a statement of charges in front of the District Court Commissioner. Id. ¶ 110. The charging document falsely alleged that Plaintiff committed thefts by "freebagging" on days she was not even working at Sears, that video evidence of the thefts existed, and that Plaintiff had confessed to Mr. Markowski. Id. ¶ 111. The District Court Commissioner charged Plaintiff with one count of theft scheme and five counts of theft. Id. ¶ 114. Plaintiff was later released from custody on her own recognizance on the morning of December 16, 2018. Id. ¶ 116. Almost four months later, on April 11, 2019, upon learning there was no evidence supporting the charges, the prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi for all six counts. Id. ¶ 120.
Notwithstanding the state's decision not to prosecute Plaintiff, Sears hired debt collectors, who sent Plaintiff four threatening letters, to collect the value of the alleged stolen merchandise from Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 128, 131. Plaintiff also lost her job at Sears and never received her final three paychecks, totaling $1,300. Id. ¶ 127. Because of the theft allegations against her, she was limited in her ability to find a new job. Id. ¶ 123. Plaintiff also suffered other negative effects on her health and wellbeing. Id. ¶¶ 121-22, 124-26. She was consumed with worry, could not eat or sleep, and became suicidal. Id. ¶ 121. She developed pain in her arms, neck, and back, and suffered from headaches and seizures. Id. ¶¶ 122, 124. She also experienced "significant shame and humiliation" in front of her neighbors, friends, family, and co-workers. Id. ¶ 125.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss. In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010) (Agee, J., concurring); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." See In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d at 92.
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with "fair notice" of the claims and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
To survive a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (); see also Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). But, a plaintiff need not include "detailed factual allegations" in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam).
Nevertheless, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" a cognizable cause of action, "even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 556 (internal quotation...
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