Kaus v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n
| Decision Date | 04 August 1941 |
| Docket Number | No. 45533.,45533. |
| Parties | KAUS v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
KAUS
v.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al.
No. 45533.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Aug. 4, 1941.
Appeal from District Court, Pottawattamie County; Chas. Roe, Judge.
Suit in equity to restrain defendant commission from collecting contributions from plaintiff who claims he is not an employer under the terms of the Iowa Unemployment Compensation law. From a decree for plaintiff, the commission appeals.
Reversed.
[299 N.W. 416]
J. Charles Crawley and Homer M. Lyon, both of Des Moines, and George Finch, of Sioux City, for appellants.
Capel & Jackson and Tinley, Mitchell, Ross, Everest & Geiser, all of Council Bluffs, for appellee.
GARFIELD, Justice.
The principal question involved is whether the relation of employer-employee exists between plaintiff and drivers of his taxicabs. Defendant-appellant commission contends that it does. Plaintiff-appellee claims the relation between him and the drivers is that of bailor and bailee.
Plaintiff-appellee, Peter J. Kaus, operates a taxi business in Council Bluffs under the trade-name, United Cab Co. He owns ten taxicabs with the name and insignia of the United Cab Co. painted on each cab. He has a central downtown office and garage together with eleven taxicab stands or stations at convenient places in the city. In the central office he maintains a telephone switchboard connected with the various stations. He employs telephone operators at the switchboard; also a mechanic to keep the taxis in running order. The cabs are operated on two twelve hour shifts between the hours of six and six. There are twenty drivers during each twenty-four hour period.
The arrangement between appellee and the drivers is oral. Appellee furnishes the cab, the oil, the switchboard service, the city license to operate as a taxicab and the insurance on the drivers protecting the public. The driver furnishes the gasoline and repairs to the tires. The driver pays appellee $3 for each twelve hour period and retains as his compensation all sums collected by him from passengers in excess of the $3 and the cost of the gasoline. The drivers are not required to account to appellee for the amounts taken in by them.
Appellee advertises in the telephone directory and newspapers, holding out such inducements to the public as: “Why not
[299 N.W. 417]
ride in luxury and style when it costs no more? Just call 3434 and a courteous driver will be at your door promptly. * * * You'll ride in luxury and safety. * * * Capable drivers and prompt service.” Those desiring taxi service ordinarily call the downtown office. From the office switchboard calls are relayed to the stand best located to answer the call. If the driver at that station is on a trip, another station is called. When a driver leaves a station to make a trip he usually notifies the central office that his stand is vacant and another driver then has the privilege of going to that station.
Appellee requires the drivers to refrain from the use of intoxicating liquor, to drive carefully and observe traffic laws, to keep the cabs clean, to be courteous, and to abide by the established schedule of fares. The schedule of fares was agreed upon by the drivers and appellee and is the same schedule used by competitors. Complaints from the police and from customers regarding the drivers are received at the central office. Appellee then “would post something on the bulletin board saying something about being more cautious and keeping within the law.” Appellee has “terminated his relationship” with drivers concerning whom there were many complaints. He has terminated the relationship because of reckless or fast driving. Appellee does not permit his drivers to drive for a competing firm. If a driver wants to take time off he notifies appellee, who tries to engage a substitute driver approved by appellee. If no satisfactory substitute is obtainable the driver is expected to operate the cab, or in any event to pay the $3. The arrangement between appellee and any driver may be terminated at any time by either party.
Appellee makes much of the fact that the drivers are given permission to refuse a call if they do not care to make it, and also that they are permitted to use the cars for personal use so long as the $3 is paid. There is evidence that a driver occasionally rejects a call where the trip is too far away “to make any money on it.” The principal personal use made by a driver is an occasional trip with his family.
The city ordinances require a license for anyone engaging in the taxi business and the procurement of insurance or a bond for the benefit of those injured or damaged through the negligence or misconduct of any driver. A violation of the ordinances constitutes a misdemeanor. Appellee procured such a license and took out the required insurance covering himself and his employees while operating the cabs. No such license was ever issued to any driver.
From the evidence above summarized the trial court found that appellee was not the employer of the drivers...
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