Kavaja v. Department of Labor and Industries of Washington

• Decision Date: 05 September 1923
• Docket Number: 17949.
• Citation: 126 Wash. 284,218 P. 196
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: KAVAJA v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES OF WASHINGTON.

218 P. 196

126 Wash. 284

KAVAJA v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES OF WASHINGTON.

No. 17949.

Supreme Court of Washington

September 5, 1923

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law (Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 7673-7796) by Pete Kavaja, for compensation for injuries. The Department of Labor and Industries of Washington awarded compensation for temporary disability, and then closed the case. From an order of the superior court affirming the order of the Department, claimant appeals. Affirmed.

Pemberton J., dissenting.

Burkey O'Brien & Burkey, of Tacoma, for appellant.

John H Dunbar, of Olympia, for respondent.

TOLMAN J.

Appellant a tree faller, was injured in the course of his employment, on January 9, 1922. His injury was classified by the Department of Labor and Industries as temporary total disability, and he received compensation in accordance therewith until August 9, 1922, when the Department closed the case. Appellant duly appealed from the decision of the Department closing the claim to the superior court for Pierce county, the county of his residence, claiming that he had suffered a permanent partial disability, and that therefore his compensation should have been continued. His allegations were denied by answer, and the case came on for trial before the court, sitting without a jury, resulting in a judgment dismissing his appeal, and affirming the order of the Department, from which judgment he has appealed to this court.

There is nothing involved here but a question of fact, which has been decided against the appellant by the Department, and by the superior court, and, since by statute the decision of the Department is prima facie correct, and the burden of proof is placed upon one who attacks it (Rem. Compiled Statutes, § 7697), we can only inquire whether or not appellant has sustained the burden thus cast upon him.

While the testimony of appellant and other nonexpert witnesses has some bearing on the question involved, yet, in the main, the actual facts must be determined from the testimony of the medical witnesses. Four doctors testified upon the trial below. Three of them agreed in the opinion that appellant's condition, as it was found to be subsequent to August 9, 1922, was not attributable to the injuries caused by the accident, though admitting the possibility that the injuries received, and the loss of weight which occurred thereafter, might have contributed thereto. The fourth doctor expressed the opinion that appellant...