Kay v. Ehrler

• Decision Date: 16 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-79,90-79
• Parties: Richard B. KAY, Petitioner v. Bremer EHRLER & Kentucky Board of Elections
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

499 U.S. 432

111 S.Ct. 1435

113 L.Ed.2d 486

Richard B. KAY, Petitioner

v Bremer EHRLER & Kentucky Board of Elections.

No. 90-79.

Argued Feb. 25, 1991.

Decided April 16, 1991.

Timothy B. Dyk, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Ann M. Sheadel, Frankfort, Ky., for respondents.

Robert A. Long, Jr., Washington, D.C., for the U.S. as amicus curiae, in support of respondents, by special leave of Court.

Syllabus

After respondent Kentucky Board of Elections denied petitioner Kay's request to have his name placed on a primary ballot for President of the United States, Kay, an attorney licensed to practice in Florida, filed a civil rights action on his own behalf in the District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the state statute on which the Board relied. Although he prevailed on the merits, the court denied his request for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: A pro se litigant who is also a lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees under § 1988. Neither § 1988's text nor its legislative history provides a clear answer to the question whether a lawyer who represents himself should be treated like a client who has an independent attorney or like other pro se litigants, who, the Courts of Appeals have correctly decided, are not entitled to attorney's fees. However, § 1988's overriding concern is with obtaining independent counsel for victims of civil rights violations in order to ensure the effective prosecution of meritorious claims. That policy is best served by a rule that creates an incentive to retain counsel in every case rather than a disincentive to employ counsel whenever a plaintiff considers himself competent to litigate on his own behalf. Even a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a disadvantage in contested litigation because ethical considerations may make it inappropriate for him to appear as a witness, and because he is deprived of the judgment of an independent third party during the litigation. Pp. 435-438.

900 F.2d 967 (CA 6 1990), affirmed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question is whether an attorney who represents himself in a successful civil rights action may be awarded "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.¹

Petitioner is licensed to practice law in Florida. In 1980, he requested the Kentucky Board of Elections (Board) to place his name on the Democratic Party's primary ballot for the office of President of the United States. Because the members of the Board concluded that he was not a candidate who was "generally advocated and nationally recognized" within the meaning of the controlling Kentucky statute, Ky Rev.Stat.Ann. § 118.580 (Michie 1982) (repealed in 1982), the Board refused his request.

Petitioner filed a successful action on his own behalf in the District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the Kentucky statute. Kay v. Mills, 490 F.Supp. 844, 852-853 (ED Ky.1980). The District Court held that the statute was invalid and entered an injunction requiring that petitioner's name appear on the ballot. Id., at 855. Two years later, the Kentucky General Assembly repealed the statute. In 1986, however, it enacted an identically worded statute, Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 118.581 (Michie 1982 and Supp.1988). In 1987, petitioner again requested that his name appear on the primary ballot, and when the Board initially refused his request, petitioner again brought suit in the District Court, and prevailed.² This time, however, he requested a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.³

The District Court denied petitioner's request for attorney's fees under § 1988 based on Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646 (CA6 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 1689, 80 L.Ed.2d 162 (1984).⁴ App to Pet. for Cert. 14a. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 900 F.2d 967 (1990). The majority read the language of the statute as assuming the existence of "a paying relationship between an attorney and a client." Id., at 971. Moreover, it concluded that the purpose of the statute was best served when a plaintiff hired an objective attorney—rather than serving as both claimant and advocate—to provide a "filtering of meritless claims." Ibid. The dissenting judge emphasized the statutory goals of promoting lawsuits that protect civil rights and relieving the prevailing party of the burdens of litigation. Id., at 972-973.

We granted certiorari, 498 U.S. 807, 111 S.Ct. 38, 112 L.Ed.2d 15 (1990), to resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the question whether a pro se litigant who is also a lawyer may be awarded attorney's fees under § 1988. The Circuits are in agreement, however, on the proposition that a pro se litigant who is not a lawyer is not entitled to attorney's fees.⁵ Petitioner does not disagree with these cases, see Brief for Petitioner 9, n. 4, and we are also satisfied that they were correctly decided. The question then is whether a lawyer who represents himself should be treated like other pro se litigants or like a client who has had the benefit of the advice and advocacy of an independent attorney.

We do not think either the text of the statute or its legislative history provides a clear answer. On the one hand, petitioner is an "attorney," and has obviously handled his professional responsibilities in this case in a competent manner. On the other hand, the word "attorney" assumes an agency relationship,⁶ and it seems likely that Congress contemplated an attorney-client relationship as the predicate for an award under § 1988.⁷ Although this section was no doubt intended to encourage litigation protecting civil rights, it is also true that its more specific purpose was to enable potential plaintiffs to obtain the assistance of competent counsel in vindicating their rights.⁸

In the end, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the overriding statutory concern is the interest in obtaining independent counsel for victims of civil rights violations. We do not, however, rely primarily on the desirability of filtering out meritless claims. Rather, we think Congress was interested in ensuring the effective prosecution of meritorious claims.

Even a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a disadvantage in contested litigation. Ethical considerations may make it inappropriate for him to appear as a witness.⁹ He is deprived of the judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory of the case, evaluating alternative methods of presenting the evidence, cross-examining hostile witnesses, formulating legal arguments, and in making sure that reason, rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical response to unforeseen developments in the courtroom. The adage that "a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client" is the product of years of experience by seasoned litigators.

A rule that authorizes awards of counsel fees to pro se litigants—even if limited to those who are members of the bar would create a disincentive to employ counsel whenever such a plaintiff considered himself competent to litigate on his own behalf. The statutory policy of furthering the successful prosecution of meritorious claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

1 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub.L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

2 When the Board determined that petitioner was the same person who had successfully challenged Kentucky's primary election law in 1980, the Board added petitioner's name to the ballot. The Magistrate found that the case was not moot at that point because "[t]he laws in question remain on the books and the problem posed for voters and future candidates, including the [petitioner], remains unsolved without action." App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a-21a (citation omitted).

3 Petitioner requested both costs and an attorney's fee and was awarded the former, but not the latter. Only the attorney's fee is at issue before us.

4 In Falcone, the Court of Appeals declined to award attorney's fees to a pro se attorney in a successful action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Court of Appeals reasoned that attorney's fees in FOIA actions were inappropriate because the award was intended "to relieve plaintiffs with legitimate claims of the burden of legal costs" and "to encourage potential claimants to seek legal advice before commencing litigation." 714 F.2d, at 647. The court relied on the fact that "[a]n attorney who represents himself in litigation may have the necessary legal expertise but is unlikely to have the 'detached and objective perspective' necessary to fulfill the aims of the Act." Ibid. (citation omitted).

5 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Kangas, 814 F.2d 1411 (CA9 1987); Smith v. DeBartoli, 769 F.2d 451, 453 (CA7 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1067, 106 S.Ct. 1380, 89 L.Ed.2d 606 (1986); Turman v. Tuttle, 711 F.2d 148 (CA10 1983) (per curiam ); Owens-El v. Robinson, 694 F.2d 941 (CA3 1982); Wright v. Crowell, 674 F.2d 521 (C...