Kay v. General Cable Corporation, 8629.
| Decision Date | 12 September 1944 |
| Docket Number | No. 8629.,8629. |
| Citation | 144 F.2d 653 |
| Parties | KAY v. GENERAL CABLE CORPORATION. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Henry K. Golenbock, of Perth Amboy, N. J., for appellant.
Ben Herzberg, of New York City (Pitney, Hardin & Ward, of Newark, N. J., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BRATTON and McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judges, and KIRKPATRICK, District Judge.
The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 as amended by the Service Extension Act of 1941, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 301 et seq., provides that any person who, upon entering the military or naval service of the United States, has left "a position, other than a temporary position, in the employ of any employer" shall, in the case of a private employer, be restored to such position or to a position of like seniority status and pay, "unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so." Section 308(b) (B).
The plaintiff, a company doctor (officially, "medical director") with the defendant corporation, left his position to enter the Army, served six months and was honorably discharged. The defendant refused to reinstate him and he applied to the District Court for relief under Sec. 8(e) of the Act. That court dismissed his petition on the ground that he did not hold a position "in the employ" of the defendant, and this appeal followed.
We are of the opinion that the plaintiff is eligible for the protection of the Act. The essential facts relating to his position are as follows:
On July 17, 1931, the plaintiff entered the service of the defendant on the basis of a full working week at its plant. Five or six months later this was reduced to three hours a day, except Sunday and half of Saturday, although he remained on call by the Company at any hour of the day or night and was expected to visit injured employees at their homes or at the hospital. His duties were to take care of all injured employees, giving first aid and all necessary medical care, to make pre-employment physical examinations and to conduct occasional routine physical examinations of all employees. Outside the plant, he maintained his own office where he received his private patients but where he was required also to receive and treat such employees as the Company sent him.
At the plant he had a waiting room, dispensary, treatment room, rest room, drug room and two examination rooms, all of which were furnished and fully equipped by the defendant. There were four nurses assisting him, employed by the Company, the plaintiff having no right either to employ or to discharge any of them.
The plaintiff's compensation was $55.00 a week which amount was regularly paid without regard to the number of patients he treated or the number of hours he spent in the Company's service, but which was on occasions reduced or increased to correspond with general wage and salary reductions and increases. From his weekly pay the Company deducted payments for social security and unemployment compensation. He had no contract for any definite period but was subject to dismissal at any time.
The status which the Statute protects is "a position * * * in the employ of" an employer — an expression evidently chosen with care. The word "employee" was not used. While it may be assumed that the expression which was adopted is roughly synonymous with "employee," it unmistakably includes employees in superior positions and those whose services involve special skills, as well as ordinary laborers and mechanics. Of course, the words are not applicable to independent contractors, but, except for casual or temporary workers, who are expressly excluded, they cover almost every other kind of relationship in which one person renders regular and continuing service to another.
The policy of the Act is stated in Sec. 1(b), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 301(b), to be that "the obligations and privileges of military training and service should be shared generally in accordance with a fair and just system * * *" though such declaration was hardly needed. Every consideration of fairness and justice makes it imperative that the Statute should be construed as liberally as possible so that military service should entail no greater setback in the private pursuit or career of the returning soldier than is unavoidable. The question here presented, therefore, is not to be solved by the application of abstract tests or formulae; but the factors which usually determine the nature of a disputed relationship must be considered in the light of the purpose which...
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