Kay v. Johnson & Johnson
| Decision Date | 06 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-1993,89-1993 |
| Citation | 902 F.2d 1 |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 12,449 Martha KAY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON and Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation, Defendants, Appellees. . Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Andrew C. Schultz with whom Field & Schultz, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.
Joseph G. Blute with whom Michelle J. Lipton and Nutter, McClennen & Fish, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendants, appellees.
Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, COFFIN and BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from an order of summary judgment entered by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in a prescription drug products liability action. The plaintiff, Martha Kay, claims that she suffers from hyperpigmentation, a severe pigmentary disorder, as a result of her use, during the period 1966-68, of Ortho Novum, an oral contraceptive manufactured by Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation ("Ortho"). Plaintiff asserts claims sounding in negligence and breach of warranty against Ortho and Johnson & Johnson, Ortho's parent corporation. Suit was originally brought in Massachusetts Superior Court and was removed to the United States District Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff's claims and the statute of limitations questions at issue in this case are governed by the substantive law of Massachusetts.
After extensive discovery on the statute of limitations issues, Ortho and Johnson & Johnson moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's claims are barred by the three-year limitations provisions of G.L. c. 260, Sec. 2A () and G.L. c. 106, Sec. 2-318 (). After briefing and the hearing of oral argument, the district court allowed defendants' motion for summary judgment; and the judgment was entered in accordance with the court's order.
We do not repeat the material facts as we are satisfied that they are adequately set forth in the comprehensive opinion of the district court, 722 F.Supp. 874 (D.Mass.1989). Plaintiff has argued on appeal that the district court erred in its application of the Massachusetts discovery rule to her claims and was incorrect in its conclusion that these claims were barred by the statute of limitations. We find plaintiff's arguments to be without merit. We conclude, for...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gonzalez v. U.S.
...1996, at the latest, when she retained her first attorney. See Kay v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.Supp. 874, 881 (D.Mass. 1989), aff'd 902 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that a plaintiff's claim for injuries arising out of her use of oral contraceptives was time-barred where the cause of actio......
-
Mouradian v. John Hancock Companies
...Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139, 25 L.Ed. 807 (1879); see also Kay v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.Supp. 874, 879 (D.Mass. 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1990). Section 10(b) reflects the determination that such stability and security are particularly important in the context of collective barg......
-
Doyle v. Shubs
...cause-and-effect relationship, no more was needed under Massachusetts law to wind the limitations clock. 2 See Kay v. Johnson & Johnson, 902 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1990) (per curiam); Fidler v. Eastman Kodak Co., 714 F.2d 192, 199 (1st Cir.1983), approved, Fidler v. E.M. Parker Co., 394 Mass. 5......
-
González v. Manatí Med. Ctr.
...281, 290 (1st Cir. 2002), as corrected (May 8, 2002) (citing Kay v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.Supp. 874, 881 (D.Mass. 1989), aff'd 902 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990)). If the jury finds that the date Ms. Hernandez retained legal counsel is the accrual date in the present case, Ms. Hernández's extraj......