Kayfez v. Gasele
| Citation | 993 F.2d 1288 |
| Decision Date | 02 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-2444,92-2444 |
| Parties | Michael D. KAYFEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. G.R. GASELE, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Michael D. Kayfez, pro se.
Mark A. Cameli, Asst. U.S. Atty., Madison, WI, for respondent-appellee.
Before POSNER and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Michael Kayfez is currently confined at the federal prison in Oxford, Wisconsin, following his convictions for possessing counterfeit reserve notes and an unregistered silencer. On April 8, 1992, Kayfez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that federal authorities miscalculated the jail time to be credited against his sentence. The district court found the calculations appropriate and thus denied Kayfez's petition.
On October 26, 1988, California state police arrested Kayfez after a legally-executed search of his home produced counterfeit federal reserve notes, a homemade silencer, and evidence of falsely-registered vehicles. On October 31, a federal detainer was filed, and he remained in custody. On June 28, 1989, Kayfez pleaded guilty to state charges of Vehicle Theft and False Registration of Vehicles. The state court deferred his sentencing for these offenses.
Two months later, Kayfez appeared before a federal court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and pleaded guilty to possessing counterfeit reserve notes and an unregistered silencer. On December 15, 1989, the federal court sentenced Kayfez to fifty-seven months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.
Kayfez then returned to state custody. On January 12, 1990, the state court sentenced Kayfez to consecutive sentences of imprisonment aggregating seven years, to run concurrently with his federal sentence, and credited 416 days against the state sentences. The court apparently intended to subtract from the seven years the time that Kayfez had already spent in custody before the state court sentencing, but it miscalculated the number of days, crediting 416, although Kayfez had actually served 443. On May 23, 1990, the state court vacated Kayfez's sentence, and continued the matter for further proceedings in September, Kayfez having waived his right to be present. On May 29, the state authorities turned him over to federal custody and thereafter he arrived at FCI Oxford. On October 4, 1990 the state court sentenced him to five years in prison, with credit for 547 days. This number represented the 416 days for which Kayfez had been given credit in the January sentence plus approximately the number of days served under those sentences.
When Kayfez entered the federal prison at Oxford on June 18, 1990, he received a letter awarding him full credit for his presentence detention time. On August 16, 1990, Kayfez received another letter, which revised the calculation. The Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) agreed to subtract twenty-seven days to account for California court miscalculation, but it refused to subtract the additional detention time. The Bureau explained that 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), authorized credit for presentencing detention time only if that time had not been credited against another sentence.
Kayfez sought administrative review of the Bureau's decision, then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In his petition, Kayfez requested credit to his federal sentence for all of his pre-sentencing custody time. Although he acknowledged this time had been credited against his state sentence, Kayfez claimed that, because his sentences are concurrent, crediting only against the state sentence would not reduce his period of actual imprisonment.
On appeal, as in district court, Kayfez relies on 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) which provides:
A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commencement of the offense for which the sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another sentence.
The Attorney General, acting through the Bureau of Prisons, makes the calculations "as an administrative matter when imprisoning the defendant." United States v. Wilson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 1355, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992).
There is no dispute that the time for which credit is sought qualifies for credit. The state and federal offenses are not the same. Arguably, however, Kayfez was arrested on the state charge after he commenced his federal offenses, and thus § 3585(b)(2) was fulfilled. In addition, a federal detainer was filed within five days of the arrest, so that his official detention from then on may well have resulted from his federal offenses, fulfilling (b)(1). United States v. Haney, 711 F.2d 113, 114 (8th Cir.1983). In any event the government makes no argument that any of the period of detention does not qualify for credit. It argues only that 416 of the 443 days prior to January 12, 1990 have been credited against another sentence.
The Bureau of Prisons treats Kayfez's federal sentence as if it commenced to run January 12, 1990 (this has the effect of crediting him with the time spent in state custody from January 12 until May 29, 1990, so that the period in dispute remains 416 of the 443 days in official custody prior to January 12)....
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