Kazadi v. State
| Decision Date | 24 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 11,11 |
| Parties | TSHIBANGU KAZADI v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
TSHIBANGU KAZADI
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
No. 11
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Argued: October 7, 2019
September Term, 2019
January 24, 2020
VOIR DIRE - FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS - PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF - RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY - STARE DECISIS - SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN LAW AND FACTS - DISCOVERY - CROSS-EXAMINATION - IMMIGRATION STATUS - In 1964, fifty-five years ago, in Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97, 100, 198 A.2d 291, 293 (1964), Court of Appeals held that voir dire questions concerning jury instructions were not appropriate. Thus, voir dire questions concerning jurors' ability and willingness to follow jury instructions on fundamental principles of presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and defendant's right to remain silent were not permitted. Given opportunity to review this issue and upon thorough consideration of recent developments—most importantly, Court's subsequent holdings in Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 179-80, 423 A.2d 558, 565 (1980) and Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 91, 437 A.2d 654, 658 (1981), that instructions as to law are binding and not advisory only—Court determined that holding in Twining is based on outdated reasoning and has been superseded by significant changes in law.
As such, to extent that Court held in Twining that it is inappropriate to ask on voir dire questions concerning presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and defendant's right to remain silent, Court overruled that holding and concluded that, on request, during voir dire, trial court must ask whether any prospective jurors are unwilling or unable to comply with jury instructions on fundamental principles of presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and defendant's right not to testify.
Court also held that, absent additional circumstances—such as allegations of quid pro quo or leniency in immigration case—State's witness's status as undocumented immigrant, or person subject to deportation order, does not show character of witness for untruthfulness or demonstrate motive to testify falsely. Without more, State's witness's status as undocumented immigrant, or person subject to deportation order, is not required to be disclosed by prosecutor during discovery and is not proper subject of cross-examination.
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Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 116042016
Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Wilner, Alan M. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Watts, J.
McDonald, Hotten, and Getty, JJ., dissent in part.
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This case presents another in a series of questions about the voir dire process in Maryland. In recent years, this Court has addressed matters concerning the proper form of voir dire questions and whether certain questions, when requested, are mandatory. See Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 354, 86 A.3d 1232, 1234 (2014); Collins v. State, 463 Md. 372, 379, 205 A.3d 1012, 1015-16 (2019). In this case, we must decide whether, upon request, a trial court must ask voir dire questions concerning a prospective juror's ability to follow jury instructions on the long-standing fundamental principles of the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and a defendant's right to remain silent.
Fifty-five years ago, in Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97, 100, 198 A.2d 291, 293 (1964), this Court held that a trial court need not ask during voir dire whether any prospective jurors would be unwilling to follow jury instructions on the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof. In the decades between then and now, this Court has never before expressly addressed whether Twining remains good law.
In this case, for the first time, we are explicitly asked to reexamine Twining. And, as another matter, we must also determine whether, during discovery, a prosecutor must disclose immigration-related information concerning a State's witness who is an undocumented immigrant, and whether a defendant may cross-examine such a witness concerning his or her immigration status.
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the State, Respondent, charged Tshibangu Kazadi, Petitioner, with first-degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence or felony, and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. Kazadi requested that the circuit court ask during voir dire whether any prospective jurors were unwilling or
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unable to follow jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the defendant's right not to testify. The circuit court declined to do so.
Before trial, Kazadi filed a motion to compel the State to disclose the Alien Registration Number,1 immigration case number, and immigration-related paperwork of one of the State's witnesses, S.L., who, according to Kazadi, was an undocumented immigrant subject to a deportation order and who, along with her son, M.L.,2 were allegedly attempting to avoid complying with the deportation order. The State filed an opposition to the motion to compel and a motion in limine to preclude Kazadi from cross-examination about S.L.'s immigration status. The circuit court denied the motion to compel and granted the State's motion in limine.
After being convicted, Kazadi appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Kazadi filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted.
Upon careful consideration of developments that have occurred in the fifty-five years since this Court decided Twining, 234 Md. 97, 198 A.2d 291—including this Court's subsequent holdings that, other than with respect to the crime charged, jury instructions are binding, see Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 179-80, 423 A.2d 558, 565 (1980), and
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Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 91, 437 A.2d 654, 658 (1981)—we determine that this Court's holding as to voir dire questions in Twining is based on outdated reasoning and has been superseded by significant changes in the law. To the extent that this Court held in Twining that it is inappropriate to ask on voir dire questions concerning the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and a defendant's right to remain silent, we overrule the holding in Twining, and conclude that, on request, during voir dire, a trial court must ask whether any prospective jurors are unwilling or unable to comply with the jury instructions on the fundamental principles of presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof, and the defendant's right not to testify.
We also hold that, absent additional circumstances—such as evidence of a quid pro quo arrangement or allegations of leniency in an immigration case—a State's witness's status as an undocumented immigrant, or the existence of a deportation order applicable to the witness, do not show the character of the witness for untruthfulness or demonstrate a motive to testify falsely. Without more, a State's witness's status as an undocumented immigrant, or any deportation order to which the witness is subject, are not required to be disclosed by a prosecutor during discovery, and are not proper subjects of cross-examination.
On January 17, 2017, jury selection occurred. On that date, Kazadi's counsel provided the circuit court with a document that was entitled "Defendant's Proposed Voir Dire[,]" and that included the following questions:
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The Court will instruct you that the State has the burden of proving the Defendant guilty of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Are there any of you who would be unable to follow and apply the Court's instructions on reasonable doubt in this case?
Is there any member of the [] jury panel who would hesitate to render a verdict of not guilty if you had hunch that the Defendant had committed the alleged crime, but were not convinced of that fact beyond reasonable doubt?
The Court will instruct you that the Defendant is presumed of be innocent of the offenses charged throughout the trial unless and until the Defendant is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Is there any member of the jury panel who would be unable to give the Defendant the benefit of the presumption of innocence?
Under the law[,] the Defendant has an absolute right to remain silent and to refuse to testify. No adverse inference or inference of guilt[] may be drawn from the refusal to testify. Does any prospective juror believe that the Defendant has duty or responsibility to testify[,] or that the Defendant must be guilty merely because the Defendant may refuse to testify?
(Numbers omitted). Kazadi's counsel requested that the circuit court ask the four questions during voir dire. The circuit court declined, stating: "Those are covered adequately in the instruction portion of the case and I think are covered in other questions that [I] ask."
During voir dire, after asking questions of the jury panel, the circuit court asked counsel whether there were any objections. Kazadi's counsel stated that he wanted the circuit court to ask the questions in his proposed voir dire that the court had declined to give. The circuit court responded: "[Y]ou've preserved your objection[.]"
On December 8, 2016, Kazadi filed a "Motion to Compel Discovery." (Some capitalization omitted). In the motion to compel, Kazadi advised that one of the State's witnesses, S.L., had provided a statement in which she said "that she was hesitant to come
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forward with information because she was worried about an outstanding deportation order[.]" Kazadi's counsel requested from the prosecutor, but was not provided, S.L.'s Alien Registration Number, "her immigration case number, and any paperwork [that] she ha[d] regarding her immigration status, including a copy of the deportation order[.]" Kazadi's counsel met with S.L. and the prosecutor, who instructed S.L. not to disclose her Alien Registration Number or answer any questions about the deportation order. Kazadi contended that the deportation order gave S.L. and her son, M.L., a motive to testify against Kazadi, in that...
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