Keane v. Fischetti, s. 18377

• Citation: 13 A.3d 1089,300 Conn. 395,32 IER Cases 373
• Decision Date: 15 March 2011
• Docket Number: Nos. 18377,18379.,s. 18377
• Parties: Monica KEANE, Administratrix (Estate of John Keane)v.Joseph FISCHETTI et al.William Mahoney et al.v.Joseph Fischetti et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

300 Conn. 395

13 A.3d 1089

32 IER Cases 373

Monica KEANE, Administratrix (Estate of John Keane)

v.Joseph FISCHETTI et al.William Mahoney et al.

v.Joseph Fischetti et al.

Nos. 18377

18379.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 8, 2010.Decided March 15, 2011.

William F. Gallagher, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, were Hugh D. Hughes, Garrett M. Moore and Gregory E. O'Brien, Cheshire, for the appellant in the first case (plaintiff in the first case).Elliot B. Spector, for the appellee in the first case (defendant William Mahoney in the first case).Justin Donnelly, Windsor Locks, for the appellees in the first and second cases (named defendant in the first case and named defendant et al. in the second case).Charles W. Fleischmann, Shelton, for the appellee in the second case (defendant Monica Keane, administratrix of the estate of John Keane).ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.ZARELLA, J.

These appeals ¹ require us to determine whether General Statutes § 7–308,² which bars actions between firefighters for negligence while acting within the scope of their employment, violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. In the first case (S.C. 18377), the plaintiff, Monica Keane, individually and as administratrix of the estate of John Keane, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which granted the motions of the defendants, Joseph Fischetti and William Mahoney, to strike all counts of the complaint. In the second case (S.C. 18379), the plaintiffs, William Mahoney and Erin Mahoney, appeal from the judgment of the trial court following the trial court's decision to grant the motions of the defendants, Monica Keane, as administratrix of the estate of John Keane, and Fischetti,³ to strike all counts of the complaint. On appeal, the plaintiffs in both cases claim that § 7–308 violates the state and federal equal protection clauses and, therefore, that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motions to strike on the ground that the actions were barred by the immunity provision in § 7–308. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

IFACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

These appeals arise from the May 19, 2007 collision of two fire trucks from the city of Waterbury (city), namely, “Truck 1” and “Engine 12,” which were being operated by firefighters employed by the city. Both trucks were among other fire rescue vehicles responding to a report of a kitchen fire on Eastern Avenue in Waterbury. Fischetti operated Engine 12 while John Keane rode in the front passenger seat. William Mahoney operated Truck 1. As the two trucks approached the intersection of East Aurora Street and the Route 73 connector to Route 8 in Waterbury, Truck 1 collided with Engine 12. As a result of this collision, John Keane suffered serious injuries that resulted in his death, and William Mahoney suffered nonfatal injuries. William Mahoney and the dependents of John Keane are eligible to receive and have received benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31–275 et seq. William Mahoney and Monica Keane, however, brought separate actions, seeking additional damages.

AFirst Case (S.C. 18377)

On February 7, 2008, Monica Keane, individually and as administratrix of the estate of John Keane, filed an amended, four count complaint ⁴ in which she alleged that Fischetti and William Mahoney were negligent in the operation of their respective fire trucks and that their negligence caused John Keane's death.⁵ Fischetti and William Mahoney thereafter filed separate motions to strike the respective counts of the complaint directed against them on the ground that § 7–308 barred injured firefighters who are eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits from bringing negligence actions against other firefighters for their injuries. Monica Keane objected to the motions and claimed that any immunity afforded to firefighters under § 7–308 violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The trial court granted the motions to strike as to those counts relating to the death of John Keane, concluding that § 7–308 barred those counts and that the immunity provision of the statute did not violate the federal and state constitutions. The court also granted the motions to strike the loss of consortium counts; see footnote 5 of this opinion; because those counts were derivative of the stricken counts relating to John Keane's death and, therefore, could not stand on their own. The court subsequently rendered judgment for Fischetti and William Mahoney.

BSecond Case (S.C. 18379)

The second case involves the same collision and the same parties, although some parties stand in different relation to each other in the second case than they did in the first case. On January 30, 2008, William Mahoney and Erin Mahoney filed a six count complaint against Fischetti, Monica Keane, as administratrix of the estate of John Keane, and the city, alleging, inter alia, that Fischetti and John Keane were negligent and that their negligence caused William Mahoney to sustain injuries.⁶ Fischetti, Monica Keane and the city filed motions to strike the respective counts against them on the basis of the immunity provision in § 7–308. William Mahoney and Erin Mahoney responded that the immunity provision in § 7–308 violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The trial court, following the same reasoning in its decision on the motions to strike in the first case, granted the motions to strike all counts of the complaint and subsequently rendered judgment for Fischetti, Monica Keane and the city. These appeals followed.⁷

IIDISCUSSION

The plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly struck their respective complaints because the immunity provided to firefighters by § 7–308, on which the trial court relied, violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. In support of their arguments, the plaintiffs raise two separate claims of unconstitutional discrimination. First, the plaintiffs claim that § 7–308 discriminates against firefighters in favor of other municipal employees because it prevents firefighters who are eligible for workers' compensation benefits from bringing actions against other firefighters for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle during the course of employment, whereas other municipal employees are not similarly prevented from bringing such actions. Second, the plaintiffs claim that § 7–308 discriminates against firefighters in favor of private employees because private employees who are otherwise eligible for workers' compensation benefits may bring motor vehicle negligence actions against coworkers, whereas firefighters who are eligible for workers' compensation benefits may not. See General Statutes § 31–293a. The plaintiffs claim that both of these distinctions are irrational and cannot survive a rational basis review. We disagree and conclude that the classifications drawn by § 7–308 do not violate the state or federal constitution. We will address each of the plaintiffs' claims of discrimination in turn.

We begin with well established standards of review regarding motions to strike and applicable equal protection principles. A motion to strike attacks the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a pleading. E.g., Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). In reviewing the sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint, courts are to assume the truth of the facts pleaded therein and to determine whether those facts establish a valid cause of action. See, e.g., Batte–Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 294, 914 A.2d 996 (2007). If the pleading fails to establish a valid cause of action, a court shall grant a motion to strike the offending claims. See, e.g., Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, at 498, 815 A.2d 1188.

In the present appeals, the propriety of the trial court's rulings on the respective motions to strike hinges on the issue of whether the trial court properly concluded that § 7–308 did not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law. A challenge to “[t]he constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.... It [also] is well established that a validly enacted statute carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, [and that] those who challenge its constitutionality must sustain the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.... The court will indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality.... Therefore, [w]hen a question of constitutionality is raised, courts must approach it with caution, examine it with care, and sustain the legislation unless its invalidity is clear.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 155, 957 A.2d 407 (2008).

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides: “No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. Article first, § 20, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin.” The plaintiffs have not claimed that the state constitution affords any greater protection than the federal constitution in this context. Therefore, we proceed to analyze the claims under each constitution together, under the same standard. See, e.g., State v. Hedge, 297 Conn. 621, 629 n. 5, 1 A.3d 1051 (2010). To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff first must establish that the state is affording different treatment to...