Keating v. City of New London

• Decision Date: 29 May 1926
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: KEATING v. CITY OF NEW LONDON.

133 A. 586

104 Conn. 528

KEATING v. CITY OF NEW LONDON.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 29, 1926

Appeal from Superior Court, New London County; Christopher L. Avery Judge.

Action by Johanna Keating against the City of New London to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defective sidewalk. From a judgment for plaintiff for $7,136 defendant appeals. No error.

Frank L. McGuire, Charles B. Whittlesey, and Thomas E. Troland, all of New London, for appellant.

Arthur M. Brown, of Norwich, and Perry J. Hollandersky, of New London, for appellee.

MALTBIE, J.

The plaintiff brought her action to recover damages for injuries sustained, as she alleged, by reason of a fall upon a sidewalk in the defendant city, claiming that the sidewalk was in a defective condition because of ice and snow upon it. The original appeal is taken from the refusal of the trial court to set aside a verdict rendered in the plaintiff's favor. It is somewhat difficult to understand the testimony of the witnesses as to the place upon the sidewalk where she fell, because they so largely illustrated it by reference to exhibits, but we certainly cannot say that the jury could not reasonably find the accident to have occurred substantially at the spot she claimed. There was considerable evidence apparently credible, that the sidewalk at that spot was slippery and not reasonably safe for passage by reason of hard-packed snow and ice upon it. Even the assistant city engineer of the defendant testified that, were it not for a covering of ashes which he stated was upon it when he visited the place the day after the accident, it would not have been safe, and the daughter of the owner of the adjoining premises, called by the defendant, testified that, before she had put such a covering over it on the night of the accident it was in a dangerous condition. There was also testimony that the defective condition of the sidewalk had existed for a week or more before the accident, without sand or other protective covering having been used to remove the danger; that the street where the accident occurred was one of the principal thoroughfares of the city, and one of the five streets to which attention was first given in the city's efforts to remedy defective conditions due to snow and ice; that the weather had been inclement during the days preceding the accident; and that, by reason of the dangerous condition of its streets, the city every day had had men and trucks or teams engaged in sanding its sidewalks. In such a situation we could not say that the jury might not reasonably have found that the sidewalk was defective at the point where the plaintiff fell, and that the condition had been such, and existed for such a length of time, as to justify imputing notice of its condition to the city in time for it reasonably to have remedied the defect; certainly we could not hold that the trial court was in error in its denial of the motion to set the verdict aside. Schroeder v. Hartford, 104 Conn. 334, 132 A. 901; Frechette v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 83, 132 A. 467.

The defendant contends, however, that the weather conditions during the 6 days preceding the accident had been such as to preclude a reasonable conclusion of liability on its part. The accident occurred about 6 p. m. on February 15, 1923. The plaintiff called as a witness the United States weather observer at New London, and he testified that, on the 6th and 7th days of February there was a snowstorm in which 5 1/2 inches of snow fell; that on the night of the 9th and 10th, 2 1/2 inches more snow fell; on the 11th, one inch fell; on the night of the 13th, there was snow and hail with some rain resulting in a snowfall of 2 1/2 inches; on the night of the 13th and 14th, one inch more of snow fell; and on the night of the 14th, ceasing at 9:30 a. m. on the 15th, 1 1/2 inches of snow fell. The defendant contends that it could not, in view of these facts, be reasonably found that the condition which caused the plaintiff's fall had existed for any such time as to render the sidewalk defective or to impute notice to the city. When once a defective condition due to ice and snow has become established, the fact that thereafter, by reason of storms or melting, that condition varies in some slight degree, will not relieve the city of liability, and will not in itself preclude a finding of constructive notice to it. Parks v. Des Moines, 195 Iowa, 972, 191 N.W. 728; Kopper v. Yonkers, 110 A.D. 747, 97 N.Y.S. 425, affirmed 188 N.Y. 592, 81 N.E. 1168; Larson v. City of New York, 145 A.D. 619, 130 N.Y.S. 257; Johnson v. City...