Keaton v. Pipkins

• Decision Date: 10 September 1930
• Docket Number: No. 252.,252.
• Citation: 43 F.2d 497
• Parties: KEATON v. PIPKINS et ux.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

43 F.2d 497 (1930)

KEATON v. PIPKINS et ux.

No. 252.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

September 10, 1930.

Charles A. Dickson, of Okmulgee, Okl., for appellant.

H. B. Parris, of Eufaula, Okl., for appellees.

Before LEWIS, PHILLIPS, and McDERMOTT, Circuit Judges.

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.

On October 16, 1926, T. R. Pipkins executed a renewal note for the principal sum of $2,500 to the First National Bank of Checotah, Oklahoma. On the same day, he made a written financial statement to the bank in which he stated that he owned certain personal property of the value of $2,250, a homestead of the value of $4,000 and 196 acres of land in McIntosh County, Oklahoma, of the value of $7,860, and that his liabilities consisted of an indebtedness to the bank in the sum of $2,500.

On November 8, 1926, T. R. Pipkins executed and delivered to Maggie Pipkins, his wife, a quitclaim deed conveying 157.76 acres of such 196 acre tract. On April 12, 1927, the bank recovered judgment against T. R. Pipkins on such note for $2,360.29 principal, with interest at 10% from November 9, 1926, for $236.02 attorney's fees and for $25.00 costs.

On December 1, 1927, the bank was taken over by the Comptroller of the Currency, on account of its insolvency, and, on December 15, 1927, Harwood Keaton was duly appointed receiver and took charge of the books, records and assets of such bank for the purpose of winding up its affairs.

On August 15, 1928, Keaton, as such receiver, commenced this suit against T. R. Pipkins and Maggie Pipkins to set aside such deed on the ground that it was made when Pipkins was insolvent, without consideration and for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding the bank, a creditor of T. R. Pipkins.

The evidence on the part of the appellees established the following facts: That Maggie Pipkins was 69 years of age; that she was first married to Henry C. Ernest; that Ernest died in 1887; that she inherited from Ernest about sixty head of cattle, two horses and a wagon, a crib of corn, some hogs, a mercantile store, a stock of merchandise, a small home and five acres of land, all of the value of approximately $5,000; that she married T. R. Pipkins in 1892; that he owned no property at the time of such marriage; that he took charge of the management of the property which Maggie Pipkins had inherited from Ernest, and sold the five acre tract and certain of the cattle, and with the proceeds purchased a tract of land near Eufaula for $1,000; that he exchanged such tract for another tract of land near Eufaula; that he sold the latter tract in 1907 for $2,200 and purchased a tract of land at Texana for $2,130; that in 1913 he sold the last mentioned tract for $3,500 and applied the proceeds to the purchase of the 157.76 acre tract of land; that the latter tract cost $4,000; that each of such tracts of land belonged to Maggie Pipkins and that she understood the deeds to each of these tracts had been taken in her name; that the deed to the 157.76 acre tract of land ran to T. R. Pipkins and that the record title thereto stood in his name from 1913 to the date of such quitclaim deed; that Maggie Pipkins did not discover that the title to such tract of land had not been taken in her name, until a short time before such quitclaim deed was executed; that Maggie Pipkins did not consent that T. R. Pipkins should, and did not know that he had obtained credit from such bank upon the faith of the ownership of such land.

The proof failed to establish that T. R. Pipkins was insolvent at the time such quitclaim deed was made. On the other hand, it tended to show that his assets, exclusive of the land in question, were then in excess of his liabilities.

The trial court found the issues for the appellees and entered a decree accordingly. The receiver has appealed.

Section 5271, C. O. S. 1921, reads as follows:

"Every conveyance of real estate or any interest therein, and every mortgage or other instrument in any way affecting the same, made without a fair and valuable consideration, or made in bad faith, or for the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding creditors, shall be void as against all persons to whom the maker is at the time indebted or under any legal liability."

Section 6020, C. O. S., 1921, reads as follows:

"Every transfer of property or charge thereon made, every obligation incurred, and every judicial proceeding taken, with intent to delay or defraud any creditor or other person of his demands, is void against all creditors of the debtor, and their successors in interest, and against any persons upon whom the estate of the debtor devolves in trust for the benefit of others than the debtor."

Counsel for the receiver contends, first, that such quitclaim deed was void, under the provisions of the statutes of Oklahoma above set forth; and, second, that under the facts Maggie Pipkins is estopped to claim as against the bank that she held the equitable title to such land.

In order to bring the case within the...