Keawsri v. Ramen-Ya Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2021
• Docket Number: 17-cv-2406 (LJL)
• Parties: KEAWSRI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RAMEN-YA INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

KEAWSRI, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
RAMEN-YA INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 17-cv-2406 (LJL)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

August 10, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

LEWIS J. LIMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment and on Plaintiffs' motion for an order conditionally certifying a collective action. Plaintiffs Ornrat Keawsri, Sachina Nagae, Takayuki Sekiya, Siwapon Topon, Pimparat Ketchatrot, Thiratham Raksuk, Parichat Kongtuk, Tanon Leechot, Thanatharn Kulaptip, Wanwisa Nakwirot, Natcha Natatpisit, and Parada Mongkolkajit (“Plaintiffs”) move for summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and for an order certifying this case as a collective action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 206. Dkt. No. 388.

Defendants Ramen-Ya Inc. (“RYI”), Miho Maki (“Maki”), Mr. Masahiko Negita (“Mr. Negita”) and Mrs. Yasuka Negita (“Mrs. Negita”) (collectively, the “RYI Defendants”) move for partial summary judgment dismissing the federal claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act against them on the grounds that Plaintiffs have presented no facts to support that RYI engaged in interstate commerce and dismissing the claims against Mr. and Mrs. Negita on an individual basis on the theory that they did not perform functions that would qualify them to be “employers” under FLSA. They ask the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Dkt. No. 387.

For the following reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied; Plaintiffs' motion for an order certifying this case as a collective action is granted; and Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs' allegations have been described in previous orders and opinions by Judges Caproni and Wang. See Dkt. Nos. 130, 367. Plaintiffs are former employees of RYI and Y&S International Corp. d/b/a Ramen-Ya (“Y&S”), which have operated and continue to operate as a single or joint employer under the trade name Ramen-Ya. Defendants Kobayashi and Kora are purportedly the owners and managers of Y&S. Defendant Maki is purportedly responsible for the management and operation of Ramen-Ya. Mr. and Mrs. Negita are allegedly owners and managers of RYI.

Plaintiffs allege various violations of federal and state labor laws, including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to provide pay-rate notices, failure to establish tip sharing and pooling arrangements, failure to maintain accurate and complete records, failure to provide complete and accurate wage statements, and failure to pay overtime and spread-of-hours compensation. Plaintiffs allege that they were paid solely from tips which were not provided to them exclusively but only after Defendants deducted more than 20% to pay for expenses of the restaurants. Plaintiffs further allege that their employers sought to conceal the compensation arrangement by providing four of the named Plaintiffs falsified payroll checks for a portion of the tip earnings described above, with the remainder of the tip earnings being paid in cash. Plaintiffs also allege that they sometimes worked in excess of forty hours per week without receiving overtime pay, and that on some days they worked more than ten hours without receiving spread-of-hours compensation as required by New York Labor Law.

RYI is a corporation organized under the laws of New York with its principal place of business at 133 West 3rd Street in Manhattan. Dkt. No. 388 ¶ 1. Y&S is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York with its principal place of business at 181 West 4th Street in Manhattan. Dkt. No. 388 ¶ 2.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs Keawsri, Nagae, Sekiya, and Topon instituted this action by complaint filed on April 3, 2017. Dkt. No. 1. On September 1, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. Dkt. No. 34. On January 2, 2018, the Court entered an order denying Defendants' motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and conditionally certifying the case as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216. Dkt. No. 130. On September 27, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint. On August 12, 2020, after being given leave to do so, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint adding Mrs. Negita as a defendant. Dkt. No. 371.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” WWBITV, Inc. v. Vill. of Rouses Point, 589 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting SCR Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshawsky, 559 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2009)).

In determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, the Court must view all facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, ” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008), and the movant bears the burden of demonstrating that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). If the movant meets its burden, “the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). It may not rely on “mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts, ” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), or “on the allegations in [its] pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible, ” Gottlieb v. Cnty. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). Rather, to survive a summary judgment motion, the opposing party must establish a genuine issue of fact by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), and demonstrating more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). If “the party opposing summary judgment propounds a reasonable conflicting interpretation of a material disputed fact, ” summary judgment shall be denied. Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1983). Where each party moves for summary judgment, “each party's motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Schwabenbauer v. Bd. of Educ., 667 F.2d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 1981)).

II. Local Rule 56.1

The Southern District's Local Civil Rule 56.1 sets forth specific requirements about how the facts relied upon by the moving party and disputed by the opposing party are to be presented. Any party moving for summary judgment must annex to its notice of motion “a separate, short and concise statement, in numbered paragraphs, of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” L. R. 56.1(a). Local Rule 56.1(b), in turn, requires the party opposing the motion to “include a correspondingly numbered paragraph responding to each numbered paragraph in the statement of the moving party, and if necessary, additional paragraphs containing a separate, short and concise statement of additional material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.” L. R. 56.1(b). All statements in a Local Rule 56.1 submission “must be followed by citation to evidence which would be admissible.” L. R. 56.1(d). “Each numbered paragraph in the statement of material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted for purposes of the motion unless specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered paragraph in the statement required to be served by the opposing party.” L. R. 56.1(c).

A Local Rule 56.1 statement, however, “is not itself a vehicle for making factual assertions that are otherwise unsupported in the record.” Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also Weider Health and Fitness v. AusTex Oil Ltd., 2018 WL 8579820, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (same); Rodriguez v. Schneider, 1999 WL 459813, at *1 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1999) (“Rule 56.1 statements are not argument. They should contain factual assertions, with citation to the record. They should not contain conclusions.”) (emphasis omitted), aff'd, 56 Fed.Appx. 27 (2d Cir. 2003). “Where . . . the record does not support the assertions in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, those assertions should be disregarded and the record reviewed independently.” Holtz, 258 F.3d at 74. A party who declines to respond to a Rule 56.1 statement in the proper form eschews its right to have the Court search the record to determine whether the allegedly undisputed fact is in fact disputed. Id. at 73 (“[A] court ‘is not required to consider what the parties fail to point out' in their Local Rule 56.1 statements.”) (quoting Monahan v. New York City Dep't of Corrections, 214 F.3d 275, 292 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Baity v. Kralik, 51 F.Supp.3d 414, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“If the opposing party then fails to controvert a fact set forth in the movant's Rule 56.1 statement, that fact will be deemed admitted pursuant to the local rule.”) (quoting Johnson v. IAC/Interactive Corp., 2 F.Supp.3d 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y....