Keddie v. Rutgers, State University
| Decision Date | 06 March 1997 |
| Citation | 689 A.2d 702,148 N.J. 36 |
| Parties | , 116 Ed. Law Rep. 720 Wells H. KEDDIE and the Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters, Plaintiffs-Respondents and Cross-Appellants, v. RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
John J. Peirano, Jr., Newark, for appellant and cross-respondent (Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, attorneys; Mr. Peirano and James P. Lidon, on the briefs).
Paul Schachter, Newark, for respondents and cross-appellants (Reinhardt & Schachter, attorneys; Denise Reinhardt, of counsel; Ms. Reinhardt, Nancy M. Macirowski and Susan J. Kraham, on the briefs).
Mark J. Fleming, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (Peter G. Verniero, Attorney General, attorney; Michael J. Haas, Senior Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The issue raised in this appeal is whether a taxpaying citizen of this State who is also a professor at Rutgers, the State University ("Rutgers"), has either a statutory or common-law right to access "public records" concerning Rutgers' expenditures for outside legal counsel in labor, civil rights, and employment-related matters in which Rutgers is or has recently been a party. The trial court denied access under both the common law and the Right-to-Know Law, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -4. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that all of the attorneys bills and the internally generated legal billing documents requested were "public records" under the Right-to-Know Law. 286 N.J.Super. 285, 297, 669 A.2d 247 (App.Div.1996). The Appellate Division also held that Rutgers was not obligated to provide plaintiffs with either legal documents and decisions filed with courts, agencies, and arbitral forums, or a list of pending legal matters. Id. at 297-98, 669 A.2d 247.
We hold that none of the documents requested are "public records" under the Right-to-Know Law because they are not explicitly required "to be made, maintained or kept on file" by Rutgers. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-2. We conclude, however, that all of the documents are common-law-public records.
Plaintiff Wells H. Keddie is a citizen of New Jersey and a professor of Labor Studies at Rutgers. Plaintiff Rutgers Council of American Association of University Professors Chapters ("AAUP-Rutgers") is an unincorporated association which, for purposes of collective negotiation, represents certain faculty members, teaching assistants, and graduate assistants employed by Rutgers. AAUP-Rutgers is an affiliate of the American Association of University Professors, a national organization that has advocated faculty participation in university budgetary matters. When the present litigation began, Keddie was president of AAUP-Rutgers.
Rutgers is an instrumentality of the State for the purpose of operating the State University of New Jersey pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:65-1 to -73. The Board of Governors is the ultimate governing authority for Rutgers. N.J.S.A. 18A:65-25. Rutgers has five campuses in the New Brunswick area, as well as major campuses in Newark and Camden.
On September 23, 1992, plaintiffs requested "public records" from Rutgers' president. The requested documents related to the expenditure of Rutgers' funds for legal representation in matters related to labor relations, civil rights claims, and other employment-related matters. They also requested copies of documents filed with courts, agencies, and arbitral forums. The documents requested can be classified in three categories: (1) attorneys bills; (2) documents Rutgers generates internally from the legal bills; and (3) pleadings, briefs, affidavits, and other filings made with courts, agencies, and arbitral forums and the decisions or awards rendered ("legal submissions"). University Counsel denied the requests, asserting that the legal submissions were available from other sources, and that Rutgers was not required to disclose the other records that were requested.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on November 30, 1992, seeking access to the documents previously requested pursuant to the common law and the Right-to-Know Law, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -4 "The RTKL"). An explanation of the legal billing procedure at Rutgers is essential to an understanding of the types of documents requested from Rutgers.
The standard procedure at Rutgers is that outside attorneys send monthly bills to University Counsel, who then forwards the bills to Rutgers' comptroller. The Comptroller's Department then prepares a "bill head," consisting of the law firm's name, address, due date, and the amount due. The legal bill and the "bill head" are then attached and sent to a Rutgers accountant for payment approval. Once approved by an accountant, the documents are then sent to the Accounts Payable Department where the information is entered into a database, and the hard copy is archived for seven years. University Counsel also keeps copies of the legal bills for two years before archiving them. Biannually, a Rutgers accountant prepares a summary of the outside legal expenses for University Counsel. That summary contains the dollar amounts paid to particular law firms and brief descriptions of the work performed.
Consistent with that explanation of the legal billing process, plaintiffs sought access to attorneys bills and the following internally generated payment information: bill heads, semiannual summaries of legal expenses generated by the accounting office, and the actual accounts payable database kept by Rutgers' accountant. Plaintiffs also sought access to all of the legal submissions.
After extensive discovery had been conducted, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argued that the records pertaining to legal billings were public documents under both the RTKL and the common law and that the legal submissions were accessible under only the common law.
The trial court held that (1) Rutgers is a public body and therefore covered by the RTKL; (2) none of the requested documents were public records under the RTKL; (3) the outside attorneys bills were not common-law-public records; and (4) the internally generated legal billing documents and the legal submissions were public records within the common-law definition but were not accessible by plaintiffs because Rutgers' interest in nondisclosure manifestly outweighed plaintiffs' interest in disclosure. The trial court, however, ordered Rutgers to provide plaintiffs with an ongoing list of cases it is involved in concerning labor, employment, and civil rights matters. Rutgers was also ordered to forward to plaintiffs a copy of any final decision or award and other relevant data such as docket numbers and venue on new cases.
The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the attorneys bills and the internally generated legal billing documents were public documents under the RTKL. 286 N.J.Super. at 297, 669 A.2d 247. The Appellate Division reasoned that the billing documents were public records under the RTKL because "Rutgers can[not] realistically be prepared for an 'audit by the State at any time' without maintaining such records." Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 18A:65-25(d)). The Appellate Division also reversed the trial court's order requiring Rutgers to provide periodic updates on pending and new matters, concluding that Rutgers did not have an obligation to provide copies of legal submissions because they were filed at various clerks' offices of the courts or tribunals involved. Id. at 297-98, 669 A.2d 247.
We granted Rutgers' petition for certification, 144 N.J. 377, 676 A.2d 1092 (1996), and now reverse.
First, we focus on whether the attorneys bills and the internally generated legal billing documents are public records under the RTKL. The New Jersey Right-to-Know Law provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided ..., all records which are required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file by any board, body, agency, department, commission or official of the State or of any political subdivision thereof or by any public board, body, commission or authority created pursuant to law by the State or any of its political subdivisions, or by any official acting for or on behalf thereof (each of which is hereinafter referred to as the "custodian" thereof) shall, for the purposes of this act, be deemed to be public records. Every citizen of this State during the regular business hours maintained by the custodian of any such records, shall have the right to inspect such records. Every citizen of this State shall also have the right, during such regular business hours and under the supervision of a representative of the custodian, to copy such records by hand, and shall also have the right to purchase copies of such records.
The RTKL has no standing requirement other than New Jersey citizenship. Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 43, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995). A citizen is not required to make a showing of interest. Ibid. Under the RTKL, the narrow question is whether the disputed records are required by law "to be made, maintained or kept on file." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-2. If that requirement is satisfied, the documents qualify as public records under the RTKL. Once documents are found to be Right-to-Know records, citizens of New Jersey have an almost absolute right to inspect, copy, or purchase those documents. Higg-A-Rella, supra, 141 N.J. at 43, 660 A.2d 1163; North Jersey Newspapers Co. v. Passaic County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 127 N.J. 9, 14, 601 A.2d 693 (1992). Inspection or copying of Right-to-Know documents is subject only to reasonable controls with respect to time, place, and reproduction costs. De Lia v. Kiernan, 119 N.J.Super. 581, 585, 293 A.2d 197 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 62 N.J. 74, 299 A.2d 72 (1972); N.J.S.A. 47:1A-2. No balancing of interests is permitted, so long as...
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