Kee v. City of Rowlett Texas, 99-10555
Citation | 247 F.3d 206 |
Decision Date | 28 March 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 99-10555,99-10555 |
Parties | (5th Cir. 2001) DARLIE KEE; DARIN ROUTIER Plaintiffs - Appellants v. CITY OF ROWLETT TEXAS; JIMMY RAY PATTERSON; CHRIS FROSCH; GREG DAVIS, Assistant District Attorney for Dallas County Defendants - Appellees |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and DUHE, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Darlie Kee and Darin Routier appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees the City of Rowlett, police officers Jimmy Ray Patterson and Chris Frosch, and Assistant District Attorney Greg Davis. The district court held that the placement of an electronic surveillance microphone at an outdoor grave site memorial service, which intercepted Kee and Routier's communications, did not violate constitutional or statutory rights and therefore did not provide a predicate for their claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 18 U.S.C. 2511. The district court reasoned that Kee and Routier failed to demonstrate that they possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their oral communications at the grave site memorial service. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
On June 14, 1996, Darlie Kee ("Kee") and Darin Routier ("Routier") attended a grave site memorial service for Damon Routier and Devon Routier, two minor children who were murdered on June 6, 1996 in Rowlett, Texas. Kee was the grandmother of the deceased children. Routier was the father of the deceased children. Darlie Routier, the children's mother, was convicted of capital murder for the children's deaths.
Jimmy Ray Patterson and Chris Frosch, police officers in the City of Rowlett (the "City"), were assigned to investigate the murders. As part of the investigation, an electronic surveillance wiretap was placed1 in a funeral urn in close proximity to the children's graves. The officers did not obtain a judicial warrant or court order, nor did they obtain the family's consent before placing the surveillance device at the grave site. However, the officers did obtain permission from the owners of the cemetery to enter and conduct their surveillance.
The grave site at issue was a privately owned plot of land situated in an outdoor and publicly accessible cemetery. The electronic surveillance device consisted of a microphone planted in an urn, which recorded sounds and conversations at the grave site. The microphone recorded the surrounding sounds of the grave site for approximately fourteen hours. Police also videotaped the activities at the grave site.
Due to the notoriety of the murders and the subsequent investigation, the news media and public were aware of the planned memorial service. News reporters from local television stations and newspapers attended and observed portions of the activity at the grave site. Family members, including Kee and Routier, and other invited guests participated in services, prayers, and conversations at the grave site. The summary judgment evidence fails to detail exactly how many people attended the grave site, who was in attendance, whether there was more than one memorial service during the day, when the media observers were present, and what conversations were recorded.2
The existence of the surveillance recordings was first discovered by Kee and Routier during the capital murder trial of Darlie Routier. At the trial, Patterson testified to the placement of the microphone surveillance device at the grave site. Patterson also testified that the device was placed in the urn beside the grave site "[i]n case someone went up there and made a confession about what happened." Upon learning about the existence of the surveillance recordings, Kee and Routier brought suit against those individuals and entities allegedly involved in the taping of their conversations.
The complaint sought damages, attorneys' fees, and a declaratory judgment against Patterson and Frosch; Greg Davis, the Assistant District Attorney assigned to the case; and the City (collectively, the "defendants"). The focus of the complaint was limited to those communications and prayers directed toward the deceased children. Specifically, Kee and Routier sought damages from Patterson, Frosch, and Davis under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and alleging violations of the constitutional right to privacy emanating from the general protections of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Kee and Routier also sought damages under 18 U.S.C. 2510-25223 for violation of the federal statutory law that prohibits illegally intercepting oral communications4 without a warrant. Kee and Routier sought damages from the City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City failed to properly supervise and train the officers as to the applicable law, and that this failure was a deliberate and intentional act of indifference. Finally, Kee and Routier sought declaratory relief requesting that the actions of the defendants be declared unconstitutional.
In three separate motions, the defendants moved for summary judgment.5 The district court held that Kee and Routier had not demonstrated that they had a subjective expectation of privacy in their conversations and prayers at the grave site. Further, the district court held that even if Kee and Routier could establish a subjective expectation of privacy, the district court was not prepared to recognize this expectation as objectively reasonable. Finally, the district court found that even if Kee and Routier could demonstrate a subjective and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the claims. Because the predicate constitutional violation could not be demonstrated, the district court dismissed all of the constitutional and statutory claims against the defendants.
Kee and Routier timely appeal the grants of summary judgment.
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Tolson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 604, 608 (5th Cir. 1998). "Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The moving party bears the burden of showing the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See id. at 325. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). "A dispute over a material fact is genuine 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Smith, 158 F.3d at 911 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The substantive law determines which facts are material. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The dispositive issue in Kee and Routier's complaint is whether the secret electronic recording of their private prayers and conversations directed at their deceased relatives violated their reasonable expectation of privacy. Their Fourth Amendment and "right to privacy" claims rest on the assumption that they had a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their oral communications at the outdoor grave site.6 Their statutory claims, arising under 18 U.S.C. 2511, also are predicated on enjoying a reasonable expectation of privacy in these oral communications.7 In similar fashion, the defendants' motions for summary judgment and defenses of qualified immunity are based on the fact that Kee and Routier cannot demonstrate that they ever possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy at the grave site upon which to base their constitutional and statutory claims. We approach both the constitutional and statutory claims under essentially the same analysis, asking whether Kee and Routier can demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy. Accordingly, our analysis necessarily focuses on this precise question.8
"The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.'" California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (). Following the Katz standard,9 Bond v. United States, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
United States v. Beene
...to caution against unrestricted surveillance." United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 55 (2d Cir.1982) ; see also Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 217 n. 21 (5th Cir.2001) ("[T]he open fields doctrine has not been expanded beyond observational searches."); Allinder v. Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180,......
-
Jones v. Halliburton Co. D/B/A Kbr Kellogg Brown & Root (kbr)
...is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir.2001) (quotations omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could enter a verdict for the non-mo......
-
Earnestine Hill v. Windows
...is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir.2001) (quotations omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could enter a verdict for the non-mo......
-
Harris v. Auxilium Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
...is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could enter a verdict for the non-m......
-
Hiding in Plain Sight: a Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public
...Id. 231. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).232. See id.233. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-53.234. See, e.g., Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 208-09, 211 (5th Cir. 2001) (analyzing whether mourners at a public gravesite, who challenged police's warrantless installation of a micro......
-
Table of cases
...772 A.2d 806 (D.C. 2001), §7:02 Kasparov v. Ambit Texas, LLC , 2017 WL 4842350 (N.D. Tex. 2017), §§16:05, 16:12 Kee v. City of Rowlett , 247 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2001), §§10:02, 10:10 Keith H. v. Long Beach Unified School District , 228 F.R.D. 652 (C. D. Cal. 2005), §§6:04, 12:12 Kelly v. Jef......
-
Privacy Privilege
...to exploit pictures of the deceased family member’s remains.” National Archives, 541 U.S. at 167. But see Kee v. City of Rowlett , 247 F.3d 206, 211-12 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that conversations at a graveside memorial service were not protected because the cemetery was a public place and ......
-
Privacy privilege
...to exploit pictures of the deceased family member’s remains.” National Archives, 541 U.S. at 167. But see Kee v. City of Rowlett , 247 F.3d 206, 211-12 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that conversations at a graveside memorial service were not protected because the cemetery was a public place and ......