Keefe v. Adams

• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: TERRELL, J.
• Citation: Keefe v. Adams, 106 Fla. 733, 143 So. 644 (Fla. 1932)
• Decision Date: 27 September 1932
• Parties: KEEFE et al. v. ADAMS et al. STATE ex rel. KEEFE et al. v. COTTON, City Manager, et al.

143 So. 644

106 Fla. 733

KEEFE et al. v. ADAMS et al.

STATE ex rel. KEEFE et al. v. COTTON, City Manager, et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

September 27, 1932

Error to Circuit Court, Pinellas County; T. Frank Hobson, Judge.

Injunction suit by Kenneth M. Keefe and others against Henry W. Adams Jr., and others, and a mandamus proceeding by the State of Florida on the relation of Kenneth M. Keefe and others against W. M. Cotton, as City Manager of the City of St Petersburg, and others. In the injunction suit a decree was rendered for defendants and plaintiffs appeal, and in the mandamus proceeding the alternative writ was quashed, and the petition was dismissed, and relators bring error.

Both the judgment and decree reversed.

ELLIS J., dissenting.

COUNSEL

Fleming, Hamilton, Diver & Lichliter and L'Engle & Shands, all of Jacksonville, for plaintiff in error.

Erle B. Askew and Carroll R. Runyon, both of St. Petersburg, and Kay, Adams, Ragland & Kurz, of Jacksonville, for defendants in error.

OPINION

TERRELL J.

We are confronted here with a writ of error from a judgment quashing an alternative writ of mandamus and an appeal from a decree denying a temporary restraining order. As to the mandamus proceeding it appears that in February, 1932, the state on relation of John S. Harris and others filed its petition for alternative writ of mandamus against W. M. Cotton as city manager, and Frank Wilson as director of finance of the city of St. Petersburg, commanding them to transfer and pay to relators specified amounts due them on certain coupons more particularly described therein, or show cause why they refuse to do so. A motion to quash the alternative writ was granted, and petition was dismissed. Writ of error was taken to that judgment.

As to the injunction suit, it appears that in June, 1932, immediately after the motion to quash was granted, Kenneth M. Keefe and others filed their bill of complaint against Henry W. Adams, Jr., and others, individually and as members of the city council of the city of St. Petersburg. This bill of complaint was predicated on the same grounds as the alternative writ in the mandamus suit, and in addition thereto embraced allegations as to seven other mandamus suits, subsequently filed, but of the same nature as that in which the writ of error was taken. The prayer of the bill seeks to hold in status quo the funds pursued in the mandamus suits and to require payment to complainants of 53 per cent. of designated future collections. A temporary restraining order was denied on the same grounds that the alternative writ was quashed, and appeal was taken from that decree. For the purpose of holding the res intact, this court made an order in aid of its appellate jurisdiction as authorized by section 5 of article 5 of the Constitution.

The writ of error and the appeal urge the same questions for adjudication by this court. The two causes have been combined and treated together as appellants and appellees in the briefs of counsel for both sides, so we will pursue the same course in our treatment of them.

Both causes arise out of the following facts: Pursuant to requirement of its charter, chapter 15505, Special Acts of 1931, the city of St. Petersburg, in August, 1931, adopted its budget for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1932, and passed a resolution fixing its tax levy for the like period. The tax levy enumerated sixteen items for which taxes should be assessed and collected, and designated the amount of millage to each item. The largest single item was 'interest on bonds' which embraced approximately 53 per cent. of the entire levy. The other fifteen items enumerated the general operating purposes or functions of the city. At the time the budget and tax levy were adopted the city had outstanding $23,000,000 in bonds on which interest had accrued, its assessed valuation was $125,000,000, and for the fifteen months' period to September 30, 1932, it was found that it would take about $2,873,000 to pay accrued interest on bonds in addition to general operating expenses.

From the adoption of its budget and tax levy resolution in August, 1931, to January 12, 1932, it is shown that the city in keeping with the terms of said resolution allocated each dollar as received, 53 per cent. to 'interest on bonds,' and 47 per cent. to the various items of operating expenses, but on January 25, 1932, it adopted a new resolution reciting in effect that only $942,363.28 had been collected from the 1931 tax levy, that $666,000 more would be required for operation expenses of the city for the current year, and that instead of following the past practice of allocating the taxes as received to the different items for which collected the city would, from January 1, 1932, appropriate all taxes to operating expenses until its 47 per cent. had been accumulated after which all amounts collected would be appropriated to 'interest on bonds.'

February 1, 1932, following the adoption of the latter resolution, the mandamus suit, writ of error in which is now before us, was instituted to require the city to pay and allocate to 'interest on bonds' as and when collected, 53 per cent. of all tax moneys received from the time it suspended such payments to the date of the alternative writ. Between February 1 and June 1, 1932, seven other mandamus suits were instituted with similar object in view. On the date the final judgment in the first mandamus suit was entered the bill of complaint was filed seeking to restrain the city from expending the 53 per cent. of the tax collections previously collected and allocated to 'interest on bonds,' and to restrain it from expending more than 47 per cent. of all future collections for general operating expenses.

Several questions are argued in the briefs, but the combined cause turns on the controlling question of whether or not under its charter power the city of St. Petersburg may adopt its budget and tax levy resolution assessing an adequate millage for 'interest on bonds' and for the different items of general operating expenses, and subsequently at will divert all collections appropriated for 'interest on Bonds' to operating expenses.

Chapter 15505, Special Acts of 1931, being that part of the city charter which among other things defines its fiscal policy, provides for a 'Council-Manager-Plan' of government for the city of St. Petersburg. Section 13 of this act provides a system of budgetary control for financing the various departments and divisions of the city government. To effect such a system it is required that the fiscal year begin with the first day of October and continue through the thirtieth day of September of the following year, that annually as required by the city manager the chiefs of the departments and divisions of the city shall prepare and submit to the city manager detailed information and estimates of expenditures and revenues of their respective departments and divisions for the ensuing year, from this information and estimates the city manager is required to submit to the city council on or before the first day of June of each year a budget estimate of the expenditures and revenues of all city departments, divisions, and offices for the ensuing fiscal year. On receipt and review of the budget estimate the city council is required to prepare and pass an appropriation ordinance on or before the first day of August of each year, said ordinance to be based on the city manager's estimate, but the items therein may be raised or lowered and the ordinance must be published and an opportunity be given for those who so desire to be heard in reference thereto before the city council sitting as committee of the whole.

Pursuant to the requirement of section 13 of chapter 15505, Special Acts of 1931, the city manager submitted his estimates, and the city council, on August 17, 1931, prepared and passed the prerequisite appropriation ordinance, section 11 of which appropriated the required amounts for 'interest on bonds' and other operating expenses of the city. When the appropriation ordinance was passed the city council ascertained that it would be necessary to raise $2,594,304.50 of the amount appropriated from taxation and forthwith adopted its resolution levying 21 mills on the dollar, on the assessed valuation of all property subject to taxation in the city. Of this levy more than 11 mills, or approximately 53 per cent. was imposed for 'interest on bonds,' and the remainder of 47 per cent. was distributed to the various departments for operating expenses. The fact that the appropriation ordinance was not passed on or before August 1st is immaterial. It was a continuing duty and imperative that it be done. Stieff v. Hartwell, 35...