O'Keefe v. Saul
| Decision Date | 27 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-00043 SRC |
| Parties | CHRISTINE L. O'KEEFE, Plaintiff(s), v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Christine L. O'Keefe's request for judicial review, under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying O'Keefe's application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. The Court affirms the Commissioner's decision.
O'Keefe filed her application for benefits on April 12, 2016. Tr. 182. The Social Security Administration initially denied her application on May 11, 2016. Tr. 63, 66-70. O'Keefe asked for a hearing before an ALJ on May 31, 2016, and the ALJ held a hearing on June 19, 2018. Tr. 38. The ALJ denied O'Keefe's application in a decision dated August 20, 2018. Tr. 15-31. On April 18, 2019, the Appeals Council denied O'Keefe's request for review. Tr. 1-3. As such, the ALJ's decision stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.
The ALJ determined that O'Keefe has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 15, 2014, the application date. Tr. 17. The ALJ found O'Keefe has severe impairments of arthritis of the bilateral thumbs, disorder of the cervical and lumbar spine with radiculopathy, carpal tunnel syndrome, bilateral DeQuervain tenosynovitis, anxiety disorder, depression, and panic disorder. Tr. 17. The ALJ found O'Keefe's alleged impairments of dyslexia, a ganglion cyst on her right foot and ankle, and vision impairments nonsevere. Tr. 18. The ALJ found that no impairment or combination of impairments met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 18.
After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that O'Keefe had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) with the following limitations. Tr. 20. She can sit for a total of four hours in an eight-hour work day, but only for two hours at one time without interruption. Id. She can stand for a total of four hours in one day, but only for two hours at one time without interruption. Id. She can walk for a total of four hours in an eight-hour work day, but only for two hours at one time without interruption. Id. She can occasionally push or pull with the bilateral upper extremities. Id. She can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but can occasionally climb ramps or stairs. Id. She can occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, and kneel, but can never crawl. Id.
The ALJ went on to find that O'Keefe can handle objects. Id. Her gross manipulation is limited to frequently with the bilateral upper extremities. Id. She can finger objects - that is fine manipulations of items no smaller than the size of a paperclip - frequently with the bilateral upper extremities. Id. She should not use hazardous machinery and can have no exposure to unshielded moving mechanical parts. Id. She can never drive a motor vehicle as a part of the work function. Id. She should have no exposure to unprotected heights. Id. She can remember, understand, and carry out simple and routine instructions and tasks consistent with SVP levels 1 and 2 type jobs with no strict production quotas with an emphasis on a per shift rather than a perhour basis. Id. She can have no interaction with the general public and occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors after the first 30 days of employment with no tandem tasks with co-workers. Id.
The ALJ found that O'Keefe cannot perform any past relevant work. Tr. 28. On the date she filed the application, O'Keefe was 47 years old, which is defined as a "younger individual age 18-49." Tr. 29. She subsequently changed age category to closely approaching advanced age. Id. O'Keefe has at least a high school education and can communicate in English. Id. After considering O'Keefe's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that O'Keefe can perform including router and retail price marker. Id. Thus, the ALJ concluded that O'Keefe "has not been under a disability." Tr. 49. O'Keefe appeals, arguing a lack of substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision.
A disability is defined as the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant has a disability "only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy[.]" Id. at § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential process when evaluating whether the claimant has a disability. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(1). First, the Commissioner considers theclaimant's work activity. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner looks to see whether "the claimant has a severe impairment [that] significantly limits [the] claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). "An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 416.920a(d).
Third, if the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner considers the impairment's medical severity. If the impairment meets or equals one of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in the regulations, the claimant is considered disabled, regardless of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d).
Fourth, if the claimant's impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one of the presumptively disabling impairments, the Commissioner assesses whether the claimant retains the "residual functional capacity" ("RFC") to perform his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(5)(i). An RFC is "defined as the most a claimant can still do despite his or her physical or mental limitations." Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 923 (8th Cir. 2011); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). While an RFC must be based "on all relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual's own description of his limitations," an RFC is nonetheless an "administrative assessment"—not a medical assessment—and therefore "it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not a physician, to determine a claimant's RFC." Boyd v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2016).Thus, "there is no requirement that an RFC finding be supported by a specific medical opinion." Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016). Ultimately, the claimant is responsible for providing evidence relating to his RFC and the Commissioner is responsible for developing the claimant's "complete medical history, including arranging for a consultative examination(s) if necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help [the claimant] get medical reports from [the claimant's] own medical sources." 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3) (emphasis added). If, upon the findings of the ALJ, it is determined the claimant retains the RFC to perform past relevant work, he or she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
Fifth, if the claimant's RFC does not allow the claimant to perform past relevant work, the burden of production to show the claimant maintains the RFC to perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy shifts to the Commissioner. See Brock v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2012); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, the Commissioner finds the claimant not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, the Commissioner finds the claimant disabled. Id. At Step Five, even though the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner, the burden of persuasion to prove disability remains on the claimant. Hensley, 829 F.3d at 932.
If substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court must affirm the decision. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g); 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). "[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high." Id. Under this test, the court "consider[s] all evidence in the record, whether it supports or detracts from the ALJ's decision." Reece v. Colvin, 834 F.3d 904, 908(8th Cir. 2016). The Court "do[es] not reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ" and will "defer to the ALJ's determinations regarding the credibility of testimony, as long as those determinations are supported by good reasons and substantial evidence." Id. The ALJ will not be "reverse[d] merely because substantial evidence also exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because [the court] would have decided the case differently." KKC ex rel. Stoner v. Colvin, 818 F.3d...
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