Keel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | NO. 1:11-CV-248,1:11-CV-248 |
| Parties | MELVIN C. KEEL, JR., v. WAL-MART STORES, INC. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
This case is assigned to the Hon. Ron Clark, United States district judge, and was referred for pretrial matters to the Hon. Earl S. Hines, United States magistrate judge, pursuant to a Referral Order entered on May 17, 2011. On August 9, 2011, the case was reassigned to the undersigned United States magistrate judge. Pending is Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s1 (Wal-Mart) "Motion for Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 39). Wal-Mart argues that dismissal of pro se Plaintiff Melvin C. Keel, Jr.'s (Keel) employment discrimination claims is warranted because the claims are barred by the statute of limitations and because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. For the reasons stated below, there is a genuine dispute regarding the limitations issue but there are no genuine disputes regarding Keel's claims. Accordingly, Wal-Mart's motion should be granted.
The Plaintiff, Melvin C. Keel, Jr., is a white male who suffers from dyslexia and illiteracy allegedly due to complications that occurred at birth.3 On February 9, 2007, Wal-Mart hired Keel as a part-time deli sales associate. Shortly thereafter, Keel gave a customer the wrong cut of meat. Wal-Mart investigated the incident and learned that Keel was unable to read or write. Wal-Mart offered Keel a position as a part-time dry grocery sales associate, which he accepted. In April 2007, Wal-Mart approached Keel with an opportunity to move to a full-time position on the overnight maintenance crew. The position's responsibilities included: sweeping the store floors, operating the scrubber machine, mopping the floors, and operating the buffer machine. Wal-Mart expected the overnight crew to finish these duties by 7:00 a.m. the following morning. Keel accepted Wal-Mart's offer on April 26, 2007.
Wal-Mart has a "Coaching for Improvement" policy that serves as a guide when an employee is not meeting the requirements and expectations of his position. The policy sets forth four levels of potential disciplinary actions: verbal coaching, written coaching, decision-making day coaching, and termination. If an employee has been given a decision-making day coaching, any failure to perform up to Wal-Mart's expectations within the following twelve months may result in immediate termination.
On June 27, 2007, Keel received verbal coaching from managers Roger Michel and Brian Kiefer. Keel received the coaching because he was performing his duties too slowly. In their report, Keel's managers noted that he was only cleaning half of the sales floor during his shift. Two weeks later, on July 8, 2007, Keel received written coaching from managers Betty Shepherd and James Holloway after they noticed that Keel was still failing to complete his duties in a timely manner.
On July 11, 2007, Keel's brother-in-law, Frank Matin, wrote a letter on Keel's behalf to two of Keel's managers. The letter complained of the conduct of Keel's supervisor, Lupe Martinez, who was allegedly verbally abusive to Keel. The letter states: (Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 18, Docket No. 39) (emphasis in original.) Finally, the letter alleges that Martinez's conduct is "significantly affecting my work relations" and that "I cannot stand this abuse anymore." (Id.) Wal-Mart investigated the allegations in this letter by interviewing Keel's co-workers. Allegedly, Wal-Mart did not find any corroborating evidence.
On August 14, 2007, Keel received a verbal coaching from managers Brian Kiefer and James Holloway. The basis for this coaching was that Keel and other members of the floor crew left the store without finishing the floors. Keel's managers placed him on decision-making day coaching.
The following day, Keel's brother-in-law attempted to send a second letter to Keel's manager. This letter references the first letter and states that Keel "[has] been left to work in the same degrading and hostile work environment." (Id., Ex. 27.) The letter further provides that Keel is (Id.) Wal-Mart never signed for the letter, and it was returned to Keel.
On August 22, 2007, one of Keel's managers, Brian Kiefer notified co-manager Walter Lashley that Keel failed to complete his assigned tasks by the end of his shift. Brian Keifer also recommended that Keel's employment should be terminated. In accordance with this recommendation, Walter Lashley terminated Keel's employment.
On August 31, 2007, Keel delivered two letters to Wal-Mart's district office in Lumberton, Texas. One letter was the August 15, 2007 letter that was returned to him. The other letter was dated August 28, 2007. This latter letter complains that Keel "was fired for Whistleblowing and nothing else." (Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 30, Docket No. 39.) The letter also alleges that Wal-Mart should have accommodated his disability by assigning someone to read for him when he worked in the deli department. Wal-Mart conducted an investigation into Keel's allegations but was allegedly unable to substantiate them.
On October 30, 2007, Keel filed his "Charge of Discrimination" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), complaining that "I have been discharged because of my disability and race." (Id., Ex. 44.) The charge also states that Wal-Mart retaliated against him for complaining of the discrimination and that it failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. Finally, the charge provides that Wal-Mart forced Keel to work in "a racially hostile work environment." (Id.)
Keel filed the instant lawsuit on May 17, 2011. Keel's pro se "Complaint" (Docket No. 1) alleges discrimination on the basis of his disability. In the pleading, the lines next to "race" and"color" are unchecked, but a handwritten line labeled "disability" is checked. Additionally, the line next to "terminated plaintiff's employment" is checked, and Keel wrote "retaliation" on the blank line next to "other." Finally, Keel alleges that Wal-Mart issued him substandard equipment during his employment. Attached to the complaint is the charge of discrimination.
A court should liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993); Moore v. Sawyer, No. 1:10-cv-310, 2010 WL 6004375, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2010) (Hines, J.). Given this interpretative rule, the undersigned construes the following claims from Keel's charge of discrimination and complaint: (1) discrimination (disparate treatment) under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); (2) retaliation under Title VII and the ADA; (3) failure to accommodate under the ADA; and (4) hostile work environment under Title VII and the ADA. Although Wal-Mart disputes whether Keel actually alleges all of these claims, Wal-Mart addresses each potential claim in its summary judgment motion.
Pending is Wal-Mart's summary judgment motion. Wal-Mart argues that this lawsuit should be dismissed for two reasons: (1) Keel's claims are barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) there are no genuine disputes regarding the claims on which Keel would be entitled to relief. Keel filed a "Response" (Docket No. 43) comprised almost entirely of non-legal objections to Wal-Mart's summary judgment evidence. Subsequently, Keel filed a motion (Docket No. 44) requesting that the Court order Wal-Mart to produce outstanding discovery. The undersigned entered an order (Docket No. 46) directing the parties to meet and confer in an attempt to resolve the discovery issues. When the parties informed the Court that the issues had been resolved, the undersigned entered an additional order (Docket No. 50) granting Keel leave to file a sur-reply supported by the recentlyproduced discovery. Keel did not file a sur-reply and has not produced any summary judgment evidence supporting his claims.
As discussed below, there is a genuine dispute regarding Wal-Mart's limitations defense but there are no genuine disputes regarding Keel's claims. Therefore, this lawsuit should be dismissed with prejudice.
This court has subject matter jurisdiction predicated upon federal question jurisdiction. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Venue is proper because events giving rise to the above claims occurred within the confines of this district. See id.
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord United States ex rel. Jamison v. McKesson Corp., 649 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2011). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material when it is relevant or necessary to the ultimate conclusion of the case. Id.
The movant has the burden to identify "each claim or defense - or the part of each claim or defense - on which summary judgment is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "If the dispositive issue is one on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of...
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