Keel v. Weinman, 6 Div. 125
Decision Date | 21 November 1957 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 125 |
Citation | 98 So.2d 611,266 Ala. 684 |
Parties | J. M. KEEL v. R. L. WEINMAN, Jr., et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Jerome Phillips, Birmingham, for appellant.
Abele & Witcher, Birmingham, for appellees.
This is an appeal from a final judgment rendered at law in favor of plaintiffs (man and wife) who are the appellees here.
There are two counts in the complaint--A and B. They both allege the existence of a contract between plaintiffs and defendant in which defendant agreed to survey certain property, which we shall hereinafter describe as lots 16 and 17, and to locate the house in which the plaintiffs were living within said lots.
In count A it is alleged that 'defendant breached his contract by not accurately and correctly locating the house in that the defendant located the house on lot 17 instead of lot 16 which in fact the house is on'. The complaint then makes claim for certain special damages.
Count B adopts all of count A except that in lieu of the allegation that defendant breached his contract, count B substitutes an allegation 'that the defendant negligently conducted said survey'; and also substitutes the words that as a 'proximate consequence of defendant's negligence' for the words as a 'proximate consequence of defendant's breach of contract'.
There was no demurrer to the complaint. Defendant filed a plea of the statute of limitations of one year applicable to both counts separately. The plea was in Code form. Section 233(35), Title 7, Code of 1940. The court sustained the demurrer to the plea as to count A (based on the breach of a simple contract), and overruled the demurrer as to count B (based on negligence). To count A the limitation is six years. Section 21, Title 7, Code. To count B the limitation is one year. Section 26, Title 7, Code. The ruling on the demurrer to the plea as to each count was in accordance with the statute. It did not eliminate count B as appellant contends, but served to form an issue in the case.
The evidence showed that the cause of action arose more than one year before the suit was instituted. That entitled defendant to the affirmative charge as to count B. But the form in which it was requested was 'The defendant respectfully requests the general charge in his favor as to count B of the amended complaint'. We cannot reverse the trial judge for refusing such a charge. A requested charge must be given or refused in the language in which it is requested. Section 273, Title 7, Code; Porter v. State, 234 Ala. 11, 174 So. 311; Fuller v. Nazal, 259 Ala. 598, 67 So.2d 806. A request for the court to charge as stated above cannot be reviewed.
The first assignment of error relates to a ruling on the demurrer to the plea of the statute of limitations as an answer to count A. For the reasons which we have stated above, there is no error shown by the assignment. Lassiter v. Thompson, 85 Ala. 223, 6 So. 33.
The second assignment of error is that the court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a new trial. The motion contained as a ground that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the great weight of the evidence, and also a ground that it is contrary to the facts in the case. Appellant's counsel in brief argue those grounds of the motion. They are therefore properly presented for review on this appeal. Cobb v. Malone, 92 Ala. 630, 9 So. 738; Roan v. McCaleb, 264 Ala. 31, 84 So.2d 358.
The evidence shows that plaintiffs-appellees made application to Family Reserve Insurance Company for a FHA loan in the sum of $4,300; that the Family Reserve Insurance Company obtained J. M. Keel, defendant-appellant, to survey the property in order to determine whether they would make the loan.
The evidence further shows that plaintiffs-appellees had no direct contact with defendant, but defendant's wife made the arrangements for the survey. At the closing of the loan the cost of the survey was charged by Family Reserve Insurance Company to plaintiffs-appellees and at that time plaintiff-appellee R. L. Weinman, Jr., handed Mrs. J. M. Keel, wife of defendant-appellant, thirty-two and a half dollars, the charge made by the defendant for the survey.
The record discloses that appellant's wife, Mrs. J. M. Keel, testified on direct examination as follows:
.
On Recross Examination.
On Redirect Examination.
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