Keels v. One Ford Truck, S. C. License No. J-6182, J-6182

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
Writing for the CourtTAYLOR; The case came on for trial before Honorable J. Henry Johnson; FISHBURNE, STUKES and OXNER, JJ., and E. H. HENDERSON
Decision Date27 June 1951
PartiesKEELS v. ONE FORD TRUCK, S. C. LICENSE NO.et al.
Docket NumberNo. 16518,J-6182

Page 770

65 S.E.2d 770
219 S.C. 449
KEELS

v.
ONE FORD TRUCK, S. C. LICENSE NO. J-6182 et al.
No. 16518.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
June 27, 1951.

Hagood, Rivers & Young, Charleston, for appellants.

[219 S.C. 450] Thomas P. Bussey, Legare & Hare, Charleston, for respondent.

TAYLOR, Justice.

This action arose out of the collision of two motor vehicles at the intersection of Anson and Society Streets in the City of Charleston. The complaint alleges that the collision occurred November 27, 1948, while plaintiff was driving his 1940 model Ford east on Society Street; that, on approaching [219 S.C. 451] the stop sign at the intersection of Anson Street, he stopped and then proceeded slowly and cautiously into the intersection where his car was struck on the right side by the appellant Ford Truck which was north bound on Anson Street, as a result of which he suffered injuries to his person and damage to the car. Various specifications of negligence, recklessness and willfulness are also set forth therein, together with the traffic ordinances of the City of Charleston.

Appellants in their answer deny all material allegations and set up the defense of contributory negligence, recklessness and willfulness on the part of the respondent in that he, in violation of the traffic ordinances of the City, failed to stop at a stop sign and drove in front of the appellants' truck when it was so close that a collision was unavoidable, thereby bringing about his own damage and injuries. The appellants, I. M. Pearlstine & Sons, in their answer counterclaimed for damage to the truck.

The case came on for trial before Honorable J. Henry Johnson, Presiding Judge, and jury during the April 1950 Term of Common Pleas Court for Charleston.

At the conclusion of respondent's testimony appellants moved for a nonsuit which was refused, but upon their request punitive damages were ruled out. At the conclusion of all the testimony appellants moved for a directed verdict which was refused. They then moved for a directed verdict as to punitive damages which was granted and the case was submitted to the jury who rendered a verdict for respondent in the sum of $650 as damages to the property of respondent

Page 771

and $16,350 as compensation for the injuries suffered by respondent.

Upon the return of the verdict appellants made timely motions for a new trial on the record and for judgment for appellants non obstante verdicto, both of which were refused.

Appellants now come to this Court contending (1) that respondent's negligence was the sole proximate cause of his [219 S.C. 452] collision, (2) that he was guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar recovery, (3) that the verdict was so excessive as to show passion and prejudice on the part of the jury.

Respondent testified that he approached the intersection at a speed of approximately 8 to 10 miles per hour, that he came to a complete stop at the stop sign, but the corner being a 'blind' one and Anson Street being very narrow (only 19 feet and 10 inches wide), it was necessary for him to move forward in order to see south on this street. Not seeing any approaching traffic, he slowly entered the intersection and was aware of the truck only when it was very close. A portion of his testimony appears as follows: 'As I approached the intersection, I came to a stop, and I had to pull the car up a little so I could see, and I put it in low gear, and as I stopped, I saw the street on Anson to my right was clear, and I started on off slowly. There were a number of people crossing the street, and my attention was on them, and...

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2 practice notes
  • Scott v. Meek, No. 17231
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • December 10, 1956
    ...537, 30 S.E.2d 449; Moorer v. Dowling, 216 S.C. 456, 58 S.E.2d 734; Cook v. Norwood, 217 S.C. 383, 60 S.E.2d 695; Keels v. One Ford Truck, 219 S.C. 449, 65 S.E.2d 770; Gillespie v. Ford, 225 S.C. 104, 81 S.E.2d 44; Geiger v. Checker Cab Co., 229 S.C. 39, 91 S.E.2d 552. And in determining th......
  • Geiger v. Checker Cab Co., No. 17122
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • February 20, 1956
    ...presented, it, and all reasonable inferences from it, must be considered most favorably to respondent's case. Keels v. One Ford Truck, 219 S.C. 449, 65 S.E.2d 770; Gillespie v. Ford, 225 S.C. 104, 81 S.E.2d 44. So viewed, it was, in our opinion, sufficient to present issues for the jury bot......
2 cases
  • Scott v. Meek, No. 17231
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • December 10, 1956
    ...537, 30 S.E.2d 449; Moorer v. Dowling, 216 S.C. 456, 58 S.E.2d 734; Cook v. Norwood, 217 S.C. 383, 60 S.E.2d 695; Keels v. One Ford Truck, 219 S.C. 449, 65 S.E.2d 770; Gillespie v. Ford, 225 S.C. 104, 81 S.E.2d 44; Geiger v. Checker Cab Co., 229 S.C. 39, 91 S.E.2d 552. And in determining th......
  • Geiger v. Checker Cab Co., No. 17122
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • February 20, 1956
    ...presented, it, and all reasonable inferences from it, must be considered most favorably to respondent's case. Keels v. One Ford Truck, 219 S.C. 449, 65 S.E.2d 770; Gillespie v. Ford, 225 S.C. 104, 81 S.E.2d 44. So viewed, it was, in our opinion, sufficient to present issues for the jury bot......

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