Keels v. One Ford Truck, S. C. License No. J-6182, J-6182
| Citation | 219 S.C. 449,65 S.E.2d 770 |
| Decision Date | 27 June 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 16518,J-6182,16518 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Parties | KEELS v. ONE FORD TRUCK, S. C. LICENSE NO.et al. |
Hagood, Rivers & Young, Charleston, for appellants.
Thomas P. Bussey, Legare & Hare, Charleston, for respondent.
This action arose out of the collision of two motor vehicles at the intersection of Anson and Society Streets in the City of Charleston. The complaint alleges that the collision occurred November 27, 1948, while plaintiff was driving his 1940 model Ford east on Society Street; that, on approaching the stop sign at the intersection of Anson Street, he stopped and then proceeded slowly and cautiously into the intersection where his car was struck on the right side by the appellant Ford Truck which was north bound on Anson Street, as a result of which he suffered injuries to his person and damage to the car. Various specifications of negligence, recklessness and willfulness are also set forth therein, together with the traffic ordinances of the City of Charleston.
Appellants in their answer deny all material allegations and set up the defense of contributory negligence, recklessness and willfulness on the part of the respondent in that he, in violation of the traffic ordinances of the City, failed to stop at a stop sign and drove in front of the appellants' truck when it was so close that a collision was unavoidable, thereby bringing about his own damage and injuries. The appellants, I. M. Pearlstine & Sons, in their answer counterclaimed for damage to the truck.
The case came on for trial before Honorable J. Henry Johnson, Presiding Judge, and jury during the April 1950 Term of Common Pleas Court for Charleston.
At the conclusion of respondent's testimony appellants moved for a nonsuit which was refused, but upon their request punitive damages were ruled out. At the conclusion of all the testimony appellants moved for a directed verdict which was refused. They then moved for a directed verdict as to punitive damages which was granted and the case was submitted to the jury who rendered a verdict for respondent in the sum of $650 as damages to the property of respondent and $16,350 as compensation for the injuries suffered by respondent.
Upon the return of the verdict appellants made timely motions for a new trial on the record and for judgment for appellants non obstante verdicto, both of which were refused.
Appellants now come to this Court contending (1) that respondent's negligence was the sole proximate cause of his collision, (2) that he was guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar recovery, (3) that the verdict was so excessive as to show passion and prejudice on the part of the jury.
Respondent testified that he approached the intersection at a speed of approximately 8 to 10 miles per hour, that he came to a complete stop at the stop sign, but the corner being a 'blind' one and Anson Street being very narrow (only 19 feet and 10 inches wide), it was necessary for him to move forward in order to see south on this street. Not seeing any approaching traffic, he slowly entered the intersection and was aware of the truck only when it was very close. A portion of his testimony appears as follows:
Respondent further testified that at the time of the collision his car was in first gear and this was corroborated by one of the investigating officers who testified that he assisted in moving the car and that it was in low gear at the time he examined it. The testimony also shows that respondent was rendered unconscious from the impact.
One witness testified that he was on the sidewalk approaching the intersection at a point where he was in a position to see what happened, that respondent came to a complete stop and slowly entered the intersection.
Another witness who was crossing Society Street testified that she looked and did not see the approaching truck, but before she reached the opposite curb the collision occurred. This witness also testified that she did not see respondent's car approaching. However, there is testimony to the effect that parking was permitted on both sides of Society Street west of the intersection, and parking was permitted on the east side of Anson Street only; therefore, such cars as were parked on Anson Street in nowise obstructed her view of on-coming traffic, but those on Society Street could have obstructed her view on this street.
It is undisputed that respondent's car was struck about midway on the right side by the front of the truck when near the center of the intersection and moved forward and to the left approximately equal distances from the point of impact, coming to rest against a mailbox and post.
Section 58 of the Traffic Ordinances of the City of Charleston appears as follows:
'Subdivision (a) The driver of each and every vehicle shall stop as required by this ordinance at the entrance to an Express Avenue and shall yield the right of way to...
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Scott v. Meek
...S.C. 537, 30 S.E.2d 449; Moorer v. Dowling, 216 S.C. 456, 58 S.E.2d 734; Cook v. Norwood, 217 S.C. 383, 60 S.E.2d 695; Keels v. One Ford Truck, 219 S.C. 449, 65 S.E.2d 770; Gillespie v. Ford, 225 S.C. 104, 81 S.E.2d 44; Geiger v. Checker Cab Co., 229 S.C. 39, 91 S.E.2d 552. And in determini......
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Geiger v. Checker Cab Co., 17122
...here presented, it, and all reasonable inferences from it, must be considered most favorably to respondent's case. Keels v. One Ford Truck, 219 S.C. 449, 65 S.E.2d 770; Gillespie v. Ford, 225 S.C. 104, 81 S.E.2d 44. So viewed, it was, in our opinion, sufficient to present issues for the jur......