Keen v. City of India

• Decision Date: 23 March 2021
• Docket Number: Cause No. 1:19-cv-1241 RLM-MPB
• Parties: CHRISTIAN L. KEEN, Plaintiff v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, acting by and through its Metropolitan Police Department, DOUGLAS SWAILS, and MALACHI WEST, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

CHRISTIAN L. KEEN, Plaintiff v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, acting by and through its Metropolitan PoliceDepartment, DOUGLAS SWAILS, and MALACHI WEST, Defendants

Cause No. 1:19-cv-1241 RLM-MPB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

March 23, 2021

ORDER

Christian Keen sued Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officers Douglas Swails, Malachi West, and the City of Indianapolis for claims that arose when Mr. Keen was arrested after police executed a search warrant at his house. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Mr. Keen's claims. For the following reasons, the court grants the defendants' motion.

Mr. Keen encountered a former acquaintance, Robert Coffman, at an annual downtown Indianapolis motorcycle event on August 26, 2017. Mr. Keen and Mr. Coffman have a tumultuous history and have known each other since April 2014 when they started riding motorcycles together. Mr. Coffman is a former member of the Rebels Motorcycle Club, which is a one-percenter club (an outlaw motorcycle club). See generally Andy Bain, Groups, Gangs, and Associates: Understanding Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, 64 S.D. L. Rev. 299, 302 (2019). As a one-percenter club, the Rebels exclude from membership anyone who used to be in law enforcement.

Mr. Coffman apparently believes that Mr. Keen is or was a member of the Rebels. Mr. Keen says he isn't and wasn't, and the court accepts that statement as true for summary judgment purposes. Mr. Coffman's beliefs are included only to explain the events of August 26, 2017. Mr. Coffman says that he left the Rebels in 2015 because he learned that Mr. Keen had been in law enforcement but was nevertheless the Rebels' national sergeant at arms. The Rebels discourage dissociation. Mr. Keen's job as the club's national sergeant at arms, Mr. Coffman thinks, was to retaliate against Mr. Coffman. In 2015, Mr. Coffman filed a police report with Detective Douglas Swails accusing Mr. Keen of vandalizing his car by putting homemade puncture devices under the tires. Detective Swails says that he verified much of what Mr. Coffman said about Mr. Keen and opened a gang file on him, though Mr. Keen was never arrested. Mr. Keen denies that he vandalized Mr. Coffman's car, and the court must accept his denial as true.

Back to the day of the motorcycle event: Mr. Keen came across Mr. Coffman and two of his friends on the sidewalk, and Mr. Coffman became confrontational. Mr. Coffman tried to provoke a fight, but Mr. Keen turned and walked away. Mr. Keen eventually ran into a group of his own friends and told them what happened. Mr. Keen's friends decided to go confront Mr. Coffman, and a fight broke out. Mr. Keen didn't join in the fight but instead stood back and took pictures. Law enforcement arrived about 30 seconds later, and the crowd dispersed. Mr. Coffman rode his motorcycle to a local American LegionPost after the fight and called 911 to file a police report; again, Detective Swails was assigned the case. Mr. Coffman said Mr. Keen hit him in the face with an expandable baton.

Detective Swails obtained a warrant to search Mr. Keen's residence for gang paraphernalia and the expandable baton used to batter Mr. Coffman. Mr. Keen doesn't challenge the validity of the search warrant or claim that the search was illegal. Indianapolis police executed the warrant on September 28, 2017 by telling Mr. Keen as he was leaving his house that they were there to execute a search warrant and that he would be handcuffed. Detective Malachi West arrived a few moments later. Detective West arrived before Mr. Keen was handcuffed, and Detective West ordered officers to handcuff Mr. Keen.

A SWAT team cleared Mr. Keen's residence within a few minutes, and Sergeant Edward Bruce took Mr. Keen inside to read him the search warrant. Mr. Keen told Sergeant Bruce that he had an arm injury and was in pain from the handcuffs. Mr. Keen has had multiple hip and arm injuries from being hit on two occasions by drunk drivers, and the handcuffs were worsening that pain. Sergeant Bruce put Mr. Keen in two sets of handcuffs, putting one cuff from each pair on Keen's wrists and connecting the two sets in the middle.¹ Mr. Keen asked if he could be handcuffed in front rather than behind his back, but Sergeant Brue said that he couldn't. As police officers took Mr. Keen from the house after his arrest, they put Mr. Keen's handcuffs in front of him.

Mr. Keen maintained throughout the search that he wasn't involved in the fight with Mr. Coffman and told Detective Swails that his pictures from the motorcycle event would prove it. Mr. Keen showed Detective Swails some of these pictures on his computer during the search, but Detective Swails wasn't persuaded because he couldn't identify anyone in the pictures and couldn't tell who the photographer was. Mr. Keen said there was a video of the fight on YouTube that showed the baton and that Mr. Keen wasn't involved in the fight. Detective Swails didn't watch any videos though while at Mr. Keen's residence. Mr. Keen also asked Detective Swails if he could be handcuffed in front, but Detective Swails said that he couldn't.

Officers seized several items as evidence, including: various motorcycle club articles of clothing and multiple one-percenter patches (including the Rebels' one-percenter patch), a black pair of brass knuckles, multiple copies of the Rebels Motorcycle Club constitution, multiple one-percenter hats, photographs of individuals in biker garb, a black Kevlar helmet, and a black ledger. In the aggregate, Detective Swails considered these items to be gang paraphilia. No expandable baton was found, though officers seized what appeared to be a black baton; Mr. Keen says it was a rubber hose. Officers also seized a firearm, ammunition, and a large quantity of steroids. Detective Swails knew that Mr. Keen had a prior felony conviction and was prohibited from possessing firearms. Mr. Keen says that the gun was his wife's and that he had a prescription for the steroids. After police completed their search, DetectiveSwails arrested Mr. Keen for battery and criminal organization. The State of Indiana later dismissed all charges.

Mr. Keen filed this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, bringing claims against Detectives Swails and West for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He also asserts a state-law claim against the City of Indianapolis for false arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, contending that it's vicariously liable for its officers' acts. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Mr. Keen's claims.

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 632 F.3d 388, 391-392 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Summary judgment . . . is proper only if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures, and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [the movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). The court's function at the summary judgment stage isn't "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In making that determination, the court must construe the evidence, and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 249, 255 ("Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions . . . ."). The movant bearsthe burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, but the non-moving party "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 256.

The defendants argue that Mr. Keen's false arrest claims fail because there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Keen based on the evidence found in Mr. Keen's residence. Detectives Swails and West further argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Keen's excessive force claim. Finally, they argue that Mr. Keen's Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim fails because the law doesn't recognize such a claim.

I. Mr. Keen's False Arrest Claims

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects the people against unreasonable arrests. U.S. Const. Amend IV. "An essential predicate to any § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest is the absence of probable cause." Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Jones by Jones v. Webb, 45 F.3d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any claim under Section 1983 against police officers for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.").

"Law enforcement officers have probable cause to arrest an individual when 'the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudentperson in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.'" Id. (citing Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1246 (7th Cir. 1994), certiorari denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995)). "The court evaluates probable cause 'not on the facts as an omniscient observer would perceive them,' but rather 'as they would have appeared to a reasonable person in the position of the arresting officer.'" Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d at 547. "An officer's belief in the existence of probable cause 'need not be based on evidence sufficient to support a conviction, nor even a showing that the officer's belief is more likely true than false.'" Driebel v. City of Milwaukee, 298 F.3d 622,...