Keenan v. International Ass'n of Machinists

• Decision Date: 13 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-cv-147-P-S.,08-cv-147-P-S.
• Citation: 632 F.Supp.2d 63
• Parties: Michael A. KEENAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

632 F.Supp.2d 63

Michael A. KEENAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, et al., Defendants.

No. 08-cv-147-P-S.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

July 13, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Barbara L. Goodwin, Murray Plumb & Murray, Portland, ME, Leon M. Rosenblatt, Law Office of Leon M. Rosenblatt, West Hartford, CT, for Plaintiffs.

David G. Webbert, Johnson & Webbert, LLP, Augusta, ME, Jeffrey R. Freund, John M. West, Warren Gary Kohlman, Jennifer L. Hunter, Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, for Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GEORGE Z. SINGAL, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 44). As explained herein, the Court GRANTS the motion IN PART as to Plaintiffs' federal claims, and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' state-law claims. In accordance with District of Maine Local Rule 7(f), the Court determines that this matter can be decided without oral argument, and thus DENIES the parties' Motions for Oral Argument (Docket # s 80 & 81).

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Santoni v. Potter, 369 F.3d 594, 598 (1st Cir.2004). "In this regard, `material' means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to the nonmovant. By like token, `genuine' means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party." Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 93-94 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995)).

The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether this burden is met, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Santoni, 369 F.3d at 598. Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmovant must "produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue." Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1999) (citation and internal punctuation omitted); see also Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). Of course, "the non-moving party's burden cannot be satisfied with a declaration that without proper explanation contradicts his/her prior deposition testimony." Meuser v. Fed. Express Corp., 564 F.3d 507, 515 (1st Cir.2009) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). "As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment to the moving party." In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This dispute arises from the imposition of a trusteeship under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Defendant International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers ("IAM") is an international labor organization that represents approximately 730,000 members in the United States and Canada. Defendant R. Thomas Buffenbarger is IAM's International President.

IAM comprises hundreds of Local Lodges, including Local Lodge S6 ("Local S6" or "the Local"), which represents approximately 3,400 employees of Bath Iron Works. Local S6 is affiliated with District Lodge 4, which is located in Maine but provides services in several states. Local S6 and District Lodge 4 are part of the Eastern Territory, which is led by Defendant General Vice President Lynn D. Tucker, Jr.¹ Plaintiffs Michael Keenan, Troy Osgood, Michael Cyr, and Cathy London are former officers of Local S6. Keenan, Osgood, and Cyr were elected in October 2007. After receiving numerous protests from Local members about that election, including allegations about the integrity of the secret ballot and the security of ballot boxes, Buffenbarger assigned Grand Lodge Representative Paul Shemanski to investigate. Shemanski concluded that the election had been flawed, and as a result, Buffenbarger directed that a new election be held.²

During his investigation, Shemanski received additional complaints from Local members about the administration of the Local's affairs. These complaints included allegations that the Local had permitted a considerable backlog of grievances to accrue, and that officers had received improper compensation. Shemanski reported these concerns to his supervisor, Tucker, who directed him to investigate further.

Defendants maintain that Shemanski's month-and-a-half-long investigation revealed an organization in disarray. Specifically, Shemanski discovered a backlog of pending grievances, at least one of which had become time-barred at the Local level; a substantial amount of improperly documented lost-time compensation;³ a substantial amount of unaccounted-for union label clothing; and the presence of a considerable amount of pornography on the Local's computers. At the close of the investigation, Shemanski and Grand Lodge Representative Bill Rudis recommended to Tucker that Local S6 be placed in trusteeship; on March 12, 2008, Tucker seconded this recommendation to Buffenbarger.

After being provided with the documentation resulting from Shemanski's investigation, Buffenbarger, who was empowered by the IAM Constitution to place Local S6 in trusteeship, concluded that trusteeship was warranted. In accordance with the IAM Constitution, on March 17, 2008, Buffenbarger issued a notice setting forth his reasons for imposing a trusteeship, and convening a hearing during which members would be "free to present testimony in favor of, or against, continuation of the trusteeship."⁴ The hearing was later relocated to a larger venue in order to accommodate all Local members who wished to attend.

The hearing before a three-person trial committee was held on April 14-17, 2008. Rudis, as the temporary Trustee, presented the case in support of continuing the trusteeship. He offered opening and closing statements, called three witnesses, and introduced eighty-six exhibits. The witnesses were Shemanski, who testified about his investigation of the complaints he had received; Brian Collis, IAM's computer technician who had examined the Local computers' hard drives and discovered pornography; and William Dameron, an IAM auditor. The exhibits included copies of the pornography discovered on the computers, audit reports and financial records, and a list of purportedly time-barred grievances.

Keenan presented the case against continuing the trusteeship. He too offered opening and closing statements, called his own witnesses, and introduced numerous exhibits. After both sides closed, individual Local members were permitted to address the trial committee. Both sides subsequently submitted post-hearing briefs.

On July 28, 2008, the trial committee submitted to Buffenbarger its conclusion that the evidence was "more than sufficient to demonstrate chronic financial malpractice" at Local S6, and "that the good and welfare of the Local Lodge, as well as the entire IAM, ha[d] been endangered."⁵ Although the committee observed that several of the grounds cited in Buffenbarger's notice had not been proven, it determined that four documented problems justified continuation of the trusteeship. Specifically, the committee cited an "enormous backlog of grievances" resulting from "a serious breakdown in grievance processing"; inadequate documentation of lost-time compensation; "an inventory shortfall of nearly $27,000" in union label merchandise; and the presence of pornography on Local computers, which presented the risk of legal liability.⁶ Accordingly, the committee recommended continuation of the trusteeship "until such time as all problems in the administration of the Local Lodge have been corrected."⁷

On August 12, 2008, Buffenbarger notified the Local's members that he had accepted the committee's recommendation to continue the trusteeship.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs now assert a variety of claims, arising from the imposition of the trusteeship, under the LMRDA and state tort law. Specifically, they allege that Defendants deprived them of rights guaranteed by Title I of the LMRDA (Count 1); imposed the trusteeship for unlawful purposes under Title III of the LMRDA (Count 2); maliciously and recklessly placed them in a false light (Count 3); maliciously and recklessly defamed them (Count 4); and maliciously and recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress (Count 5). (See Compl. (Docket # 1) ¶¶ 40-54.) In moving for summary judgment, Defendants maintain that the trusteeship was imposed lawfully, that a conditional privilege protects their statements about Plaintiffs, and that those statements were not made with actual malice, i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).

A. Federal Claims

1. Title III of the LMRDA

The LMRDA "governs the implementation of trusteeships by labor organizations." Pape v. Local 390 of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1309 (S.D.Fla.2004). "The legislation was an attempt to respond to abuses within the organized labor movement while minimizing governmental interference with the internal affairs of labor organizations." Morris v. Hoffa, 361 F.3d 177, 186 (3d Cir.2004) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). To that end, ...