Keiner v. City of Anchorage

• Decision Date: 06 February 1963
• Docket Number: No. 240,240
• Citation: 378 P.2d 406
• Parties: Wallace H. KEINER, Appellant, v. CITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 406

378 P.2d 406

Wallace H. KEINER, Appellant, v. CITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee.

No. 240.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Feb. 6, 1963.

Bailey E. Bell and Francis J. Nosek, Jr., Bell, Sanders & Tallman, Anchorage, for appellant.

Richard O. Gantz, Harland W. Davis and Vasken Minasian, Anchorage, for appellee.

Before NESBETT, C. J., and DIMOND and AREND, JJ.

DIMOND, Justice.

Following an administrative hearing, the City of Anchorage declared Keiner's building to be a fire and health hazard and a public nuisance and ordered it removed. On appeal to the superior court Keiner's request for a de novo hearing was refused, the case was heard on the record, and the city's determination was affirmed. On appeal to this court Keiner makes two main points: (1) that he was entitled to a trial de novo in the superior court; and (2) that the evidence produced at the administrative hearing did not justify removal of the building.

The Code of Ordinances of the City of Anchorage prohibits a person from maintaining any structure which is unsafe, or which is a menace to the health, morals, or safety of the public, or which has become a fire or health hazard or a public nuisance. ¹ Other parts of the code specify the procedure to be followed in determining whether a particular building is in violation of the code, and if so, whether it must be removed or may be repaired. ²

In accordance with the code provisions, Keiner's structure was inspected by the city building inspector. The inspector's report to the city manager, after stating his findings, recommended that the building be declared a public nuisance and be demolished. Reports from the fire department, city sanitarian, and State Department of Health substantiated the building inspector's findings and conclusions. Based upon these reports, the city manager made and had served on Keiner written findings and an order that the building be demolished. Keiner filed objections, and then a public hearing was held by the city council acting as a board of adjustment. Following the hearing, the board found that the building was a fire and health hazard and a public nuisance, and provided by ordinance for its removal. ³

When Keiner appealed to the superior court he requested that the matter be heard there de novo and that he be given a jury trial. These requests were not granted. The court reviewed the record of evidence and proceedings before the board, found the record to complete and sufficient and free from reversible errors, and affirmed the board's decision.

Keiner claims that this procedure deprived him of a constitutional right. He takes the position that a decision that the building must be removed involved the exercise of judicial power; that he was therefore entitled to a judicial determination of the question of whether the building was in face a public nuisance and a fire and health hazard; that this question could not be judicially determined merely by court review of the evidence and proceedings at the board hearing, but necessitated a de novo taking of evidence and making of findings of fact by the court; and that unless that is done, enforcement of the board's order for removal of the building will deprive him of his property without due process of law.

In support of that argument, Keiner invokes the 'Ben Avon doctrine', established by the United States Supreme Court in 1920 in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough. ⁴ In that case the superior court of Pennsylvania had reversed a finding of the Public Service Commission as to the value of property in computing a water rate. The Pennsylvania supreme court reversed on the ground that since there was competent evidence to sustain the commission's conclusion and no abuse of discretion was apparent, the lower court had no right to substitute its judgment for that of the commission as to the fair value of the property. The United States Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that the state supreme court's decision had the effect of withholding from the courts power to determine the question of confiscation according to their own independent judgment when the action of the public service commission came to be considered on appeal. The rule which was then laid down, and which has come to be known as the Ben Avon doctrine, was this: 'In all such cases, if the owner claims confiscation of his property will result, the state must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the order is void because in conflict with the due process clause, Fourteenth Amendment.' ⁵

If this doctrine still retains any force, ⁶ it would have no application here. The crux of Keiner's argument is that he was constitutionally entitled to a de novo hearing before the superior court. This is not what Ben Avon stands for. That doctrine required only that there be an independent judicial judgment on issues decided by a non-judicial body when confiscation of property is claimed. The doctrine does note require a de novo taking and weighing of evidence by the reviewing court.

Conceivably Keiner would be entitled to a trial de novo, in whole or in part, if he had been denied the opportunity to present to the board of adjustment relevant and material evidence supporting his claim of confiscation. ⁷ But he makes no such claim. His contention is that he should be able to relitigate factual questions simply because a constitutional right is involved. Due process does not require that. ⁸

Keiner contends that he is entitled to a trial de novo because the board proceedings did not provide him with the procedural safeguards which the due process clause assures. He claims that rules of evidence were not followed; that there was no determination as to what matters were competent or incompetent, relevant or irrelevant; that leading and suggestive questions were propounded to witnesses; that exhibits were not marked for identification nor marked as exhibits; and that all records, papers, files, pictures and reports, which were submitted by the city clerk to the superior court as the record on appeal, had never been subject to cross examination by Keiner.

Broad assertions and suggestions that various rules of evidence were not followed, without particularization or a showing of prejudice, is of no assistance to this court in determining whether there is any merit to Keiner's claims. ⁹ An examination of the entire record fails to disclose a denial of or interference with fundamental rights. The board made its findings only after due notice and full opportunity to be heard; the conduct of the hearing was consistent with the essentials of a fair trial; there is no assertion that the board was anything but impartial; and a complete record of the proceedings was kept so that the reviewing court was able to determine that there was no substantial failure to observe applicable rules of law and procedure, and that in all other respects Keiner was afforded a fair hearing. This satisfies the procedural requirements of due process of law. ¹⁰

Keiner next argues that a statute gives him the right to a de novo appeal. He refers to Section 16-1-35, Twenty-fourth, A.C.L.A.1949, [AS 29.10.213-243] which authorizes a city council to adopt building and zoning regulations and to provide for the condemnation of buildings which have become fire or health hazards or public nuisances. The council is constituted a board of adjustment to hear and decide appeals from administrative determinations, and detailed provisions are made for appeals from the board to the district court. ¹¹ The portion of the statute which Keiner relies upon is the statement that when an appeal is taken from a decision of the board of adjustment, 'Said case shall be heard and tried de novo in the District Court.'

This provision does not govern the procedure in the state superior court. Legislative enactments subsequent to statehood, and a procedural rule adopted by this court after creation of the state judicial system, show an obvious intent that where appeals are taken from administrative agencies or magistrate courts there shall not be a trial de novo unless the superior court requires it. ¹² This procedure simplifies and expedites the handling of appeals. ¹³ At the same time, it affords sufficient flexibility so that if the agency record is not sufficient to determine the issue on appeal, or if the record discloses that justice requires evidence to be taken de novo, the superior court has the discretion to do what is necessary by granting a new trial or hearing, either in whole or in part. In this case the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting review to the record taken before the board.

Keiner contends that the term 'administrative agency', as used in S.L.A.1959, ch. 50, § 17(1)(a) [AS 22.10.020(a) ¹⁴ refers only to agencies which are created by the state legislature. There is nothing in the wording of the statute, or in its legislative history, which persuades us to adopt such an interpretation. We conclude that the term 'administrative agency' should be construed broadly so as to include a municipal council, acting as a board of adjustment, since it is in fact performing administrative functions.

Keiner next argues that he is being deprived of his property without due process of law because there is no reasonable basis in fact for the board's finding that the building was a fire and health hazard and a public nuisance. In dealing with this issue we apply the rule that the board's findings should not be reversed if in the light of the whole record they are supported by substantial evidence, ¹⁵ i. e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. ¹⁶

Judged by that test, we conclude that the superior court was justified in sustaining the findings and decision of the board of adjustment. Keiner's building was a two-story,...