Keir v. Trager
Decision Date | 30 January 1932 |
Docket Number | 30222. |
Citation | 134 Kan. 505,7 P.2d 49 |
Parties | KEIR v. TRAGER et al. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
When reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, evidence relating to contributory negligence presents jury case.
Motorist on primary highway is not negligent in assuming that driver of car on secondary highway will stop in obedience to stop sign (Rev. St. Supp. 1931, 8--122).
Whether motorist on primary highway was contributorily negligent in assuming that driver on secondary highway would stop in obedience to sign at intersection held for jury (Rev. St Supp. 1931, 8--122).
1. One driving on a primary highway approaching an entrance of a secondary highway into such highway, at which a stop sign has been erected by the state highway commission, is not negligent in assuming that the driver of a car on the secondary highway will stop in obedience to the sign.
2. When the facts relating to contributory negligence are of such character that reasonable minds might reach different conclusions thereon, it is a question of fact for the jury to determine.
3. The instructions respecting the law of the road and contributory negligence considered with other instructions, and held not misleading.
4. The particular findings of the jury considered, and held not inconsistent with the general verdict.
Appeal from District Court, Johnson County; Garfield A. Roberds Judge.
Action by Annie Keir against Mrs. Will Trager and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.
Arthur J. Stanley and Arthur J. Stanley, Jr., both of Kansas City Kan., for appellants.
John C Nipp and E. E. Thompson, both of Kansas City, Mo., and C. W. Gorsuch and C. B. Little, both of Olathe, for appellee.
This action was brought to recover damages growing out of the collision of two automobiles. The plaintiff prevailed, and the defendants appeal.
The principal contention of the appellants is that the court erred in overruling their demurrer to appellee's evidence.
The accident occurred on highway 73, where Sixty-Third street enters the highway. Highway 73 is an 18-foot brick highway, with concrete ribbons on either side. Sixty-Third street is a dirt road covered with loose rock or gravel. It enters the highway at right angles, but does not cross it. At the point where Sixty-Third street enters the highway, there is a stop sign. On July 10, 1930, the appellee was driving south on the highway, operating an Essex sedan with nonskid tires and brakes in perfect condition. She was accompanied by her daughter. When she was about 235 feet north of the street, she was driving about 25 miles per hour. She looked to the southwest, and saw the appellants' car proceeding east on Sixty-Third street at about 35 miles per hour. A house stood on the northwest corner of the junction, and for a short distance appellants' car was not visible to the appellee. Appellee testified:
The testimony of appellee's daughter does not differ essentially from the testimony of the appellee. A witness who appeared on the scene of the accident shortly after it occurred testified that the appellant Anna Marie Trager said: "It is all my fault." Evidence was also adduced relating to the extent of the injury. To this evidence the appellants demurred, "for the reason the case made by the plaintiff conclusively proves the plaintiff to have been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and she is not entitled to recover." The court overruled the demurrer, and this is assigned as error.
The general rule is that the defense of contributory negligence is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. It is for the jury to determine, considering the special circumstances and surroundings of each particular case, whether the conduct of the parties was such as would be expected of a reasonable prudent person. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Railroad Co., 110 Kan. 4, 202 P. 582. In considering a demurrer, all of the testimony...
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