Keisling v. Keisling

Decision Date23 December 2002
Citation92 S.W.3d 374
PartiesSharon M. KEISLING v. Daniel Kerry KEISLING.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Dan R. Alexander and John E. Herbison, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Sharon M. Keisling.

John P. Brown, III, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Daniel Kerry Keisling.

JANICE M. HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and E. RILEY ANDERSON, ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ, joined.

OPINION

This case is before the Court on an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.1 We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in transferring child custody from one parent to the other when no petition requesting a change of custody had been filed at the time of the ruling. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in changing custody when the aggrieved party was not provided with notice that custody would be addressed at the hearing. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's award of custody and remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant, Sharon M. Keisling, and the respondent, Daniel Kerry Keisling were divorced in the Circuit Court of Wilson County, Tennessee, in 1998. Ms. Keisling was granted custody of the parties' three minor children: Daniel Ryan Keisling, Rachael Annette Keisling, and Heather Rebecca Keisling. Mr. Keisling was granted liberal co-parenting time. Prior to the divorce, the children lived in the same household with both their parents and their maternal grandparents. After the divorce, Ms. Keisling continued to reside with the children at her parents' home.

A multitude of pleadings have been filed with the trial court since the entry of the parties' divorce. These post-divorce proceedings have been particularly acrimonious. In March of 2000, the litigation between the parties intensified when Ms. Keisling filed a petition seeking, among other things, to modify Mr. Keisling's visitation due to allegations that he had sexually abused their children. In connection with this action, Mr. Keisling's visitation was initially suspended, then restricted. The court ordered counseling for the children. Mr. Keisling's regular, unsupervised visitation with his children was ultimately restored in March of 2001 when the trial court concluded that Mr. Keisling "did not sexually molest any of the parties' minor children." In December of 2001, Mr. Keisling filed a petition asking the trial court to grant him custody of the children. Mr. Keisling voluntarily dismissed this petition in May of 2002.

On July 11, 2002, another post-divorce petition was filed by Ms. Keisling. In this petition, Ms. Keisling asked the trial court to modify Mr. Keisling's visitation with their children due to new allegations of sexual abuse and to modify child support. Approximately two weeks following the filing of Ms. Keisling's petition, the trial court held what it characterized as an "emergency hearing" regarding the new allegations of child sexual abuse. Mr. Keisling filed no answer, responsive pleading, or counter-petition prior to the time that the trial commenced on July 22, 2002.

The trial transcript reflects that on July 22, 2002, while discussing preliminary matters, counsel for Mr. Keisling said:

We don't think the kids are in a healthy environment in the maternal grandparents' house, and we think that the hatred between the grandparents and the father is damaging the kids. We're going to renew our petition to have the kids removed from that house or to change custody to Mr. Keisling.

Counsel for Mr. Keisling subsequently emphasized that because an earlier petition seeking to award Mr. Keisling custody was dismissed without prejudice, he intended "to refile the same now." When asked by the court what he thought needed to happen, Mr. Keisling responded, "I think [the children] need to be removed from their mother's residence, put in my care." Toward the end of the three-day hearing, Mr. Keisling's counsel stated that he was asking the trial court to "not only find that there is no abuse but to go a step further and have the courage to take these kids out of the environment that they're in."

On July 26, 2002, at the conclusion of the proof on Ms. Keisling's petition, the trial court denied her request for relief. The trial court found, as it had during a previous proceeding, that Mr. Keisling did not sexually abuse any of the children. The court orally directed that custody of the parties' three children be temporarily changed from Ms. Keisling to Mr. Keisling. Mr. Keisling was ordered to arrange immediate counseling for the children. The court also prohibited Ms. Keisling from exercising overnight visitation with her children until she obtained housing of her own. In addition, Ms. Keisling's parents were not permitted to be present during visitation.

Ms. Keisling's counsel pointed out that there were no pleadings before the court requesting a change in custody. In response, the trial court stated that it based its ruling upon Mr. Keisling's "oral petition" requesting custody. The trial court then directed counsel for Mr. Keisling to "get our record clear and get your written petition in because you orally moved the Court and I assumed you had a written petition making its way to this file." In support of its ruling, the trial court stressed the "emergency" nature of the case, Ms. Keisling's failure to obtain therapeutic counseling for the children as previously ordered by the court, and the temporary basis of the current order changing custody. The parties' three children were immediately placed in the custody of Mr. Keisling, where they remain.

On August 5, 2002, Ms. Keisling filed an application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals denied the motion on August 8, 2002. Also on August 8, 2002, thirteen days after the trial court's oral ruling was issued, Mr. Keisling filed his Answer and Counter-Petition in response to Ms. Keisling's July 11, 2002 petition, requesting, among other things, a change in custody. On August 12, 2002, the court entered a written order temporarily changing custody to Mr. Keisling. No date was set for a subsequent hearing. The order concludes that the need for therapeutic counseling and the alienation of the affections of the minor children toward their father required "no less drastic alternative than to award custody of all three children on a temporary basis" to Mr. Keisling. Neither the oral ruling nor the written order include any specific findings of fact regarding a material change in circumstance or the children's best interests that would support a transfer of custody to Mr. Keisling.

Ms. Keisling sought review by this Court. On September 6, 2002, we granted permission to appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in transferring child custody from one parent to the other when no petition requesting a change of custody had been filed at the time of the ruling.

II. Analysis
A. Due Process Requirements

Basic due process requires "notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 884 (Tenn.1993) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). One of the purposes of pleadings is to give notice of the issues to be tried so that the opposing party can adequately prepare for trial. See McClellan v. Bd. of Regents of the State Univ., 921 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tenn.1996).

Due process is a flexible concept that "calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Wilson v. Wilson, 984 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Tenn. 1998); Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents of State Univ. & Comty. Coll. Sys., 863 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Tenn.1993). Three factors must be considered in determining the procedural protections demanded by a particular situation: "(1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally (3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 317-18 (Tenn.2000) (citing Wilson, 984 S.W.2d at 902).

1. Private Interest

The first factor to consider in determining the procedural protections required is the "private interest at stake." Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d at 317. Here, the private interest is the custody of one's children. Parents have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care and custody of their children under both the United States and Tennessee constitutions. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Tenn. Baptist Children's Homes, Inc. v. Swanson (In re Swanson), 2 S.W.3d 180, 187 (Tenn.1999); Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tenn.1994); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 578-79 (Tenn. 1993). This Court has recognized for over a century that a "parent is entitled to the custody, companionship, and care of the child, and should not be deprived thereof except by due process of law." State ex rel. Bethell v. Kilvington, 100 Tenn. 227, 45 S.W. 433, 435 (1898). Accord Nash-Putnam v. McCloud, 921 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tenn.1996); Bond v. McKenzie (In re Adoption of Female Child), 896 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tenn.1995).

2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

The second factor to consider in determining the procedural protections a particular situation requires is "the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
175 cases
  • State v. Odom, W2008–02464–SC–DDT–DD.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Tennessee
    • 4 Noviembre 2010
    ...... See Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Tenn.2002).          “ ‘The right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal is a fundamental ......
  • Hardcastle v. Harris
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Tennessee
    • 8 Diciembre 2004
    .......         The fundamental purpose of the pleading requirement in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 9.07 is notice. Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374, 377 (Tenn.2002); Castelli v. Lien, 910 S.W.2d 420, 429 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). Because claims for attorney's fees are ......
  • Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-memphis Hosp.s, W2008-01486-SC-R11-CV.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Tennessee
    • 20 Octubre 2010
    ...pleading is to give notice of the issues to be tried so that the opposing party will be able to prepare for trial. Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374, 377 (Tenn.2002); Poster v. Andrews, 182 Tenn. 671, 677, 189 S.W.2d 580, 582 (1943). While a complaint need not contain detailed allegations......
  • State Of Tenn. v. Odom, W2008-02464-SC-DDT-DD
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Tennessee
    • 3 Marzo 2011
    ...... See Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Tenn. 2002).         "'The right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal is a fundamental ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT