Keith v. Petrakakas
| Decision Date | 16 May 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. D,D |
| Citation | 95 N.J.Super. 262,230 A.2d 543 |
| Parties | Edward KEITH, Plaintiff, v. George PETRAKAKAS, and Mildred Petrakakas, Defendants. J. 7887. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
Hymen B. Mintz, Newark, for plaintiff.
Melvin Tolstoi, Newark, for Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (William O. Barnes, Jr., Newark, attorney).
KAPP, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).
This is a proceeding to compel payment from the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6--60 et seq.
On August 1, 1965 plaintiff, while accompanied by three passengers, became involved in an automobile accident with defendants. The passengers noticed the Fund of their claims within the required 90-day period, but plaintiff neglected to do so until February 11, 1966. This delay, it is asserted, was occasioned by his erroneous assumption that defendants possessed liability insurance coverage. A judgment had been obtained against defendants upon the basis of which this claim is made.
Plaintiff asserts that the notice given by the passengers in his vehicle was sufficient notice, in his behalf as well, of an Accident, so as to comply with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6--65. It is not contended that this was a case where 'an insurer had disclaimed on a policy of insurance.' N.J.S.A. 39:6--65(b).
Initially, it should be observed that although the word 'accident' appears in the caption to section 65, supra, that caption is written in the conjunctive, thereby requiring in addition to the notice of an accident, a notice of an intention to file a claim. Furthermore, the wording of section 65 itself leaves little doubt that notice of An intention to make a claim is an absolute prerequisite to payment from the Fund. The pertinent portion of that section reads as follows:
'Any qualified person, or personal representative of such person, who suffers damages resulting from bodily injury or death or damage to property arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in this State * * * and whose damages may be satisfied in whole or in part from the fund, Shall, within 90 days after the accident, As a condition precedent to the right thereafter to apply for payment from the fund, give notice to the board, the form and contents of which shall be prescribed by the board, of his Intention to make a claim thereon for such damages if otherwise uncollectible; * * *.' (Emphasis supplied)
The mere notice of an accident by one other than the claimant does not constitute the type of notice required by section 65. Furthermore, the selection and utilization of such words as 'shall' and 'condition precedent' in describing a claimant's obligation to notice the Fund exhibits a clear legislative intention that there be strict and literal compliance with the provision. See Szczesny v. Vasquez, 71 N.J.Super. 347, 177 A.2d 47 (App.Div.1962); Danisi v....
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U.S. v. Studivant
...has no right under the statute to receive compensation. Keith v. Petrakakas, 98 N.J.Super. 153, 236 A.2d 402 (1967), aff'g, 95 N.J.Super. 262, 230 A.2d 543 (1967). Payment from the fund is not based on a common law right but is the product of a purely statutory remedy to which a state may v......
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Watford v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Bd.
...By the same token, were we to place the strict interpretation on the statute as was placed by the court in Keith v. Petrakakas, 95 N.J.Super. 262, 230 A.2d 543 (Law Div.1967), the decision in Wharton could have never been In the case at bar the Fund contends that the letter from the uninsur......
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Keith v. Petrakakas
...The order appealed from is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Kapp in his opinion reported in 95 N.J.Super. 262, 230 A.2d 543 (Law Div.1967). ...