O-kel-ly v. Henry
| Decision Date | 07 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 37184,2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 309 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Idaho |
| Parties | LERAJJAREANRA O-KEL-LY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JEFF HENRY, Warden of the Idaho Maximum Security Institution; STATE COMMISSION OF PARDONS & PAROLE; OLIVIA CRAVEN, Executive Director of the State Commission of Pardons & Parole, and CHERYL YANCEY; CONNIE MC ROAN; (whose true first name is unknown to petitioner) YOUNG; (whose true first name is unknown to petitioner) MATTHEW; JOHN and JANE DOES 1-5, Members of the State Commission of Pardons & Parole; TEREMA CARLIN and JOHN and JANE DOES 1-5, Employees of the Idaho Department of Corrections,Respondents. |
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt, District Judge.
Order dismissing petition for writ of habeas corpus, affirmed.
Lerajjareanra O-Kel-Ly, Boise, pro se appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Krista L. Howard, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondents.
Lerajjareanra O-Kel-Ly (hereinafter Petitioner), a pro se inmate, appeals the district court's order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after being denied parole. According to his allegations, in preparation for his parole hearing, he was provided a parole questionnaire to answer and was interviewed by Cheryl Yancey. Yancey did not tell Petitioner at that time what her recommendation to the Commission of Pardons and Parole (Commission) would be. However, on November 26, 2007, Petitioner received a copy of Yancey's recommendation that parole be denied and that Petitioner be passed to his full-term release date. Yancey's recommendation was based on Petitioner's extensive criminal history, lack of rehabilitative programming, disciplinary problems while in prison, and danger to society. Petitioner was allowed to respond and sent his response that same day, November 26, 2007, to be delivered to his caseworker, David Vehling. However, this response was not timely delivered to the Commission.
Petitioner's parole hearing occurred on December 3, 2007, before the Commission. Petitioner discussed his name change from Steven Wayne Rogers to Lerajjareanra O-Kel-Ly, his contention that certain disciplinary offense reports (DORs) against him had been fabricated, his lack of DORs for over a year, his desire to renounce his American citizenship, and his lack of access to rehabilitative programming. The Commission questioned Petitioner concerning his motives to change his name and renounce his American citizenship, expressing concern that he was doing these things to avoid the registration requirements for his past sex crime. The Commission voiced its concern about Petitioner's history of sexual misconduct and commented that his actions both inside and outside of prison did not show that he was safe to release. The Commission also noted reports that Petitioner had asked prison staff what types of things would get him into administrative segregation, to which Petitioner replied that he did ask this of a staff member because he was worried about getting falsified DORs in retaliation for his litigation activities. Petitioner later asserted this staff member was Respondent Carlin. The Commission ultimately denied Petitioner parole and passed him to his full-term release date. The Commission did not explain to Petitioner its rationale for its decision and did not allow him an opportunity to respond further at that point.
Two days after the hearing, the Commission received Petitioner's response to Yancey's recommendation and sent the response back to Petitioner with a note stating that it was too lateto be considered. Petitioner requested access to the information viewed by the Commission at his hearing, but there was no response to this request. In February of 2008, Petitioner requested expungement from his file of an entry that had been discussed at his parole hearing concerning his inquiry about the types of actions that would cause him to be placed into segregation. The request was denied and Petitioner appealed through the prison's internal appeals process. The decision was upheld at every appellate level.
Petitioner filed the present petition for habeas corpus relief on November 18, 2008. The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After receiving Petitioner's response, the district court issued an order dismissing the petition in part and ordering Petitioner to amend his petition on the remaining claims. The claims that survived were:
Petitioner filed an amended petition to which Respondents filed an objection and response. On July 3, 2009, the district court issued an order dismissing all of Petitioner's claims except his due process claim against Vehling and/or John or Jane Does for not delivering Petitioner's reply to Yancey's recommendation in time for the Commission to consider it at Petitioner's parole hearing. Petitioner filed a motion to amend, alter, or be granted relief from the court's judgment and a motion for leave to amend his complaint for a second time to cure any pleading deficiencies in the claims that were dismissed.
Before the Petitioner filed these motions, the Respondents filed a motion to vacate the pending evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's remaining claim in anticipation of a new parole hearing the Commission had decided to grant to Petitioner so that it might consider his reply to Yancey's recommendation. The district court granted the motion. At the new parole hearing, the Commission reviewed the information it had received for the December 2007 hearing in addition to Petitioner's response to Yancey's recommendation that had not been consideredearlier. Petitioner was also given an opportunity to respond to the Commission. The Commission again elected to deny Petitioner parole and pass him to his full-term release date.
The Respondents filed the minutes of this second parole hearing with the district court, along with a motion to dismiss Petitioner's last remaining claim. The district court then dismissed the claim because it had been rendered moot by this new parole hearing. The district court also denied Petitioner's motions to amend the judgment and to amend his complaint.
Petitioner now appeals. He argues that the district court should not have dismissed his retaliation claim until it gave him a chance to further amend his petition to cure any deficiencies and until he could pursue further factual development through discovery. He also argues that the court erred in dismissing his equal protection claim for the same reasons and because it was in fact sufficiently pleaded. Additionally, he contends that the district court erred in determining that it had no authority to order relief other than that which he had already been afforded. This is because, he contends, the district court has the power to grant declaratory relief, which would allow Petitioner to bring a civil rights action for damages.1
Whether to issue a writ of habeas corpus is a matter within the discretion of the court. Quinlan v. Idaho Comm 'n for Pardons & Parole, 138 Idaho 726, 729, 69 P.3d 146, 149 (2003); Hoots v. Craven, 146 Idaho 271, 274, 192 P.3d 1095, 1098 (Ct. App. 2008). When we review an exercise of discretion in a habeas corpus proceeding, we conduct a three-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as discretionary, acted within the boundaries of such discretion, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Hoots, 146 Idaho at 274, 192 P.3d at 1098.
Habeas corpus proceedings are civil in nature, and generally the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Idaho Code § 19-4208; Hoots, 146 Idaho at 275, 192 P.3d at 1099; Drennon v. Fisher, 141 Idaho 942, 943, 120 P.3d 1146, 1147 (Ct. App. 2005). In this case, the court considered materials outside of the pleadings before dismissing Petitioner's claims. When acourt considers matters outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment. Hayes v. Conway, 144 Idaho 503, 506-07, 163 P.3d 1215, 121819 (Ct. App. 2007); Duvalt v. Sonnen, 137 Idaho 548, 552, 50 P.3d 1043, 1047 (Ct. App. 2002). Summary judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Conway, 144 Idaho at 507, 163 P.3d at 1219; Duvalt, 137 Idaho at 552, 50 P.3d at 1047. On appeal, we exercise free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Duvalt, 137 Idaho at 552, 50 P.3d at 1047. In assessing a summary judgment on a habeas corpus petition, we treat all uncontroverted allegations in the petition as true, and we liberally construe all controverted facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Drennon v. Craven, 141 Idaho 34, 36, 105 P.3d 694, 696 (Ct. App. 2004); Freeman v. Idaho Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 872, 875, 71 P.3d 471, 474 (Ct. App. 2003).
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