Kellam Energy, Inc. v. Duncan

Citation668 F. Supp. 861
Decision Date19 August 1987
Docket NumberNo. Civ. A. 84-579-CMW.,Civ. A. 84-579-CMW.
PartiesKELLAM ENERGY, INC., a Virginia corporation as Successor to Kellam, Inc. and Shore Atlantic, Inc., Plaintiff, v. Robert M. DUNCAN, t/a Super Soda, a Delaware resident, and R.C. Nehi Bottling, Inc., t/a Super Soda, a Delaware corporation, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Delaware

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles S. Crompton, Jr., and W. Harding Drane, Jr., of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, Del. (Willcox & Savage, Norfolk, Va., of counsel), for plaintiff.

William J. Wier, Jr., Joseph G. Krauss, of Herlihy & Wier, Wilmington, Del. and R. Brandon Jones, of Hudson, Jones, Jaywork & Williams, Dover, Del., for defendants.

                                         TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                                             PAGE
                 FACTS.............................................................866
                   I. THE PARTIES..................................................866
                       A. Plaintiff................................................866
                       B. Defendants...............................................867
                  II. THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP....................................867
                 III. THE SEVEN CONTRACTS AT ISSUE.................................869
                  IV. THE LITIGATION...............................................870
                 DISCUSSION........................................................871
                  I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN COMPLEX LITIGATION........................871
                 II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
                     THE CONTRACT CLAIM............................................872
                     A. The Regulations and Their Interpretations..................872
                     B. Changed Business Practices.................................874
                        1. The Contracts' Length...................................874
                        2. The Requirements Provisions.............................875
                        3. The Equipment Purchase Term.............................875
                III. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
                     BREACH OF CONTRACT: THE COMMON LAW UNFAIR COMPETITION
                     AND THE ANTI-TRUST COUNTERCLAIMS..............................876
                     A. The Contract Counterclaim..................................876
                        1. The Covenant Not to Compete.............................876
                        2. The Oral Contract Modification..........................877
                        3. The Written Contract Terms..............................878
                     B. The Unfair Competition Counterclaim........................879
                     C. The Antitrust Counterclaims................................880
                        1. Tying...................................................880
                           a. Sale of the Tied Product.............................881
                           b. Coercion.............................................881
                        2. Exclusive Dealing.......................................883
                           a. Whether An Arrangement Existed.......................883
                
                                                                             PAGE
                           b. A Significant Anti-Competitive Effect................884
                              i. The Relevant Line of Commerce.....................884
                             ii. Significant Impact on Competition.................885
                        3. Resale Price Maintenance................................886
                        4. Attempted Monopolization................................888
                           a. The Relevant Product Market..........................888
                           b. Dangerous Probability of Success.....................890
                                i. Logical Problems with the Market Share Data.....890
                               ii. The Market Share Data...........................890
                              iii. Other Factors Beyond Market Share...............891
                 IV. CONCLUSION....................................................892
                
OPINION

CALEB M. WRIGHT, Senior District Judge.

In this breach of contract action the defendants asserted counterclaims based on the federal antitrust laws and sundry state and common law claims. The matter is before the Court on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment.

The action was brought by Plaintiff, Kellam Energy, Inc. ("Kellam"), a Virginia corporation that is a wholesale distributor of petroleum in Delaware, Maryland and Virginia. The Defendant is R.C. Nehi Bottling, Inc. ("Nehi"), a Delaware soft drink bottling corporation that operates a chain of "Super Soda" convenience stores which sell beverages, groceries and snacks, as well as gasoline. Robert M. Duncan ("Duncan"), a Delaware resident and chief executive officer of Nehi, is the other defendant.

The Court denies Nehi's Summary Judgment Motion on Kellam's contract claim. There remains an unresolved factual question concerning whether certain contracts between the parties violated federal petroleum regulations.

The Court also denies Kellam's Motion for Summary Judgment on the contract counterclaim, holding that there exists a factual dispute as to whether Kellam breached the contracts by charging Nehi too high a price for petroleum. The Court, however, grants plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Unfair Competition counterclaim, because it does not state a viable common law cause of action in Delaware.

The Court grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the four antitrust counterclaims. The Court rules that defendants' tying counterclaim merits summary judgment because there is no evidence that the tying arrangement was forced upon Nehi. The Court also finds that the requirements contracts signed between Kellam and Nehi could not have constituted exclusive dealing, in violation of Clayton Act § 3, because no exclusive dealing arrangement existed. The Court holds that Kellam's sales methods may have constituted resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act § 1, so that summary judgment is denied on this counterclaim. Finally, the Court denies summary judgment on defendants' attempted monopolization counterclaim.

FACTS
I. THE PARTIES
A. Plaintiff

Kellam is a regional distributor of gasoline, diesel fuel, propane gas, and home heating oil. The Company, since 1938, has sold to both retail outlets and individual consumers on the Delmarva Peninsula. The Peninsula is an isolated, rural tri-state area that includes portions of Delaware, Maryland and Virginia. Kellam also operates, on the Peninsula, a chain of convenience stores through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Shore Stop Inc. ("Shore Stop"). Both Kellam and Shore Stop are headquartered in Belle Haven, Virginia.

Kellam is a wholesale gasoline jobber. That is, it purchases oil from a large refiner—Texaco—and distributes it to retailers on the Delmarva Peninsula. The Company sells gasoline through an established dealer network using, primarily, requirements contracts. Under these agreements, Kellam installs, at the retailer's facility, underground tanks, gasoline dispensing equipment, and Texaco signs—an investment of approximately $70,000 per station. The contracts stipulate that Kellam must service this equipment and supply the retail outlet with all of its gasoline needs. In exchange for Kellam's services, the retail dealer agrees, inter alia, that it will purchase all of its gasoline requirements to be sold at a particular location from Kellam Energy. To perform its obligations, Kellam must maintain a staff of service technicians, own a fleet of gasoline transports and operate several bulk distribution plants. In the 1960s Kellam was one of the first companies on the Peninsula to install self-service gasoline dispensing equipment.1

Kellam's predecessor corporations, Shore Atlantic, Inc. and Kellam, Inc., concentrated almost exclusively on retail gas sales. In 1979, all this changed. Kellam took the decision to integrate forward into the convenience store business; Shore Stop, Inc. was incorporated to direct Kellam's new venture.

Shore Stop opened its first convenience store in Machipongo, Virginia in March, 1981, and three more Virginia outlets followed shortly thereafter. In 1982, however, Kellam seized a rare opportunity to expand its convenience store business when Banks Dairy Markets, Inc. which owned and operated a chain of seventeen convenience stores in Maryland and Delaware, filed for bankruptcy. Under a reorganization plan approved by the Bankruptcy Court, Shore Stop began operating the Banks convenience stores in 1982 and acquired Banks Dairy Markets, Inc. in 1983. As of December 31, 1984, Shore Stop owned and operated thirty-three convenience stores on the Delmarva Peninsula. Most of these stores sell gasoline.

B. Defendants

Defendant, Nehi, is a soft drink bottling company headquartered in Camden, Delaware. The Company owns the exclusive bottling and distribution rights for R.C. Cola, Diet Rite Cola, Orange Crush, and Hires Root Beer in Delaware and Maryland's Eastern Shore. Nehi owns two liquor stores and a chain of sixteen beverage warehouses. Under the name "Super Soda Center", the Company currently operates ten beverage warehouses in Delaware and leases six Super Soda Centers in Maryland. In 1984, Nehi reported approximately $10 million in sales.

After initially selling a limited number of items, like soft drinks and cigarettes, the Company made a dramatic decision in 1973. Defendant, and Nehi's president, Duncan, decided to add gasoline to the Super Soda line of products. At that time, he contacted Kellam about supplying Super Soda's existing locations.

II. THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP

In 1974, Kellam installed gasoline dispensing equipment at the Super Soda Center in Salisbury, Maryland, and the parties entered into the first gasoline supply contract. Between 1975 and 1982, Nehi and Kellam entered into long-term gasoline contracts for nine more Super Soda Centers. Kellam today supplies ten of the sixteen Super Soda Centers located in Delaware and on the Eastern Shore of Maryland; the Super Soda Centers are Kellam's largest independent customer for gasoline.2

The events that set...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • ET Barwick Industries v. Walter E. Heller & Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • December 22, 1987
    ...prove Heller's extension of credit was conditioned upon Industries' carrying out Heller's suggestions. See e.g. Kellam Energy Inc. v. Duncan, 668 F.Supp. 861, 881 (D.Del.1987) (As a precondition to a tying claim, the buyer must actually purchase or lease the unwanted There being no evidence......
  • Sea-Land Service v. Atlantic Pacific Intern.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii
    • July 12, 1999
    ...tying arrangement, a plaintiff must show that the buyer is required to purchase or lease the unwanted product. Kellam Energy, Inc. v. Duncan, 668 F.Supp. 861, 881 (D.Del. 1987). Sea-Land argues that because it does not assess a separate charge for the use of its containers, API was not forc......
  • H.L. Hayden Co. of New York, Inc. v. Siemens Medical Systems, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • June 12, 1989
    ...of free riding. Id.; see Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir.1968) (quoting Societe Comptoir ); Kellam Energy, Inc. v. Duncan, 668 F.Supp. 861, 879 (D.Del.1987) (citing Societe Comptoir We do not agree with the district court's first ground for rejecting Healthco's counterclai......
  • Yeager's Fuel v. Penn. Power & Light
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • January 31, 1997
    ...(noting "[a]n agreement affecting less than all purchases does not amount to true exclusive dealing") (citing Kellam Energy, Inc. v. Duncan, 668 F.Supp. 861, 883-84 (D.Del.1987)). In support of this assertion, they point to testimony from various developers averring that in spite of the lan......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
8 books & journal articles
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • ABA Antitrust Library Market Definition in Antitrust. Theory and Case Studies
    • December 6, 2012
    ...Stores of Am., 125 F.T.C. 311 (1998), 374, 378 Johnson & Johnson, 2006 FTC LEXIS 81 (FTC 2006), 324 Kellam Energy v. Duncan, 668 F. Supp. 861 (D. Del. 1987), 387 Knoll Pharms. v. Teva Pharms. USA, 2001 WL 1001117 (N.D. Ill. 2001), 330 Koninklijke Ahold NV, 122 F.T.C. 248 (1996), 4 Koninklij......
  • Wholesaling and Retailing
    • United States
    • ABA Antitrust Library Market Definition in Antitrust. Theory and Case Studies
    • December 6, 2012
    ...district court had “erred in defining the submarket” and asserted a much broader relevant submarket that 177. Kellam Energy v. Duncan, 668 F. Supp. 861, 884 (D. Del. 1987). 178. Id. at 889-90. 179. 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979). 180. Id. at 707. 181. Id. at 712. 388 Market Definition in Anti......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • ABA Antitrust Library Pharmaceutical Industry Antitrust Handbook. Second Edition
    • December 8, 2018
    ...126249 (D.N.J. 2009), 310 K-Dur Antitrust Litig., In re , 338 F. Supp. 2d 517 (D.N.J. 2004), 120, 274, 309 Kellam Energy v. Duncan, 668 F. Supp. 861 (D. Del. 1987), 362 King Drug Co. v. Cephalon, 309 F.R.D. 195 (E.D. Pa. 2015), rev’d on other grounds sub nom . Modafinil Antitrust Litig., In......
  • Chapter 6. Monopolization
    • United States
    • ABA Archive Editions Library Telecom Antitrust Handbook
    • January 1, 2005
    ...Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 271 (7th Cir. 1981) (30% is generally inadequate), with Kellam Energy, Inc. v. Duncan, 668 F. Supp. 861, 890-91 (D. Del. 1987) (43% to 50% may be sufficient). 310 Telecom Antitrust Handbook The essential facilities doctrine, which was first disc......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT