Keller v. Davidson

• Citation: 299 F.Supp.2d 1171
• Decision Date: 23 January 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.03-Z-1482(CBS).,CIV.A.03-Z-1482(CBS).
• Parties: Maryanne KELLER, Pauline York, Diana Degette, Douglas Garrett, John W. Singletary, and Lila Pedroza, Plaintiffs, v. Donetta DAVIDSON, Secretary of State, Colorado General Assembly, and Bill Owens, Governor of the State of Colorado, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

299 F.Supp.2d 1171

Maryanne KELLER, Pauline York, Diana Degette, Douglas Garrett, John W. Singletary, and Lila Pedroza, Plaintiffs, v. Donetta DAVIDSON, Secretary of State, Colorado General Assembly, and Bill Owens, Governor of the State of Colorado, Defendants.

No. CIV.A.03-Z-1482(CBS).

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

January 23, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David Richard Fine, Kelly/Haglund/Garnsey & Kahn LLC, Denver, CO, for plaintiffs.

Richard C. Kaufman, Friedlob, Sanderson, Paulson & Tourtillott, LLC, Christopher R. Paulson, Saunders, Snyder, Ross & Dickson, P.C., Allan L. Hale, Richard A. Westfall, Hale Hackstaff Friesen, LLP, Denver, CO, for defendants.

Before EBEL and PORFILIO, Circuit Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and WEINSHIENK, Senior District Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

This dispute over competing congressional redistricting plans for the state of Colorado is before a three-judge panel convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284. We have before us Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand, the General Assembly and Governor Bill Owens' Motion to File Amended Counterclaims, and Colorado Attorney General Ken Salazar's Motion to Intervene on the side of the Plaintiffs. In light of the Colorado Supreme Court's recent decision in the original proceeding of People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo.2003), we also face a number of questions pertaining to this court's jurisdiction and the preclusive effects of the Salazar decision. After hearing oral argument and reviewing the parties' briefs on these issues, we conclude, for the reasons set forth below, that we have jurisdiction over this case.

We also conclude, however, that the Colorado Supreme Court's Salazar decision necessarily adjudicated the issue of federal constitutional law raised by Defendants' counterclaims now before us. Unless the United States Supreme Court overturns Salazar on federal constitutional grounds, this case will be dismissed: the federal claims will be dismissed under principles of Res Judicata and the Plaintiffs' state law claims will be dismissed as moot. However, if the United States Supreme Court reverses or modifies the federal law ruling in Salazar, then we will have to determine in light of the Supreme Court's opinion how to proceed in this case. The time during which the Secretary of State and the General Assembly can seek certiorari from the Supreme Court to review Salazar has not yet passed, and Salazar is therefore not yet final. Accordingly we will retain jurisdiction for now and enter a ruling only on the General Assembly and Governor Owens' Motion to File Amended Counterclaims. We will defer ruling on all other pending motions until the Salazar opinion is final.

I. Background

This case first arose in May of 2003, but the controversy underlying this litigation originated in 2001. As a result of the 2000 census, Congress determined that Colorado would be allotted an additional seat in the House of Representatives, increasing the number of congressional districts in Colorado from six to seven. After acquiring the census data in 2001, however, the Colorado General Assembly failed to pass a congressional redistricting plan in time for the 2002 elections. In response to litigation brought by Colorado voters, the Colorado state courts stepped in and drew a congressional district map for the 2002 elections that took account of the new census figures and conformed to federal voting rights requirements. See Avalos v. Davidson, No. 01CV2897, 2002 WL 1895406 (Colo.Dist.Ct. Jan.25, 2002); aff'd sub nom. Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642 (Colo.2002). After the 2002 elections gave Colorado Republicans majorities in both houses of the state legislature, the General Assembly made another attempt at passing a redistricting plan. This time they were successful, and the redistricting legislation, passed as "Senate Bill 03-352," was signed into law by Governor Bill Owens on May 9, 2003.

On that same date, Plaintiffs now before us filed suit against Colorado Secretary of State Davidson in state court, challenging the General Assembly's power and procedures in passing SB 03-352 (the "legislative plan")¹ and seeking to enjoin the plan's implementation. On August 1, 2003, after Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include claims based on federal law, Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, where it was randomly assigned to Senior District Judge Zita L. Weinshienk. On August 8th, Defendants filed Answers and Counterclaims, in which Defendants requested a declaratory judgment both that the legislative plan was a lawful exercise of the Assembly's power and that, under Article I, § 4 of the United States Constitution, neither the Colorado Constitution nor a prior redistricting plan adopted by court order would prevent the Assembly from drawing new congressional districts. On August 13, 2003, Judge Weinshienk filed a Notification to Chief Judge Deanell Reece Tacha of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that the case required the appointment of a three-judge panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284, and Chief Judge Tacha appointed this panel on August 18, 2003.

In the time between the filing of this suit in state court and its removal to federal court, Colorado Attorney General Salazar filed an original petition in the Colorado Supreme Court, seeking an order prohibiting Secretary of State Davidson from implementing the legislative redistricting plan and commanding Davidson to use the court plan in the 2004 elections. Salazar's original petition, filed on May 14, 2003, with the Colorado Supreme Court, argued that Article V, Section 44 of the Colorado Constitution prohibited the General Assembly from redistricting when it had failed to do so before the first congressional election of the decade and the courts had been forced to step in and draw the district boundaries. The Colorado Supreme Court heard oral argument on September 8, 2003, from Salazar and Davidson, as well as from the General Assembly, which had intervened on the respondents' side to join Davidson. That court also heard arguments from Governor Owens as amicus.² Cognizant of the possibility that the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling in Salazar v. Davidson might resolve some or all the major issues in the lawsuit pending before this court, we took no significant action on this case after removal, other than to issue an order on September 25th asking the litigants before us to file "status report" briefs with us three days after the announcement of the Colorado Supreme Court's Salazar decision.

On December 1, 2003, the Colorado Supreme Court handed down its decision in Salazar v. Davidson, holding that Colo. Const. Art. V, § 44 limited redistricting to once per decade, to be completed in the time between the decennial census and the first election of the decade. Since the state courts had adopted a redistricting plan in 2002 after the legislature's efforts had failed, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the legislative plan passed in May, 2003 violated the state constitution, and it ordered Davidson to employ the court-approved plan through the 2010 election season.

Plaintiffs now argue that the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion in Salazar has settled the federal constitutional issues before us, and they ask that we dismiss Defendant's federal law counterclaims and that we then either dismiss the entire case without prejudice or remand it to state court for determination of any remaining state law issues. Defendants argue that we should proceed to address the merits of their federal constitutional claims, and the General Assembly and the Governor ask for leave to file amended counterclaims requesting declarations that Colo. Const. Art. V, § 44, as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court in Salazar, violates Art. I, § 4 of the federal Constitution and that the legislative plan adopted in May, 2003 is the lawful plan for Colorado's congressional districts. The General Assembly and the Governor's amended counterclaims also request an injunction from this court prohibiting the enforcement of the court-created congressional districts that the Salazar court ordered the Secretary of State to use through 2010. Finally, the Attorney General moves to intervene on the side of the Plaintiffs, and joins Plaintiffs in arguing that we lack jurisdiction to hear this case and that the Colorado Supreme Court's Salazar decision precludes us from addressing Defendants' federal law counterclaims.

II. Jurisdiction

This court has an independent duty to examine its own jurisdiction. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). We therefore raised the jurisdictional question in this case on our own motion and requested argument from the parties in our December 9th Minute Order.

A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,³ lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider claims that explicitly or functionally seek appellate review of prior state court judgments. Thus, a party to a state court proceeding may not appear in federal court to challenge the judgment of the state court on the basis of claims that were actually decided by the state court or of claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with that prior state court judgment. Kenmen Eng'g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 473 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983)). While the Courts of Appeals have at times struggled in setting clear guidelines for identifying claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with state court judgments, recent Tenth Circuit precedent instructs us to ask "whether the state-court judgment caused, actually and proximately, the injury for which the federal-court plaintiff see...