Keller v. Hyundai Motor Mfg.

• Decision Date: 19 January 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19cv207-MHT
• Parties: James Michael KELLER, Plaintiff, v. HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

513 F.Supp.3d 1324

James Michael KELLER, Plaintiff,

v.HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19cv207-MHT

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Signed January 19, 2021

Chase Elliot Estes, Julian Lenwood McPhillips, Jr., McPhillips Shinbaum LLP, Kyle David Sawyer, Attorney at Law, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Meryl L. Cowan, Michael Lee Lucas, Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Myron H. Thompson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

During a company-wide downsizing in 2018, defendant Hyundai Motor Manufacturing, also known as HMMA, terminated the longstanding employment of plaintiff James Michael Keller, a supervisor in the company's production division. Keller was then 50 years old, and he brought suit against the company thereafter, alleging that Hyundai fired him because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621.

The company responded that it fired Keller, not for his age, but because he was either unable or unwilling to prevent the workers he oversaw from attempting to unionize. If true, this may well have violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151. But Keller chose instead to address this defense by amending his complaint to add a claim under § 25-7-35 of the Code of Alabama, part of the State's right-to-work law.

Keller's suit is now before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. The court has jurisdiction over his ADEA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal-question), and it exercises supplemental jurisdiction over his state claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. On the record presented, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the company's assertion that it fired Keller for the union activity of his subordinates is pretextual. Accordingly, the company's motion for summary judgment on Keller's ADEA claim will be denied. However, it is apparent that § 25-7-35 of the Code of Alabama does not provide Keller a remedy for his firing even if, as Hyundai says, it was based on the union efforts among his team members. As such, the company's motion for summary judgment on Keller's state claim will be granted, and Keller's motion for partial summary judgment on this claim will be denied.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

"A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or defense--on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Id.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Keller was hired in 2004 to work in Hyundai's stamping shop, where employees mold sheet steel into the component parts of the company's automobiles. See Jan. 22, 2020, Depo. of James Keller (doc. no. 61-7) at 28. He was promoted to team leader a year later and to group leader the year after that. See id. at 28-31. When Keller was fired from Hyundai in 2018, he was one of two group leaders in the stamping shop, although Hyundai has since added a third group-leader position to that department. See Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 60) at 5-6, 25.

Faced with declining sales in early 2018, Hyundai determined that layoffs of about two dozen salaried employees were necessary, and it delegated to senior management of each division the responsibility for recommending who should be let go. See id. at 13-14. Of the 21 employees removed during this so-called "reorganization," seven, including Keller, were selected from the production staff by the division's vice president Christopher Susock. See id. at 18.

At that point, Hyundai had for several years been the focus of a unionization campaign by the United Auto Workers (UAW). Once this campaign became public, workers who favored the union started wearing gold shirts under their work attire to show their support. Hyundai does "not believe that a third party such as a union is necessary." HMMA's Position on Unions (doc. no. 61-3) at 16. The company therefore "trained its Group Leaders on how to lawfully and persuasively explain the benefits of remaining union-free" and "the disadvantages of unionization." Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 60) at 7.

According to the declarations and deposition testimony of the people involved in recommending Keller for termination, an unusually large number of the workers he supervised wore the gold shirts that evidenced their support for the UAW campaign. Hyundai says it expected group leaders such as Keller to convince their supervisees not to support the union, so it took the number of union sympathizers on his shift as indication that he was ineffective in his role. See id. at 15-16; Decl. of Christopher Susock ("Susock Decl.") (doc. no. 61-4) at ¶¶ 24(b), 26(b). As Susock explained, his decision to recommend Keller's termination "primarily related to the fact that Keller had a substantial number of pro-union Team Members in his group, and he was not taking sufficient steps to lead his group so that his Team Members did not believe that they needed a union." Susock Decl. (doc. no. 61-4) at ¶ 26(b). Hyundai says this showed that Keller's supervisees had "low morale," a term it ostensibly uses to mean "that many of Keller's Team Members exhibited that they felt the need for third party representation instead of leadership from their own Group Leader." Id. at ¶ 24(b); see also Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 60) at 8 ("By employee morale, HMMA is referring to how strongly its Team Members feel that they need third party (union) representation in the workplace.").

As Hyundai tells it, anxiety about the union sympathies of Keller's subordinates was so great that the highest echelons of the company's leadership took notice. Vice president Susock says Hyundai's CEO personally told him "that he was very concerned about the number of Team Members on Keller's shift wearing these gold colored t-shirts, and further stated that the Group Leader for the shift did not appear to be a strong leader for the Company's position on third parties." Susock Decl. (doc. no. 61-4) at ¶ 20. The CEO apparently warned Susock that his "employment at HMMA could be in jeopardy if this concern was not properly addressed." Id.

Susock says that he included Keller among the employees he recommended for termination as part of the company's March 2018 reorganization after this admonishment by Hyundai's chief executive. As he testified, "if something wasn't done, it was going to turn into a much greater problem for us as a company." Susock Depo. (doc. no. 61-9) at 60. Director of Production Support Craig Stapley, with whom Susock consulted before recommending Keller for termination, says he agreed that Susock should recommend Keller's termination because "he believed that [Hyundai] needed a Group Leader in the Stamping Shop who would engage on the company's position when it came to third party intervention." Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 60) at 14-15. Stapley testified that "[o]ur concern, as a company, was a large penetration of people that felt they needed a third-party intervention in [Keller's] group." Stapley Depo. (doc. no. 61-10) at 93. In sum, Hyundai says it fired Keller because his group members had "low morale," by which it means that many of them were inclined to support the union, Susock Decl. (doc. no. 61-4) at ¶ 24(b); because Keller "was not providing leadership," by which it means that he did not persuade enough of his group members to oppose the union, Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 60) at 18; and because Keller needed "constant supervision," by which it means that his superiors had to pull his group members away from the union themselves, Stapley Depo. (doc. no. 61-10) at 75.

Keller tells a different story. He points to his contemporaneous performance evaluations, which show that his leadership skills were regularly judged by his superiors to meet or exceed the company's expectations. See, e.g. , 2015 Keller Performance Evaluation (doc. no. 61-8) at 54; 2016 Keller Performance Evaluation (doc. no. 61-8) at 64; 2017 Keller Performance Evaluation (doc. no. 61-8) at 74. These evaluations include generally favorable comments from his supervisors, none of which mention the union activity among his team members that supposedly so alarmed the company. See, e.g. , 2016 Keller Performance Evaluation (doc. no. 61-8) at 66; 2017 Keller Performance Evaluation (doc. no. 61-8) at 76.

At the time of Keller's firing, he was 50 years old. Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 60) at 4. His counterpart stamping-shop group-leader Bill Carter, who was not included in the reorganization, was 37 years old. Id. at 6. Keller's replacement was 37 years old as well. Id. at 25. Of the 21 Hyundai employees selected for reorganization, 18 were over the age of 40. See Report of Carole M. Amidon (doc. no. 61-13) at 17 tbl.1. Hyundai's statistical expert found that, during the reorganization, employees over the age of 40 were more than three times as likely as their younger counterparts to be selected for termination. See id. at 19-20.

III. DISCUSSION

Keller brings two claims in his amended complaint. His first is brought under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621, alleging that his termination constituted age discrimination. His second is that Hyundai's actions "violated Alabama public policy and Ala. Code...