Keller v. Keller, 2014-03161

• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
• Citation: 126 A.D.3d 940,2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 02453,6 N.Y.S.3d 126
• Docket Number: 2014-03161
• Parties: Ronald KELLER, respondent, v. June KELLER, appellant.
• Decision Date: 25 March 2015

126 A.D.3d 940
6 N.Y.S.3d 126
2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 02453

Ronald KELLER, respondent
v.
June KELLER, appellant.

2014-03161

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

March 25, 2015.

6 N.Y.S.3d 126

Nicholas J. Damadeo, P.C., Huntington, N.Y., for appellant.

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, SANDRA L. SGROI, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.

Opinion

126 A.D.3d 940

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced

126 A.D.3d 941

by judgment entered April 4, 2008, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Behar, J.), dated January 15, 2014, which denied her motion to hold the plaintiff in contempt for failure to pay child support and related expenses pursuant to that judgment, and pursuant to a money judgment of the same court entered August 4, 2009, and six orders of the Family Court, Suffolk County.

6 N.Y.S.3d 127

ORDERED that the order dated January 15, 2014, is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to adjudicate the plaintiff in contempt of the judgment of divorce, the money judgment, and the orders, and for the imposition of an appropriate penalty thereon.

“Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 245, a spouse may be punished for contempt for failing to make payments pursuant to [a judgment of divorce], but it must appear ‘presumptively, to the satisfaction of the court,’ that payment cannot be enforced pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 243 (sequestration), Domestic Relations Law § 244 (money judgment), CPLR 5241 (income execution) or CPLR 5242 (income deduction)” (Jones v. Jones, 65 A.D.3d 1016, 1016, 885 N.Y.S.2d 323 ; see Klepp v. Klepp, 35 A.D.3d 386, 826 N.Y.S.2d 629 ; Higbee v. Higbee, 260 A.D.2d 603, 688 N.Y.S.2d 669 ). Thus, contempt may be warranted where the record demonstrates “that resort to other, less drastic enforcement mechanisms [has] been exhausted or would be ineffectual” (Capurso v. Capurso, 61 A.D.3d 913, 914, 878 N.Y.S.2d 754 ; see Jones v. Jones, 65 A.D.3d at 1016, 885 N.Y.S.2d 323 ; Rosenblitt v. Rosenblitt, 121...