Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co

Citation67 L.Ed. 731,43 S.Ct. 445,261 U.S. 428
Decision Date09 April 1923
Docket NumberNo. 260,260
PartiesKELLER et al., Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia, v. POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER CO., Inc., et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Messrs. Frank H. Stephens, of Chicago, Ill., and Conrad H. Syme, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 429-431 intentionally omitted] Mr. John A. Garver, of New York City, for appellee.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 431-436 intentionally omitted] Mr. Chief Justice TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. It is an appeal provided for in paragraph 64 of the law creating the Public Utilities Commission of the District. The law is section 8 of an act approved March 4, 1913, making appropriations for the District for the year ending June 30, 1914 (37 Stat. 938, 974). Paragraph 7 requires the commission created thereby to value the property of every public utility within the District actually used and useful for the convenience of the public at the fair value thereof at the time of the valuation. The commission, after a public hearing, fixed the value of the Potomac Electric Power Company at $11,231,170.43. The company then filed a bill in equity in the Supreme Court of the District against the commission, seeking to enjoin the order as unlawful, unreasonable and inadequate under paragraph 64 of the law. It made a party defendant to the bill the Washington Railway & Electric Company, because it is the sole stockholder of the Power Company.

The Supreme Court of the District upheld the findings of the commission in every particular and dismissed the bill. From this decree the company appealed to the Court of Appeals of the District, on the ground that the commission and the Supreme Court had found the value as of July 1, 1914, whereas the time of the valuation was December 31, 1916, and between the two dates there had been a sharp rise in values, for which the company was not made any allowance in the valuation, and also because under the circumstances of the case, and the challenge by the company that the valuation was arbitrary, the court should disregard the prima facie effect given by the statute to the findings of the commission, and exercise its own independent judgment as to both law and facts, so far as it was necessary to determine whether the use of such valuation as a basis of rate making would result in confiscation. The Court of Appeals sustained the appeal on these grounds, and remanded the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion.

When this appeal was opened by counsel at the bar we declined to hear the merits, and postponed the case to give both sides an opportunity to prepare to discuss the questions, first whether Congress had the constitutional power to vest the District Courts and this court with jurisdiction to review the proceedings of the commission, and, second, whether if the power existed, the appeal to this court was only intended to apply to a final decree and finally whether this was such a decree. Briefs have accordingly b en filed and we have had an oral argument upon these questions.

The Public Utilities Law is a very comprehensive one. It applies to all public utilities in the District, except steam rilways and steamboat lines. It creates a commission to supervise and regulate them in the matter of rates, tolls, charges, service, joint rates, and other matters of interest to the public. It directs investigation into the financial history and affairs of each utility and its valuation at a fair value as of the time of valuation. It requires a public hearing on this subject. It also provides that while the utility may fix a schedule of rates, not exceeding the lawful rates at the passage of the act, which it must publish, the commission may of its own initiative, or upon the complaint of another, or indeed of the utility itself, investigate the reasonableness, lawfulness, and adequacy of the rate or service and may change the same. The utility must then adopt the change and publish its schedules accordingly. The law further provides that, in such proceedings, the utility shall have notice and a hearing, that a stenographic record of the proceedings shall be kept and produced by the commission in any court proceeding thereafter instituted to question the validity, reasonableness, or adequacy of the action of the commission.

The relevant part of paragraph 64 is given in full in the margin.1 In short, it enables the commission by action in equity to invoke the advice of the District Supreme Court upon the elements in value to be by it considered in arriving at a true valuation of the property of a utility. It further grants to any utility or any person or corporate interest dessatisfied with any valuation, rate or rates, or regulation, or requirement, act, service, or other thing fixed by the commission the right to begin a proceeding in equity in the Supreme Court, to vacate, set aside, or modify the order on the ground that the valuation, rate, regulation, or requirement is unlawful, inadequate, or unreasonable. Paragraph 65 limits the time within which such a proceeding to vacate, set aside, or amend the order of the commission may be begun to 120 days, and thereafter the right to appeal or of recourse to the courts shall terminate absolutely. Paragraph 67 provides that, if new evidence is introduced by the plaintiff different from that offered in the hearing before the commission, unless the parties otherwise agree, the new evidence shall be sent to the commission to enable it to change its order if it sees fit, and then the court shall proceed to consider the appeal either on the original order or the changed order as the case may be. Paragraph 69 provides that in such proceedings the burden of proof is upon the party adverse to the commission to show by clear and satisfactory evidence that the determination, requirement, direction, or order of the commission complained of is inadequate, unreasonable, or unlawful as the case may be.

What is the nature of the power thus conferred on the District Supreme Court. Is it judicial or is it legislative? Is the court to pass solely on questions of law, and look to the facts only to decide what are the questions of law really arising, or to consider whether there was any showing of facts before the commission upon which, as a matter of law, its finding can be justified? Or has it the power, in this equitable proceeding, to review the exercise of discretion by the commission and itself raise or lower valuations, rates, or restrict or expand orders as to service? Has it the power to make the order the commission should have made? If it has, then the court is to exercise legislative power, in that it will be laying down new rules, to change present conditions and to guide future action, and is not confined to definition and protection of existing rights. In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210, 226, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 69 (53 L. Ed. 150) we said:

'A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabil ties as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative not judicial in kind. * * *'

Under the law, the proceeding in the District Supreme Court is of a very special character. The court may by called in to advise the commission as to the elements of value to be by it considered, at any stage of the hearing before the commission. To modify of amend a valuation, or a rate, or a regulation of the commission as inadequate, as the court is authorized to do, seems to us necessarily to import the power to increase the valuation, or rate, or to make a regulation more comprehensive, and to consider the evidence before it for this purpose. In other words, the proceeding in court is an appeal from the action of the commission in the chancery sense. In the briefs of counsel for the commission it is so termed. The form which the bill filed is given by the electric company is that of a series of exceptions to the rulings of the court on the evidence and at every stage of the hearing and finally to the conclusions of fact as against the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 69 is significant in its indication that issues of fact as to inadequacy of the action by the commission are to be passed on by the court.

Counsel seek to establish an analogy between the jurisdiction of the District Supreme Court to review the action of the commission, and that conferred on, and exercised by, the federal District Courts in respect of the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. We think, however, that the analogy fails. The act for the creation of the Commerce Court provided (Judicial Code, § 207 [Comp. St. § 993]) that is should have the jurisdiction of the then Circuit Courts of all cases brought to enjoin, set aside or annul or suspend in whole or in part any order of the commission. When the Commerce Court was abolished by the Act of October 22, 1913 (38 Stat. 219 [Comp. St. § 992]), this jurisdiction was conferred on the several District Courts of the United States. This permits these courts to consider...

To continue reading

Request your trial
182 cases
  • US v. Brodie, Crim. No. 87-0492.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • May 19, 1988
    ...to vest appointment of inferior officers, such as election supervisors, in courts of law); Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (District of Columbia tribunal); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F.Supp. 902, 906-11 (D.D.C.1967) (three-judge ......
  • Castañon v. United States, Civil Action No. 18-2545 Three-Judge Court (RDM, RLW, TNM)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • March 12, 2020
    ...provisions of the Constitution serve as a check on Congress's District Clause power. See, e.g. , Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co. , 261 U.S. 428, 442-44, 43 S.Ct. 445, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (concluding that Congress could not contravene Article III by using its District Clause powers to crea......
  • Mobil Oil Corporation v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Civ. A. No. 71-230.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • November 18, 1974
    ...is stated only when a contract extending for a longer period than one year is required. . . ." 28 See Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428, 441-443, 43 S.Ct. 445, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923); United States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641, 652-653, 69 S.Ct. 787, 93 L.Ed. 938 29 This is particularly the ......
  • In re Assessment of Kan. City S. Ry. Co., Case Number: 25038
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oklahoma
    • May 8, 1934
    ...not exercise powers administrative in the last analysis. See Wyman's Administrative Law, page 92. See Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 67 L. Ed. 731, 43 S. Ct. 445; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 55 L. Ed. 246, 31 S. Ct. 250. ¶41 In the case of Gordon v. U. S., 117 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • Did liberal justices invent the standing doctrine? An empirical study of the evolution of standing, 1921-2006.
    • United States
    • Stanford Law Review Vol. 62 No. 3, March 2010
    • March 1, 2010
    ...Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922) (p. 1376); Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600 (1923) (p. 1413 n.226); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923) (p. 1395 n.115); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (p. 1375); Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trs v. United States, 263 U.S. 143 (192......
  • Ascertaining the laws of the several states: positivism and judicial federalism after Erie.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 145 No. 6, June - June 1997
    • June 1, 1997
    ...Article III courts "with administrative or legislative functions which are not properly judicial"), and Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 444 (1923) (stating that the jurisdiction of Article III courts is limited to deciding cases and controversies and "does not extend to .........
  • THE PATH OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REMEDIES.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 98 No. 5, June 2023
    • June 1, 2023
    ...and justiciable' issues in such form that the judicial power is 'capable of acting on them'") (quoting Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 444 (1923)); id. at 84 ("[O]nly a person with 'legal standing' can attack an administrative act."); id. at 117 (noting that a court may "se......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT