Keller v. Town of Westfield

Decision Date29 February 1956
Docket NumberNo. A--753,A--753
Citation39 N.J.Super. 430,121 A.2d 419
PartiesNelson A. KELLER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TOWN OF WESTFIELD, a municipal corporation, and William H. Mair and Thelma C. Mair, his wife, Defendants-Appellants. . Appellate Division
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Alan Bruce Conlin, Westfield, for respondent (H. Frank Pettit, Westfield, attorney).

Robert S. Snevily, Westfield, for appellant Town of Westerfield.

Irvine B. Johnstone, Jr., Westfield, for appellants William H. Mair and Thelma C. Mair (Dughi & Johnstone, Westfield, attorneys).

Before Judges CLAPP, JAYNE and FRANCIS.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FRANCIS, J.A.D.

The Law Division invalidated a variance from the zoning ordinance of the Town of Westfield. It had been recommended by the board of adjustment and approved by the township committee.

The original section of the zoning ordinance involved permitted the construction or use of a building in a residence 'A' zone for the office 'of a professional person, such as a doctor, dentist, lawyer, engineer, artist, photographer, teacher or musician, Provided such office or studio is accessory to and part of a residence * * *.'

Appellant, William H. Mair, who is described in the pretrial order as 'having a degree of Doctor of Medical Technology,' purchased a one-family residence in the 'A' zone for the purpose of establishing his laboratory and office. His work is said to involve technical laboratory work and tests, as well as application of 'physiotherapy procedures and other specialized treatment to patients referred by physicians.' The activity was and is carried on under the name Clinipath Laboratories. The premises had been owned and lived in for 25 years by a Mrs. Donohue. After the accomplishment of remodeling, she was to reside there as a tenant. Mair and his wife, who took title as tenants by the entirety, intended to continue living elsewhere.

The Mairs applied for and were granted a permit to renovate and remodel the building so as to adapt it to the desired purposes. The work was performed, the exterior of the house was improved in appearance and a portion of the lot was paved so as to provide off street parking.

About seven months later a complaint was filed in the municipal court against William and Thelma Mair, charging a violation of the zoning ordinance because Mair was not residing there. The magistrate interpreted the language to mean that a professional person could maintain an office in the 'A' zone as an accessory use only if the premises were used as his residence also. Accordingly a finding of guilt was made.

Successive appeals were heard in the County Court and by Part B of the Appellate Division, and the conviction was affirmed. State v. Mair, 39 N.J.Super. 18, 120 A.2d 487 (App.Div. Feb. 10, 1956). We accept the conclusion that under the ordinance residence in the building is a prerequisite to the maintenance of an office therein.

On July 1, 1954, after the conviction and affirmance in the County Court but prior to the final determination on appeal, Mair applied to the board of adjustment for a variance in order to permit the second floor of the premises to be occupied by a tenant rather than by himself and his wife. The town council, obviously being desirous of eliminating any possible doubt about residence being a requirement when a professional office is opened in the 'A' zone, amended the ordinance to read that such office is permissible 'providing the person using the office Resides in the building * * *.' The amendment became effective July 12, 1954.

Three days later, on July 15, a hearing was held by the board of adjustment on the variance request. It is inconceivable that the board was unaware that the governing body had just officially emphasized the mandate which the applicant was seeking to avoid. In any event a variance was recommended to the town council, presumably under N.J.S.A. 40:55--39(d) (which authorizes such action 'in particular cases and for special reasons'), although the language of subsection (c) seems to have been employed.

The findings of fact by the board recite that the variance was sought because of the interpretation of the ordinance by the magistrate with respect to residence on the premises. They say also that refusal of the relief would 'result in particular and exceptional practical difficulties and exceptional and undue hardship * * * in view of the substantial expenditure made in good faith by Dr. Mair under the building permit granted to him,' and that granting the application would 'not result in substantial detriment to the public good and would not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zoning plan.' Finally this statement is made:

'That the fact that the residential portion of the premises in question was occupied by a tenant rather than by the professional person operating the laboratories would not be detrimental to the public good and would not impair the intent and purpose of the zoning plan and the zoning ordinance.'

A copy of the resolution was sent to the town council on July 19 and the variance was granted on September 13. No explanation appears in the record for the inconsistent course of conduct pursued by the governing body and the action taken is difficult to understand. The municipality prosecuted and convicted Mair and his wife for...

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18 cases
  • Jantausch v. Borough of Verona
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court
    • July 12, 1956
    ...in such circumstances has been held not to constitute a special reason within R.S. 40:55--39(d), N.J.S.A. Keller v. Town of Westfield, 39 N.J.Super. 430, 121 A.2d 419 (App.Div.1956); cf. Dolan v. DeCapua, supra (16 N.J. at page 610, 109 A.2d 615). But what of the intermediate situation in w......
  • Shim v. Washington Tp. Planning Bd.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • March 11, 1997
    ...and underlying philosophy of the ordinance.' " Wyzykowski, supra, 132 N.J. at 520, 626 A.2d 406 (quoting Keller v. Town of Westfield, 39 N.J.Super. 430, 435, 121 A.2d 419 (App.Div.1956)). Plaintiffs' construction of the ordinance runs counter to the settled rule that an accessory use need n......
  • Wyzykowski v. Rizas
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1993
    ...the interpretation is consistent with both "the letter and the underlying philosophy of the ordinance." Keller v. Town of Westfield, 39 N.J.Super. 430, 435, 121 A.2d 419 (App.Div.1956) (emphases added). The Ocean Grove ordinance defines "accessory use" in the same terms the Charlie Brown co......
  • State v. P. T. & L. Const. Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • June 12, 1978
    ...80 A.2d 655 (Law Div.1951); DeBenedetti v. Twp. of River Vale, 21 N.J.Super. 430, 91 A.2d 353 (App.Div.1952); Keller v. Westfield, 39 N.J.Super. 430, 121 A.2d 419 (App.Div.1956). Second, it must be determined whether a use which is found to be incident to the permitted use is also a customa......
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