Kelley v. Bowen, Civ. A. No. 88-0400-MA.
Decision Date | 16 June 1988 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 88-0400-MA. |
Parties | Albina T. KELLEY, Plaintiff, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
John Fisher, Medford, Mass., for plaintiff.
Frederick E. Dashiell, Asst. U.S. Atty., for defendant.
This is an action brought pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 405(g) (1983), to review a final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("the Secretary") denying the plaintiff, Albina T. Kelley, disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Kelley contends that the decision of the Secretary should be reversed as it is not supported by substantial evidence, and seeks summary judgment. The Secretary opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below, I reverse the Secretary's decision.
The plaintiff filed an application for Title II benefits on October 16, 1985, seeking benefits dating from August 9, 1985, alleging an inability to work due to her illiteracy, borderline retardation and limited cognitive abilities, anxiety, inability to concentrate, and visual-motor deficiencies. Kelley, at the time of the alleged disability, was 44 years old, had attended special classes until age 16, and had been employed as a homemaker and domestic worker in private homes since 1975.
The plaintiff's application was initially denied by the Social Security Administration on January 30, 1986. The application was reconsidered, and again denied on April 16, 1986. A de novo hearing was held on September 12, 1986 before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), who issued an opinion denying the plaintiff's application for benefits on January 30, 1987. This became a final decision of the Secretary on December 31, 1987, when the Appeals Council approved the ALJ's decision. This action followed.
This Court is called upon to perform a limited task in reviewing the final decision of the Secretary in this matter. This Court is only to determine whether the findings of the Secretary are supported by substantial evidence in the record; where they are, those findings are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Burgos Lopez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 747 F.2d 37, 39 (1st Cir.1984), citing Falu v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 703 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir.1983). The Secretary's findings must be upheld "if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support his conclusion." Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir.1981), citing, inter alia, Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). Nevertheless, a district court can reverse the decision of the Secretary if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, and a rehearing would serve only to delay the award of benefits. Dunbar v. Califano, 454 F.Supp. 1261, 1268 (W.D.N.Y.1978), citing Gold v. HEW, 463 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.1972).
The Social Security Act defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment" that might lead to death or is expected to last or, indeed, lasts for at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To be considered disabling, an impairment must be so severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ..." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The ALJ found that, in the most recent I.Q. test taken by Mrs. Kelley, her verbal I.Q. was evaluated at 66.1 Thus, the issue in this case is whether Mrs. Kelley has any physical or mental impairments "imposing additional and significant work-related limitation of function." As the First Circuit has noted, "an impairment imposes significant limitations when its effect on a claimant's ability to perform basic work activities is more than slight or minimal." Nieves v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 775 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir.1985) (footnote omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) ( ).
Although I find there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that Mrs. Kelley suffers from no physical impairments, I do not find substantial evidence in the record to support her conclusion that Mrs. Kelley is not suffering from any significant psychiatric impairments that significantly limit her work-related activities. The plaintiff highlights three problems that should be considered as constituting mental impairments satisfying the requirements of § 12.05(C) — her inability to concentrate, motor-visual deficiencies, and anxiety. I find that Mrs. Kelley's anxiety and related problems constitute a significant impairment not adequately considered by the ALJ.
The ALJ seems to dismiss Mrs. Kelley's anxiety and depression as fairly insignificant. The ALJ evidently rejects the opinion of some of the experts who have filed reports in this matter concerning Mrs. Kelley's psychological well-being; as the ALJ herself noted, for instance, Dr. Mortimer Schnee, one of the examining doctors "felt ... Mrs. Kelley was suffering from a psychological or learning disability." Transcript, at 22. An examination of the record in this case, however, indicates that Mrs. Kelley's psychological difficulties stemming out of her anxiety and depression are significant and actively hinder her cognitive abilities, and may thus interfere with her work performance. In their report concerning Kelley, for example, Dr. M. Ann Viets, a counseling psychologist, and Dr. Sterling I. Colten, a licensed psychologist, remarked extensively concerning Kelley's psychological limitations:
Viets and Colten also note that these feelings of anxiety have interfered with Mrs. Kelley's intellectual performance:
The general impression of the I.Q. test is that of an individual who is currently functioning at a level consistent with her basic endowment except in those areas which might be adversely effected sic by the presence of...
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