Kelley v. Brennan
| Decision Date | 29 October 1892 |
| Citation | 25 A. 346,18 R.I. 41 |
| Parties | KELLEY v. BRENNAN. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Exceptions from court of common pleas.
Action of assumpsit by Margaret E. Kelley against Edward L. Brennan, alleging breach of a promise to marry. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant petitions for a new trial. Denied.
Charles H. Page and Franklin P. Owen, for plaintiff.
Dexter B. Potter, for defendant.
After the rendition of the verdict, the defendant moved an arrest of judgment, because the declaration averred no offer on the part of plaintiff to marry the defendant, but only averred that she was ready and willing to do so. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant excepted.
It may be true that in cases in which the promise to marry is general,—that is, in which no time or place of marriage is fixed in the promise, or in which the promise is to marry within a reasonable time, or upon request, and in which, also, the defendant has not married another,—it is necessary for the plaintiff to aver and prove an offer of marriage and a refusal by the defendant, since, in such cases, it may not be possible for the plaintiff otherwise to show that the defendant is in default. Burks v. Shain, 2 Bibb, 341; Fible v. Caplinger, 13 B. Mon. 464; Burnhara v. Cornwell, 16 B. Mon. 284; Gough v. Farr, 2 Car. & P. 631; Oliv. Prec. (2d Ed.) 288, note. But in the note last cited it is said that if, after an engagement to marry, and the lapse of a reasonable time, or the time agreed upon between the parties, the gentleman omits to offer to marry, it is generally considered a refusal to marry; and the language of the court in Seymour v. Gartside, 2 Dowl. & R. 55, is quoted, that it can hardly be expected that a lady should say to a gentleman, "I am ready to marry you; pray marry me." This latter point, however, it is not necessary for us to determine, for the testimony shows a positive refusal by the defendant to marry the plaintiff before the suit was begun. Such refusal was a breach of the defendant's engagement to marry the plaintiff, and dispensed with the necessity for an offer on the part of the plaintiff to marry the defendant before bringing suit, if such an offer would otherwise have been necessary. In Gough v. Farr, 2 Car. & P. 631, the defendant, when asked by the plaintiff's father if he intended to marry the plaintiff, replied, "Certainly not," and it was held sufficient to enable the plaintiff to maintain her action; the declaration of...
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Anderson v. Kirby
...total cessation of intimacy without explanation." This ruling was followed in Hubbard v. Bonesteel, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 361. In Kelley v. Brennan, 18 R.I. 41, 25 A. 346, was held that a refusal by the defendant to marry the plaintiff before the suit was begun "was a breach of the defendant's e......
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Anderson v. Kirby
...cessation of intimacy without explanation." This ruling was followed in Hubbard v. Bonesteel, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 361. In Kelley v. Brennan, 18 R. I. 41, 25 Atl. 346, it was held that a refusal by the defendant to marry the plaintiff before the suit was begun "was a breach of the defendant's e......
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Wrynn v. Downey
...promise." 2 Ency. Laws of England, 238. But it has been held in Rhode Island that no such corroboration is necessary here. Kelley v. Brennan, 18 R. I. 41, 25 Atl. 346. The evidence, as we conclude, was improperly admitted, and was so calculated to prejudice the jury against the defendant as......
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Thompson v. Scott
...requirement to the contrary, corroboration of plaintiff is not required. Salchert v. Reinig, 135 Wis. 194, 115 N.W. 132; Kelley v. Brennan, 18 R.I. 41, 25 A. 346; Fisher v. Oliver, 172 Mo.App. 18, 154 S.W. We do not deem it necessary to set out the testimony, but it is sufficient to say tha......