Kelley v. Kelley
Decision Date | 03 August 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 990711-CA.,990711-CA. |
Citation | 2000 Utah Ct. App. 236,9 P.3d 171 |
Parties | Sonia KELLEY, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Wayne KELLEY, Respondent and Appellant. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Ellen Maycock, Kruse Landa & Maycock, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
James C. Haskins and Thomas N. Thompson, Haskins & Associates, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges GREENWOOD, JACKSON, and DAVIS.
¶ 1 Respondent Wayne Kelley appeals the trial court's orders pertaining to his relationship with petitioner Sonia Kelley. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
¶ 2 Sonia and Wayne married on May 24, 1980 and subsequently had two children. During their marriage, Wayne worked in the construction industry. Wayne founded Altex Construction in Alaska and owned a majority interest in another company, DSI. Wayne's work required him to make extended stays away from home, during which he occasionally rented an apartment.
¶ 3 In 1994, the terms of a purchase by DSI of another company placed Wayne's personal assets at risk. To minimize this risk and protect the family home, Wayne and Sonia agreed to divorce, transfer title to Sonia individually, but continue to live as husband and wife. Accordingly, Sonia and Wayne obtained a divorce decree entered on July 18, 1994.
¶ 4 This decree provided that Sonia was awarded primary custody of the children, Wayne was to pay child support totaling $1,000 per month, and Sonia was "awarded the sum of not less than $1,000.00 per month as alimony from [Wayne], said alimony to continue for three years, or until [Sonia] remarries, or until terminated by statute, whichever shall occur first." Among the property distributed, Sonia was awarded the marital residence in Bountiful, Utah, and two automobiles. Wayne was awarded all other real property, one automobile, and his personal effects.
¶ 5 Following their 1994 divorce, Wayne and Sonia made no change in their predivorce relationship or living arrangements. Wayne and Sonia continued to cohabit, subject to the traveling demands of Wayne's work, which included obtaining an apartment in Texas. They did not tell their children or anyone else in the community that they had divorced. Their financial relationship remained the same, with Wayne providing funds "at the same standard of living which had existed prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce."1 They continued to socialize together, including attending a Christmas party in 1994 and taking a family vacation in 1995. In May 1995, Wayne gave Sonia an anniversary card indicating he loved her and wished to spend another fifteen years together.
¶ 6 In the fall of 1995, Sonia became suspicious that Wayne was romantically involved with another woman. With Wayne's assurance that the relationship was over, however, Wayne and Sonia reconciled—until a few months later. In the spring of 1996, Sonia discovered that Wayne had continued his relationship with the other woman, which precipitated a May 1996 altercation. Wayne subsequently cut off financial support for Sonia and Sonia sought legal counsel.
¶ 7 On July 10, 1996, Sonia moved to modify the divorce decree, asserting such decree was fraudulently obtained and that "[s]ince the entry of the Decree of Divorce, [Wayne] has fully supported the family by paying over to [Sonia] the approximate sum of $7,500 each month" but that said support had ceased. The court entered a temporary order which provided, inter alia, that Sonia have custody of the children, Wayne make child support and alimony payments totaling $6,000 per month, and that Wayne pay $5,000 in temporary attorney fees. Also on July 10, 1996, Sonia filed a separate action to establish a common law marriage between her and Wayne effective on the day the decree was entered, July 18, 1994, and to obtain a divorce therefrom. This second proceeding was consolidated with the first. In July 1997, Sonia filed another separate action against Wayne seeking damages for fraud and other claims, which was likewise consolidated into the divorce/modification proceedings.
¶ 8 Before the matter came for trial, on August 18, 1997, Wayne moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that there can be no establishment of a common law marriage following the 1994 divorce because no such adjudication or determination was obtained within one year of the relationship's termination as required by section 30-1-4.5(2) of the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1998). The trial court agreed that no timely determination was made, but concluded that the one year time restriction was unconstitutional. Specifically, the court concluded that although the restriction did not run afoul of the Open Courts Clause, see Utah Const. art. I, § 11, it did violate the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause. See Utah Const. art. I, § 24. Consequently, the court denied Wayne's motion for partial summary judgment.
¶ 9 The matter was addressed during a bench trial, after which the trial court made factual findings. Regarding the existence of a common law marriage, the court's findings included the following:
The court further determined that Wayne had the current ability to produce $10,000 per month in income.
¶ 10 Through its findings and conclusions and the new divorce decree, both entered July 22, 1999, the trial court concluded: (1) that Sonia's action based upon fraud must fail; (2) that the parties entered a common law marriage which "commenced immediately following the entry of the Decree of Divorce" on July 18, 1994, and terminated in June 1996; and (3) that there was a change of...
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