Kelley v. Leachman
Citation | 29 P. 849,3 Idaho 392 |
Parties | KELLEY v. LEACHMAN |
Decision Date | 18 May 1892 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Idaho |
WHAT CONSTITUTES A MORTGAGE-SEPARATE AGREEMENT TO RECONVEY.-1. A deed absolute on its face, and a separate agreement by the grantee for reconveyance of the same tract of land to grantor upon payment of consideration named in the deed, with interest, taxes, etc., by specified time, bearing same date as deed, constitute together a mortgage.
SAME-EJECTMENT.-2. In such case ejectment will not lie by grantee to obtain possession of land from grantor.
REMEDY-FORECLOSURE.-3. The remedy is foreclosure under section 4520 of the Revised Laws of Idaho, et seq.
(Syllabus by the court.)
APPEAL from District Court, Nez Perces County.
Judgment reversed and cause dismissed, with costs awarded to appellant.
E O'Neill, for Appellant.
A deed absolute in form may be a mortgage by there being a written defeasance, or a verbal defeasance, or both, (Smith v Smith, 80 Cal. 323, 21 P. 4, 22 P. 186, 549; 2 Devlin on Deeds, secs. 1100, 1102, 1103; 4 Kent's Commentaries 12th ed., *142, *143.) The intention of the parties controls, and, in case of doubt, courts always incline to and determine the instrument to be a mortgage. (2 Washburn on Real Property, 60, 66; Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139; Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 331.) A sale in form, but which in fact and substance may be avoided by the payment of money within a given time, is, and will be held to be, a mortgage. If a mortgage until that period elapses, it must forever remain a mortgage. (Hickox v. Lowe, 10 Cal. 197; Robinson v. Cropsey, 2 Edw. Ch. 138; 2 Devlin on Deeds, secs. 1107, 1115; 4 Kent's Commentaries, *142, *143; 2 Washburn on Real Property, 65.) Where the terms of the agreement naturally lead to the conclusion that the transaction was intended as security for a debt, clear and decisive proof is requisite to overcome their import. (Hickox v. Lowe, 10 Cal. 197, 211; Horn v. Keteltas, 46 N.Y. 605; Holmes v. Grant, 8 Paige, 243.) The determination as to whether the statute of limitation had run against the conveyance as a mortgage, and whether as a deed the action of ejectment were not barred by the adverse possession of the defendant for over five years, was in issue by pleadings and evidence, and should have been found. (Spotts v. Hanley, 85 Cal. 155, 168, 24 P. 738; Knight v. Roche, 56 Cal. 15, 17; Spreckels v. Ord, 72 Cal. 86, 13 P. 158; Duff v. Duff, 71 Cal. 513, 12 P. 570.) Limitation on mortgage or mortgage debt is the same as on bond or unsecured note. (Wormouth v. Hatch, 33 Cal. 121; Arrington v. Liscom, 34 Cal. 336, 94 Am. Dec. 722.) All testimony showing the circumstances, understanding or agreement under which the deed and defeasance were executed is both admissible and requisite, and decision based on part of the evidence of the case is against law. (Knight v. Roche, 56 Cal. 17; Pierce v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 116; Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139; Husheon v. Husheon, 71 Cal. 407, 12 P. 410; Gay v. Hamilton, 33 Cal. 686; Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332.)
Rand & Howe, for Respondent.
A bond, in terms a defeasance, as that the grantee shall reconvey to the grantor, upon being paid a certain sum, does not convert the original conveyance into a mortgage. (2 Washburn on Real Property, 63; Trull v. Skinner, 17 Pick. 216; Green v. Butler, 26 Cal. 605; Hughes v. Davis, 40 Cal. 117.) Before the statute could be set on foot there must be some repudiation of the contract--some positive denial of the right of plaintiff. (Love v. Watkins, 40 Cal. 568.) Before defendant could have any standing in a court of equity he must fully pay the amount agreed upon or offer to redeem, and even this would be no bar to ejectment, but must bring his suit, after surrender, for a reconveyance or assumpsit. (Duclos v. Walton (Nov. 24, 1891), 21 Or. 323, 28 P. 1; Townsend v. Petersen, 12 Colo. 491, 21 P. 619.)
On the twenty-sixth day of July, 1883, the defendant, S. S. Leachman, was the owner of, and in possession of, the north half of the southeast quarter of section 27, and the west half of the southwest quarter of section 26, in township 35 north, of range 5 west, of Boise meridian, in Nez Perces county. On that day he gave the plaintiff, Madison A. Kelley, a deed of conveyance of the said tract of land, absolute on its face, with covenants of warranty, for the consideration of $ 1,661.39. The deed was made, executed and delivered in the forenoon of said day. In the afternoon of the same day, in pursuance of the agreement of the parties, the plaintiff executed the following agreement to reconvey and deliver the same to the defendant:
The plaintiff, on the tenth day of September, 1891, files his complaint, alleging ownership of the said tract of land; that the defendant, on said date, entered into possession of the said premises under the plaintiff. Various payments were made from year to year by the defendant to plaintiff upon the amount appearing to be due him, for principal and interest by the terms of the said agreement, until about the beginning of the year 1890. In February, 1891, plaintiff demanded possession of the land, which defendant refused; whereupon plaintiff brings this suit in ejectment, alleging above facts, and that he is entitled to possession; that value of rents, issues and profits of said premises is $ 300, and that he has sustained damage in the sum of $ 150; prays judgment for the recovery of the premises, for rents and profits, damages and costs of action. Defendant denies ownership of plaintiff; that he was ever in possession; denies value of rents and profits and damages; alleges ownership; continued possession in himself; that the deed and defeasance were intended as a mortgage; alleges the payment of the whole $ 1,661.39, principal and interest; pleads statute of limitation; prays decree...
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