Kelley v. Singletary

• Decision Date: 19 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 92-14246CIV.,92-14246CIV.
• Citation: 222 F.Supp.2d 1357
• Parties: William H. KELLEY, Petitioner, v. Harry SINGLETARY, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

Page 1357

222 F.Supp.2d 1357

William H. KELLEY, Petitioner, v. Harry SINGLETARY, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 92-14246CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

September 19, 2002.

Laurence H. Tribe—Cambridge, MA, Barry P. Wilson—Boston, MA, James C. Lohman—New Orleans, LA, for Petitioner.

Robert J. Krauss, Carol Ditmar—Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondents.

ORDER

ROETTGER, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is William H. Kelley (Kelley), and Respondent is Harry Singletary, Secretary of the Department of Corrections for the State of Florida (State). This Court previously entered a partial order on August 31, 2000 denying claims 4, 5, and 6 of the petition. The Court reserved ruling on the first three claims as Kelley had requested to present more evidence in an evidentiary hearing. The Court held an evidentiary hearing in Boston, Massachusetts on April 24-25, 2001 and in Ft. Pierce, Florida on July 9, 2001. Final briefs were filed with the Court and a final argument was held on November 7, 2001 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.

FACTS

Irene Maxcy and John Sweet were lovers, and they planned to kill Irene's husband, Charles von Maxcy, a wealthy citrus grover and rancher from Sebring, Florida. Sweet and Irene talked for months about the murder, after which they planned to live together on Maxcy's large estate. Sweet contacted an acquaintance, William Bennett of Boston, Massachusetts. Arrangements were made, and a price was set: $5000 up front, and $15,000 after the murder.

On October 1, 1966, Sweet went to Daytona, Florida to meet Andrew von Etter. Von Etter was to do the killing, along with a partner. The next day von Etter called Sweet to tell him the partner, "William Kelley", had arrived. On October 3rd Sweet drove von Etter and "Kelley" to the estate. The alleged killers showed Sweet the weapons they would use, knives and a revolver, which they kept in a satchel. Sweet drove back to Sebring. Charles von Maxcy was murdered that day. A couple weeks later, Sweet went to Boston to pay the $15,000 balance due for the murder.

Unfortunately, the murder did not signal the beginning of a blissful life on the estate for Irene Maxcy and John Sweet. Sweet wanted more money, purportedly to pay off the murder balance, and he began to harass and threaten Irene and her five-year-old daughter daily. Terrified, Irene Maxcy went to the authorities. In exchange for immunity, she implicated Sweet in the murder-for-hire scheme. Sweet was arrested in 1967, charged with first degree murder. It became known in the course of the investigation for Sweet's trial that the "triggermen" in the murder were named von Etter and "Kelley". These men were not charged at this time, however, as prosecutors felt they had insufficient evidence against them.

Irene Maxcy was the star witness for the prosecution in Sweet's first trial. Her testimony was erratic and difficult as she denied, even under the protection of immunity, that she wanted to kill her husband. She testified it was entirely Sweet's idea. She claimed to have witnessed many of the phone calls Sweet had made in arranging the murder, and she related many of the details about which Sweet had kept her informed, including the murder itself. She further testified that she gave Sweet more than $35,000 to help pay for the murder, and that Sweet had wanted another $75,000. Sweet, testifying on his own behalf, denied any involvement in the crime. The trial ended in a hung jury. Sweet was tried again in 1968. Again, Irene Maxcy testified against him, and again, Sweet denied any involvement. This time the jury agreed on a guilty verdict.

The Second District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed Sweet's conviction. Sweet v. State, 235 So.2d 40 (Fla.2d D.C.A. 1970). The court of appeal held that the trial court erred in not admitting Irene Maxcy's testimony that she had been having a romantic relationship with the case agent. The case agent denied having this relationship. But these conflicting accounts, in conjunction with the unseemliness of the relationship to begin with, were found to undermine the credibility of both Irene Maxcy and the case agent.¹ As this testimony formed the vital foundation of the case, the court of appeal, one judge dissenting, ordered a reversal. See id. at 42.

Sweet was not tried a third time. By 1971 the State had given up on the case. Five years later, in 1976, most of the physical evidence was destroyed at the behest of the clerk of court, who had been charged with storing the case file and the evidence. The State allowed the destruction of the physical evidence—which included a bullet, a bloody bedsheet, and a shred of the victim's shirt—on the basis that the case "had been disposed of."

By 1981 John Sweet was facing criminal charges in Massachusetts of prostitution, narcotics distribution, arson, bribery, counterfeiting, loan sharking, and hijacking. With authorities closing in on him Sweet went to them first. His plan was to win immunity in exchange for information he had on the murder of Charles von Maxcy. William Kelley was the target, as Sweet implicated him as one of the murderers.² The Massachusetts authorities brought Sweet to Florida where Sweet gave authorities there his confession. The next day Sweet was awarded immunity in Massachusetts.

A Florida grand jury indicted William Kelley on first degree murder charges in December, 1981—some fifteen years after the murder. Kelley was arrested in 1983. His first trial, like Sweet's, ended in a hung jury and a mistrial. Kelley was retried in March of 1984. For both trials the primary evidence against Kelley was Sweet's testimony. Again, Sweet recounted the details of the murder, how it was arranged, and who was involved. Corroborating Sweet's accusations, the State presented evidence that a "Mr. and Mrs. William Kelley" had registered at the Daytona Inn the night before the murder. Also, the jury heard from Abe Namia, a private investigator hired by Sweet's attorney shortly after Sweet's 1967 arrest. Namia testified about statements Sweet had purportedly made which incriminated Kelley. The jury returned a guilty verdict against Kelley in March, 1984.

The jury then reconvened to hear evidence pertaining to Kelley's sentence. After weighing the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors suggested by this evidence, the jury recommended death. In April, the presiding judge followed the recommendation, and formally sentenced Kelley to death. The judge found three statutory aggravating circumstances justifying the sentence: prior conviction of a prior felony, homicide committed for pecuniary gain, and homicide committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. See Fla. Stat. Ch. 921.141. The court indicated one mitigating factor: Kelley was the only one, out of at least five, to receive punishment for Charles von Maxcy's murder.

APPEALS

On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, Kelley argued eight issues, challenging both his conviction and his death sentence. See Kelley v. State of Florida, 486 So.2d 578 (Fla.1986). Kelley claimed the destruction of evidence irreparably prejudiced him, the testimony of the private investigator, Abe Namia, was improperly admitted hearsay, the trial court erred in not answering a jury question during its deliberation, the trial court erred in allowing the jurors to take notes, certain post-arrest statements should not have been admitted, and the trial judge erred giving non-pattern instructions to the jury after the jury reported it was deadlocked. The Supreme Court of Florida rejected each of these claims. It did not consider Kelley's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as this was Kelley's direct appeal, and the court further rejected Kelley's attack on his death sentence as "without merit." Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Kelley's conviction and sentence. See id. at 580-86. Kelley sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court; the Court denied this petition on October 6, 1986. See Kelley v. Florida, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 244, 93 L.Ed.2d 169 (1986).

Kelley filed his post-conviction relief motion to vacate the judgment and sentence pursuant to rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure in the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Florida in November, 1987. After a hearing the court denied the motion in August, 1988; Kelley appealed the denial, again to the Supreme Court of Florida. See Kelley v. State, 569 So.2d 754 (Fla.1990). As his first point of collateral relief, Kelley repeated his argument that the destruction of evidence impaired his due process rights. The court rejected this claim on much the same grounds as it did on direct appeal. The court denied two other claims: the purported improper contact by the prosecution of a witness and an improper closing argument, as procedurally barred. Further, Kelley argued more extensively that there were Brady violations, and averred a detailed list of supposed instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Florida deferred entirely to the trial court's order on all of these claims, and concluded there was neither a Brady violation, nor ineffective assistance of counsel. Kelley's other claims of juror misconduct, and error in the trial judge's decision not to recuse himself from the case, were likewise found unavailing. See id. at 755-62. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the trial court's denial of Kelley's motion to vacate the judgment and sentence on September 6, 1990.

Kelley filed a petition of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Florida in April, 1991. Kelley raised another claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this time directed at his appellate counsel. Kelley further attacked the constitutionality of applying Florida's death...