Kelley v. U.S.

Decision Date03 January 1978
Docket NumberNo. 7,D,7
PartiesHelen D. KELLEY and John E. Kelley, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant, Ruth Semko, Defendant. ocket 76-6159.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Morton Hollander, Washington, D. C. (Rex E. Lee, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., James M. Sullivan, Jr., U. S. Atty., Syracuse, N. Y., William Kanter and Eloise E. Davies, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Donald W. Kramer, Binghamton, N. Y. (Kramer, Wales & McAvoy, Binghamton, N. Y., of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before MANSFIELD and TIMBERS, Circuit Judges and DOOLING, District Judge. *

DOOLING, District Judge:

The United States is, under 28 U.S.C. § 2674, liable for tort claims in the same manner and extent as a private individual under like circumstances. No action may be instituted upon such a tort claim until it has been presented to the interested federal agency and has been finally denied (28 U.S.C. § 2675), and the claim must be presented in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two years after the claim accrues (28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)). Failure to act on the claim for six months may at the claimant's option be treated as a final denial. 28 U.S.C. § 2675.

Where the tortious injury complained of has resulted from a Government employee's operation of a motor vehicle "was acting within the scope of his . . . employment," but suit is commenced not against the Government but against the Government employee and is commenced in a state court, then 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) provides that upon the Attorney General's certifying that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the incident, the case must be removed to the federal district court

". . . and the proceedings deemed a tort action brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto."

Section 2679(d) provides, as to cases removed upon the Attorney General's certificate, that

"Should a United States district court determine on a hearing on a motion to remand held before a trial on the merits that the case so removed is one in which a remedy by suit within the meaning of subsection (b) of this section is not available against the United States, the case shall be remanded to the State court." **

This appeal presents the question whether in such a removed tort action the plaintiffs, who originally sued a federal employee in the state court, must, nevertheless, after the removal, prove that before suing the employee they presented the claim to the Government as a claim against it in compliance with Section 2675(a) within the two years prescribed by Section 2401(b).

On November 8, 1972, plaintiff Helen Kelley was struck by a motor vehicle owned and operated by Francis A. Hunt, an employee of the Department of Agriculture. In May 1973 Mrs. Kelley and her husband sued Hunt and Ruth Semko in Broome County Supreme Court, alleging that the Semko vehicle was so negligently driven that it nearly collided with Hunt's car, and that Hunt's vehicle was driven so negligently that it went out of control and struck plaintiff. The pleading did not mention Hunt's employment. The Travelers Insurance Company, Hunt's insurer, undertook his defense and designated counsel for him. Hunt answered in July 1973; he denied the main allegations of the complaint and cross-claimed against Semko for an apportionment of any damages awarded the plaintiffs, but he did not refer to his federal employment, or plead the defense afforded by Section 2679(b) to federal drivers whose accidents occur when they are acting within the scope of their employment.

Hunt had earlier reported the accident, orally at least, to his circuit supervisor, and on January 19, 1973, a Special Agent of the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Agriculture, David Ricks, interviewed plaintiff Helen Kelley, obtaining from her a statement of the details of the accident, a copy of a report on the surgery performed on Mrs. Kelley, and a copy of the hospital bill, which amounted to $3,773. There is no reason to suppose that Ricks did not identify himself.

Hunt did not, however, when he was sued in May 1973, deliver the process served upon him or an attested true copy to his immediate superior or to whomever his head of department had designated to receive such papers, as 29 U.S.C. § 2679(c) and 28 C.F.R. § 15.1 require, and, in consequence, none of the papers in the lawsuit was sent to the United States Attorney, the Attorney General, or the head of Hunt's employing agency, as Section 2679(c) and Section 15.1 contemplate.

On March 5, 1974, during the taking of Hunt's deposition, his employment was put on the record explicitly, and Hunt testified that he had been working on the day of the accident in Friendsville, Pennsylvania, and was on his way home from that work when the accident happened. Still nothing was done to bring the Government into the case.

In the first days of December 1974, a little over two years after the accident, counsel for Hunt communicated with General Counsel's Office of the Department of Agriculture, and, evidently, sent copies of the pleadings to them and to the United States Attorney. Hunt's counsel took the position, in writing to the United States Attorney, that at the time of the accident Hunt was operating his own car with the permission of the federal government while acting within the scope of his employment; counsel expressed the opinion that Section 2679(b) applied to the Kelley case; he noted that Section 2679(c) requires the Attorney General to defend any civil action brought in any court against a Government employee for personal injury resulting from his operation of a motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his Government employment.

On January 29, 1975, the United States Attorney (for the Attorney General) certified, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), that Hunt was an employee of the United States and had been acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. On February 6, 1975, the Government removed the case to the federal court. On May 1, 1975, plaintiffs filed a claim based on the accident with the Department of Agriculture. On May 27, 1975, the Government moved for an order substituting the United States as defendant in place of Hunt (28 U.S.C. § 2679(b), (d)) and dismissing the action because plaintiffs had failed to file an administrative claim before suing (28 U.S.C. § 2675).

Judge MacMahon (of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation) granted the motion to substitute the United States but denied the motion to dismiss. He held inapplicable N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214, sd. 5, requiring an action for personal injuries to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued, since 28 U.S.C. § 2675 requires an administrative claim to be filed before commencing a tort action against the United States, and 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) bars such an action unless the claim is presented against the United States within two years after the claim accrues and the action is commenced within six months after the mailing of a final denial of the claim. However, noting the statement in the legislative history that the bills which in 1966 amended Sections 2675 and 2401 to impose the administrative filing requirement had "the common purpose of providing for more fair and equitable treatment of private individuals and claimants when they deal with the Government or are involved in litigation with their Government," 1 Judge MacMahon observed that plaintiffs were not at fault, had pursued their suit diligently, and had not been advised that the Government was the proper defendant, and that, on the Government side, since it was Hunt's duty to notify his superior of the suit, and the Government's duty to investigate and promptly certify Hunt's status if he was acting within the scope of his employment, delay could not rightly operate to advantage the Government and prejudice the plaintiffs. The Court concluded that the Government could not lull plaintiffs into a false sense of security by waiting until plaintiffs' time to file an administrative claim had expired and thereupon move to be substituted and to dismiss.

The case exemplifies a sub-class of Federal Tort Claims Act cases, a sub-class which draws to it no reprobation and invites no special rigor of treatment. It is, simply, one of the not uncommon cases in which a driver of a motor vehicle who is a federal employee is sued individually because the plaintiff did not know that defendant was a federal employee, or did not understand that the employee was on federal business at the time of the accident. The instances in this sub-class of cases are characterized by innocent ignorance or ingenuous blunder. There is nothing here to be discouraged or visited with disaster.

The Government argues that the United States may be sued only as it consents to be sued, that it has consented to be sued only if a claim is first presented to the appropriate department (Section 2675), is presented within two years after "such claim accrues," and is sued upon within six months after final denial (Section 2401(b)); unless then, the action shows compliance with the statute, sovereign immunity is not waived and the court is without jurisdiction to proceed. The Government, it is pointed out, is not subject to estoppel based on acts or omissions of its agents. The Government contends finally that a number of cases directly in point have reached a result opposite to that reached by the district court in this case.

No questions of immunity or jurisdiction are genuinely involved. The Congress in setting up the tort claims procedure, now embodied in Chapter 171 of Title 28, waived the sovereign immunity of the United States except for those classes of cases listed in Section 2680. Of the...

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