Kelley v. United States
| Decision Date | 20 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-5537 |
| Parties | CONNIE KELLEY and DONALD KELLEY Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., alleging that defendant's negligent inspection, maintenance, and warnings with respect to a slippery "deck surface/walkway" at Valley Forge National Historical Park ("the Park") caused injury to plaintiff Connie Kelley. Presently before the Court is defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants defendant's Motion to Dismiss and dismisses the action with prejudice.1 The alternative Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as moot.
On November 28, 2010, plaintiffs visited Valley Forge National Historical Park in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14; Pl.'s Opp. Mot. 2.) While at the Park, Ms. Kelleyslipped and a fell on a "man-made walkway[] constructed of vinyl" ("the deck surface/walkway"3 ). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiffs describe the purpose of the deck surface/walkway as "aid[ing] ingress and egress to redoubts and other historical structures." (Id. ¶ 11.) According to the National Park Service's Incident Report, attached to the Amended Complaint,4 the deck surface/walkway leads to an "overlook platform to the Fort Washington's redoubt."5 (Id. Ex. A, at 2). Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Kelley fell because of a "slick, slippery" condition, (id. ¶ 14), and the Incident Report adds that "[t]here were many leaves on the pathway along with moisture," (id. Ex. A, at 4). Plaintiffs aver that "the vinyl walkways [in the Park] require regular maintenance in order to be used and enjoyed safely." (Id. ¶ 13.)
Ms. Kelley's right patella was fractured in the fall, and she alleges that her right leg is permanently scarred and disfigured. (Id. ¶ 17.) She also claims to have suffered nerve damage and "contusions, abrasions, and lacerations over various portions of her body." (Id.) As a result of Ms. Kelley's injuries, Mr. Kelley avers a continuing loss of consortium. (Id. ¶ 27.)
According to plaintiffs, the Park "charges fees for various activities and attractions in the park-area, . . . including . . . a ninety (90) minute guided trolley tour of the entire park; a compact disc driving tour which can be purchased for use in a visitor's car; a 'step on guideservices'; fee based formal education programs; and, fees for various activities in the park itself." (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs state that the park has "undergone 'significant renovations' and rehabilitation within the last three (3) years, including renovation of the train station, lifeguard huts, waysides added to the landscape, and man-made walkways constructed of vinyl." (Id. ¶ 11.)
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, in response to a pleading, a defense of "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" may be raised by motion to dismiss. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a civil plaintiff must allege facts that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff's allegations must show that defendant's liability is more than "a sheer possibility." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In Twombly, the Supreme Court used a "two-pronged approach," which it later formalized in Iqbal. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Under this approach, a district court first identifies those factual allegations that constitute nothing more than "legal conclusions" or "naked assertions." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. Such allegations are "not entitled to the assumption of truth" and must be disregarded. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. The court must then assess "the 'nub' of the plaintiff['s]complaint—the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation[s] . . . to determine" whether it states a plausible claim for relief. Id.
Plaintiffs claim that defendant negligently inspected and maintained the deck surface/walkway and failed to warn of the dangerous conditions that allegedly caused Ms. Kelley's accident. (Am Compl. ¶ 23.) In its motion to dismiss, defendant asserts that Pennsylvania's Recreational Use of Land and Water Act ("RUA") bars liability unless the Park maliciously or willfully failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. (Mot. Dismiss 3.) Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Park's conduct was malicious or willful. Instead, they argue that RUA does not bar liability in this case because even on land covered by RUA, a landowner has a duty to maintain improvements that the landowner builds. (Pl.'s Opp. Mot. 14.) Because RUA applies to both the Park and the deck surface/walkway where Ms. Kelley slipped, the Court grants defendant's motion to dismiss.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States is liable for "tort claims . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Liability is governed by "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); see also Lingua v. United States, 801 F. Supp. 2d 320, 330 (M.D. Pa. 2011). The relevant state law in the instant case is RUA, which limits the liability of landowners who "make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes." 68 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 477-1. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that RUA's purpose is to limitliability in connection with "outdoor recreation on largely unimproved land." Rivera v. Phila. Theological Seminary, 507 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa. 1986) (emphasis added).
Landowners whose land is covered by RUA "owe[] no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes." 68 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 477-3. Such landowners are liable only for "willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity" or "where the[y] charge[] the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof." Id. § 477-6. RUA applies to both private and public landowners, Walsh v. City of Phila., 585 A.2d 445, 450 (Pa. 1991), and "viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites" is one of the recreational purposes enumerated in the statute, 68 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 477-2.
In analyzing whether RUA bars plaintiffs' claims in this case, the Court must determine (1) whether RUA applies to the Park as a whole and (2) whether RUA applies to the deck surface/walkway. The Court concludes that RUA applies to both the Park and the deck surface/walkway.
In Blake v. United States, a court in this District held that RUA applies to the Park as a whole. No. 97-0807, 1998 WL 111802, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. 1998). The court relied on the land's lack of enclosure, relative lack of improvements, expansiveness, and natural state. Id. Lower Pennsylvania courts have considered similar factors in determining whether a parcel of land is the type of large, undeveloped area to which RUA applies. See, e.g., Yanno v. Consol. Rail Corp., 744 A.2d 279, 282-83 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) ().
This Court agrees with the Blake court that the Park "is precisely the kind of land to which RUA tort immunity should be applied." Blake, 1998 WL 111802, at *6. The Blake court explained that the Park is "suitable, in [its] natural condition, for hiking, nature study, and viewing historical and scenic sites, all of which are listed as examples of permissible recreational purposes in section 477-2(3) of the RUA." Id. at *7. The court noted that the park is a large tract of land held open to the public free of charge with the exception, at that time, of a fee for a tour of the Washington's Headquarters building. Id. at *1.
Plaintiffs' attempts to distinguish Blake are unpersuasive. Although plaintiffs allege that the Park now charges fees for additional activities, that does not invalidate the Blake court's reasoning. The Park's primary use remains recreational, and, in any event, commercial use is only one of the factors relevant to RUA's applicability. Plaintiffs do not allege that the Park charges for general admission or for any activities they performed on their November 28, 2010, visit, such that the § 477-6 exception to RUA coverage—which applies to landowners who "charge[] the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof"— might apply. See Blake, 1998 WL 111802, at *8 n.2 (). Finally, renovations and the construction of "lifeguard huts, waysides[,] . . . and man-made walkways"...
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