Kellner v. Budget Car and Truck Rental, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-5314.,02-5314.
• Citation: 359 F.3d 399
• Parties: James KELLNER and Lauri Kellner, individually and as next kin of Michael W. Kellner, deceased; Lauri Kellner, individually and as natural parent and next of kin of Shawn June, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BUDGET CAR AND TRUCK RENTAL, INC., et al.; Comcar Industries, Inc., a/k/a M.D. Transport Systems, Inc., Defendants, Clay Hyder Trucking Lines, Inc.; M.D. Transport Systems, Inc.; John Zaffer, Administrator of the Estate of Christopher N. Zaffer, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

359 F.3d 399

James KELLNER and Lauri Kellner, individually and as next kin of Michael W. Kellner, deceased; Lauri Kellner, individually and as natural parent and next of kin of Shawn June, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BUDGET CAR AND TRUCK RENTAL, INC., et al.; Comcar Industries, Inc., a/k/a M.D. Transport Systems, Inc., Defendants, Clay Hyder Trucking Lines, Inc.; M.D. Transport Systems, Inc.; John Zaffer, Administrator of the Estate of Christopher N. Zaffer, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-5314.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: September 17, 2003.

Decided and Filed: February 26, 2004. Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206.

Argued: Paul T. Gillenwater, GILLENWATER, NICHOL & AMES, Knoxville, Tennessee, H. Forrest Horne, Jr., JONES, MARTIN, PARRIS & TESSENER, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Plaintiffs.

Michael J. King, WOOLF, McCLANE, BRIGHT, ALLEN & CARPENTER, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Defendants.

ON BRIEF: Paul T. Gillenwater, GILLENWATER, NICHOL & AMES, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Plaintiffs.

Michael J. King, Tony R. Dalton, WOOLF, McCLANE, BRIGHT, ALLEN & CARPENTER, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Defendants.

Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; KRUPANSKY and CLAY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge.

James and Lauri Kellner, appearing individually and as next of kin, have appealed the district court's summary dismissal of their negligence suit against three party-defendants — John Zaffer, administrator of the estate of Christopher Zaffer ("Zaffer"), M.D. Transport Systems, Inc. ("MDTS") and Clay Hyder Trucking Lines, Inc. ("CHTL") — arising from a motor vehicle accident on the Tennessee interstate. The Kellners have contended that defendants negligently and proximately caused the accident by leaving a tractor-trailer parked in the emergency "breakdown" lane along the shoulder of the interstate. For the reasons discussed below, this Court affirms the order of summary judgment.

On the morning of October 23, 1999, Christopher Zaffer was driving his tractor-trailer westbound on Interstate 40 in Jefferson County, Tennessee, when his rig began experiencing mechanical problems and became disabled.¹ Zaffer drove the vehicle into the emergency lane of the interstate and there is no dispute between the parties that both Zaffer's tractor and trailer were completely within the "breakdown" lane with no portion of the rig protruding into or overlapping onto the travel lanes of the interstate.²

Zaffer placed the orange-triangle warning devices required by Tennessee statute and federal regulation behind the tractor-trailer to signal to approaching traffic that his rig was disabled. The weather conditions were clear and the roadway was dry. The section of I-40 on which Zaffer's rig became disabled provided three lanes for motorists traveling either east or west. According to record testimony the tractor-trailer could be seen by approaching westbound motorists from a distance of at least 1,000 feet.

Zaffer was under or near the tractor-trailer, shortly before 3:30 p.m., when Diane Rupe was driving westbound on I-40 in a Ford truck with a 24-foot cargo box, rented from Budget Car & Truck Rental, Inc. ("Budget"). Behind the Ford truck, Rupe towed a minivan. In the passenger cab, along with Rupe, were her grandsons Michael Kellner and Shawn June, ages 1 and 10 respectively.

Tragically, the Budget truck driven by Rupe left the far right travel lane of traffic, moved into the emergency lane, and collided with Zaffer's parked tractor-trailer. As a result of the collision, Michael Kellner, Rupe and Zaffer were killed, while Shawn June sustained injuries requiring hospitalization.

On June 6, 2000, plaintiffs-appellants James and Lauri Kellner, the parents of Michael Kellner and Shawn June, filed a negligence complaint in the district court against MDTS and Comcar Industries ("Comcar"). Appellants later amended their complaint to add as defendants: Zaffer's estate, CHTL, Jeannie Denniston — the administrator of the estate of Diane Rupe — and State Farm Insurance Company ("State Farm"), Rupe's uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance carrier. On September 20, 2000, the parties agreed by stipulation to dismiss Comcar from the action.

On November 29, 2001, Zaffer, MDTS and CHTL filed a motion for summary judgment; State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment on December 14, 2001. On February 11, 2002 in a memorandum and order, the district court granted defendants' motions, concluding that, as a matter of law, the defendants' actions were not the proximate cause of the appellants injuries and damages.³ On February 25, 2002, appellants filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.⁴

This Court reviews de novo the order granting summary judgment to appellees Zaffer, MDTS and CHTL. See Virts v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 285 F.3d 508, 516 (6th Cir.2002).

As the forum state, Tennessee precedent provides that a plaintiff bringing a negligence action must prove: "(1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct falling below the applicable standard of care amounting to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal cause." Bennett v. Putnam County, 47 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (quoting McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 774 (Tenn.1991)). See also McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn.1995); Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn.1993). Recovery in a negligence action may occur only if the plaintiff can prove that the defendants' conduct was negligent and was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injury. Tennessee Trailways, Inc. v. Ervin, 222 Tenn. 523, 438 S.W.2d 733, 735 (1969); Lancaster v. Montesi, 216 Tenn. 50, 390 S.W.2d 217, 220 (1965). Tennessee courts have repeatedly stated that negligence is not presumed from the mere fact of an accident or injury. Williams v. Jordan, 208 Tenn. 456, 346 S.W.2d 583, 586 (1961); De Glopper v. Nashville Ry. & Light Co., 123 Tenn. 633, 134 S.W. 609, 611 (1911); Armes v. Hulett, 843 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992).

In the instant case, the district court determined that as a matter of Tennessee law a reasonable jury could conclude that Zaffer had breached his duty by not moving the rig to a safer location in the five hours prior to the accident. However, in granting the motion for summary judgment the court concluded that, as a matter of law, none of the movants — Zaffer, MDTS, or CHTL — provided the proximate cause of the accident.

Based upon the undisputed facts that Zaffer's rig rested completely off the active traffic lanes of the interstate and was plainly visible for a distance of over 1,000 feet, the district court reasoned that "a reasonable jury would have to conclude Rupe could see the rig prior to the accident." Consequently, the court concluded that Rupe's actions in leaving the travel lanes and crashing into Zaffer's rig were the proximate cause of plaintiffs' losses. In so deciding, the court relied upon Carney v. Goodman, 38 Tenn.App. 55, 270 S.W.2d 572, 576 (1954), which concluded that "the negligence of one in obstructing the highway by a standing vehicle was superseded by another's negligence in running into such vehicle, and that the latter's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident." See also Dunnivant v. Nafe, 206 Tenn. 458, 334 S.W.2d 717, 719 (1960). Thus, in the instant case, while the district court concluded that a reasonable jury could find Zaffer negligent in not removing his rig from the shoulder of the interstate before the accident occurred, the court nevertheless held that plaintiff Rupe had provided the proximate cause pursuant to the standard determined in Carney: "Did the driver running into the standing vehicle see it in time to enable him, by use of due care, to avoid the collision? If he did not, his negligence is merely a contributory cause; if he did, his negligence is the proximate cause." Carney v. Goodman, 270 S.W.2d at 576.

Further, the district court stated that through Carney "Tennessee [has] adopted a special rule about proximate causation in standing vehicle cases such as the present one." While the general rule in Tennessee that the foreseeability of an intervening, superseding act presents a jury question, the Carney court adopted a special rule in standing vehicle cases, which the district court applied in the present case, noting that "[u]nder this rule it is unforeseeable as a matter of law someone would drive into a plainly visible standing vehicle." The Carney opinion noted that "[t]he operator of a vehicle that crashes into a vehicle negligently left standing in an unsuitable stopping place provides the proximate cause of any resulting injuries if she could see the standing vehicle in time to avoid a collision." Id.

On appeal, the plaintiffs aver that summary judgment is inappropriate in the instant case where facts regarding the foreseeability requirement of proximate causation are in dispute. Specifically, the appellants maintain that Zaffer's negligence was the proximate cause of the tragic accident because, by parking his disabled vehicle on the shoulder of the interstate and not moving it during the five hours preceding the accident, Zaffer could foresee through the exercise of reasonable diligence that injury or loss could or would occur. However, appellants' reliance upon such a broad definition of foreseeability fails to comport with Tennessee negligence law and, consequently, fails to prove that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to appellees.

Pursuant to Tennessee negligence law, once it is determined that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal obligation to conform to a reasonable person standard of conduct, i.e., a duty — the question becomes whether defendant failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, i.e., whether defendant breached the duty. In a negligence action, the standard of conduct is always the same. It is a...